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This thesis takes up the normative question of representation and argues that for representation 
to be effective legislators must act in the interest of their constituents. It approaches the question 
of representation by presupposing that substantive acts of representatives done on behalf of 
constituents is important in assessing whether representation is taking place or not. It 
challenges the concept of representation that focuses only on the conferment of office through 
elections and demands that representative acts which considers and includes citizen 
participation be used to judge representation. It demonstrates this by analysing the 
Constituency Development Fund (CDF) which was introduced by a government policy 
designed to promote and support the activities of representatives and offers insights into the 
reasons for lack of effective representation in Nigeria. The empirical findings in the research 
reveals that the lack of understanding of what it means to represent, on the part of both the 
representatives and the constituents, coupled with institutional features that do not foster 
accountability, affect effective representation in Nigeria. Other factors working against 
effective representation are the issue of non-participation of the constituents in matters that 
affect them directly and distant connections that exists between the representatives and the 
constituents.   
 
Apart from having in place institutional features that would enhance the relationship between 
the representatives and the constituents, institutions through which the representatives’ act 
needs to be strengthened by enacted laws that would make it binding on representatives to act 
in acceptable manner. Rules of ethics and responsibility can also define acceptable behaviour 
for representatives in the course of their acting on behalf of constituents. This can overcome 
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OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
A. Introduction 
 
In determining the role of the legislature, representation has become a vital and indispensable 
element in any democratic political system.1 This relates to how citizens in a defined 
constituency choose from a range of candidates who are also from that constituency and elect 
them to the legislative arm of government to represent their interests. In the performance of 
this function, the legislators connect the people to the government in special ways.2 They are 
expected to act in a way that meets the expectations of the voters. What they do and how they 
do it has assumed a significance that political scientists can no longer ignore. It is now 
considered by political theorists as a factor in determining the democratic nature of the 
legislative arm of government in particular and the society as a whole.3 
 
Traditionally, the representative function of legislators depends largely on what they make of 
it and what the constituents expect. There is no formal or definitive job description for 
legislators.4 The institutions that create the idea of political representation tend to leave the 
judgement of what constitutes representation to the representatives themselves.5  As a result of 
this, we see continuously cases where the representatives fail to achieve the ideal. Situations 
often arise where the conduct of political representatives fails to meet any plausible account of 
representation, yet they are said to represent.6 This raises the question as to whether these 
elected representatives work in the interests of constituents or for their own personal interests.7 
 
Concerns like this have given rise to a series of studies about the legislature, analysing its role 
from various perspectives.8 An important aspect of this is the empirical examination of the acts 
of members of the legislature and the relationship with their constituents.9 Miller and Stokes in 
their analysis of constituency influence in the American congress define representation as 
                                                          
1 Philip Norton, Parliaments and Citizens in Western Europe, (Vol 3, Frank Cass London Portland OR 2002) 3. 
2 G. Loewenberg and S.C. Patterson, Comparing Legislatures, Toronto (Little Brown and Co 1979) 167. 
3 Suzanne Dovi, The Good Representative, Wiley-Blackwell (2012) 4-6. 
4 Norton (n 1) 20. 
5 Scot Brenton, ‘Representative Role and Responsibilities’, Parliament of Australia (2015) 1 www.aph.gov.au) Accessed 
11th August 2015. 
6 Dovi (n 3) ix. 
7 Ibid 131. 
8 Norton (n 1). 
9 Malcolm Jewel, ‘Legislator-Constituency Relation and the Representative Process’ Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol 2 No 
3 (1983) 303-33; Jane Mansbridge, ‘Rethinking Representation’, the American Political Science Review, (Nov.,2003); 
Michael Saward, ‘The Representative Claim’, Contemporary Political Theory (2006); Andrew Rehfeld, ‘Towards a General 
Theory of Political Representation, The Journal of Politics, Vol 68, No 1 (Feb. 2006) 1-21. 
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‘responsiveness’.10 Following this definition, Pitkin defines representation to be how 
representatives ‘act in the interests of the represented in a manner responsive to them’.11 Further 
studies have taken this acting for others in a broader sense to include ‘allocation 
responsiveness’12 (this is the advantage and benefits in terms of development projects that 
representatives are able to obtain for those they represent). This broad view of representation 
encourages focus on the activity of the representatives and throws more light on the individual 
legislator’s style of representation. It also explores the obligation that the legislator has towards 
constituents.  
 
In line with the above view of representation, this thesis will attempt to examine how legislators 
actually ‘represent’. The approach is to investigate the actions of the legislators to see if and in 
what ways they take the constituents’ interests into consideration and if they are responsive to 
their preferences in the course of representing them. This is done by juxtaposing normative 
models of political representation with empirical evidence, i.e. the reality of citizen 
participation and interest consideration. Also, I examine the Constituency Development Fund 
(CDF), which is a government policy dedicated to allocating development projects to 
constituencies. Although this approach may be applied to other similar policy areas, this 
research focuses on this specific policy area. The aim is to suggest better models of 
representative processes that will provide a deeper understanding of the forces that drive 
constituency interests in Nigeria. 
 
Generally, political literature analyses the concept of representation making it subject to 
various interpretations. These interpretations are often based on formal mechanisms that are 
more interested in voting systems.13 Although, they agree that democratic institutions must be 
representative for democracy to work,14 they often fail to offer guidance on how representative 
actions are structured to improve representation. Political actions not only demand adequate 
assessment of the context of actions: it will often, though not necessarily always aim at the 
realisation of a certain ideal. Hence, the focus of this research will be on the substantive actions 
of representatives. Bearing in mind that in politics, policy decisions and implementations are 
                                                          
10 Warren Miller, Donald Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, The American Political Science Review Vol 57, Issue 
1, (March 1963) 45-56, www.jstor.org. Accessed 17 June 2016. 
11 Hannah Pitkin, ‘The Concept of Representation’ University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles California 
(1967) 205. 
12 Heinz Eulau & Paul Karps, ‘The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness’, Legislative 
Studies Quarterly Vol 2, No 3 (Aug. 1977) 242-245 www.jstor.orgaccessed 2nd Oct 2015. 
13 Stephen Coleman, Direct Representation: Towards a Conversational Democracy, ippr exchange (2005) 1. 
14 Dovi (n 3) 1. 
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usually not the outcome of an abstract entity acting alone, but of a collective decision-making 
process performed by individuals who are expected to act in line with the interests of those 
they represent. It is assumed that representation occurs when a representative’s action reflects 
and responds to constituents’ expressed preferences.15 
 
Thus, by merely defining conditions whereby someone becomes a representative and those 
conditions that make them legitimate, we are unable to explain whether the act of representation 
is taking place. The question about what qualifies an act to be representing or not representing 
is important if we must have an understanding of the concept and make representatives act in 
line with it. This will enable us to look closely at how representative acts are made, received 
and judged.16 Therefore, by focusing on the substantive acts of legislators, their individual 
efforts and the skills they have brought to the job can be seen and how they perform their 
constituency role taking the preferences of their constituents into consideration becomes clear 
and measurable.    
 
The reason this approach is taken is that, generally there is an impression of remoteness of 
elected representatives to the real issues that plague those they claim to represent.17 This 
behaviour resonates with political theorists like Seward who feels the need to question the 
received ideas of political representation, as merely elections alone and as such conferring 
representativeness or implying representation.18 Another reason for this renewed attempt is the 
rise in deliberative trend in democratic theory in recent years which places emphasis on who, 
where and how deliberation is taking place.19 This normative controversy about representation, 
which rejects the concept as a zero sum game where one is elected and as such becomes a 
representative, raises the awareness that leads us to revisit the acts of members of parliament. 
This will enable us to see the modes and styles of representation and make sense of its 
remoteness or inadequacy. 
 
Subsequently, the thesis offers a definition of representation, which stresses the creative aspects 
of representation as well as the institution that underlines it. It is an important way for the act 
of representation to be conceived as political inclusion of the represented. Since it is not easy 
                                                          
15 Dovi (n 3)1. 
16 Saward Michael, ‘The Representative Claim’, Contemporary Political theory 5(3), (2006) 298. 
17 Ibid 299. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Nadia Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation, Political Theory Vol 28 No 6 (2000) 
758-786 www.jstor.org  accessed 2nd March 2016. 
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to measure legislators’ efforts, the thesis will attempt an assessment of their ‘actions’ to 
determine whether or not they represent their constituents. The goods they bring to their 
constituents will be used as a measure of how they represent them. This will be directly 
attributed to the benefit that flows from them to their constituencies and how such benefit 
reflects the preference of their constituents. This is necessary to tell us whether representation 
is taking place. 
 
Before moving on, there is need to explain that this thesis is set against a different background 
in the content and form of representation than the one found in western liberal democracies 
such as the UK or the US. Its focus is on Nigeria, where the legislators have, as part of their 
oversight legislative function, an additional function of deciding and allocating infrastructural 
projects and services to their constituency districts using a fund known as the Constituency 
Development Fund (CDF). This is a specific type of public spending programme that has been 
adopted by developing countries including Nigeria. The CDF as a policy tool dedicates public 
money to benefit specific political subdivisions through the allocation or spending decisions 
influenced by legislators in the Parliament.20 It allocates budgetary resources on services and 
infrastructure in constituencies as part of a wider local decentralisation and development 
policy.21 The need to ensure equitable and even distribution of development projects which 
will bridge the gap of the infrastructural deficit and make government presence felt especially 
in the rural areas forms the crux of this initiative. The legislators whether as full implementers 
or coordinators of this programme are meant to carry out this function in the ordinary course 
of their representative role to their constituents and in performing this role, there are important 
linkages between the legislators and the constituents. These linkages are meant to bring the 
legislator’s actions closer to their constituents’ preferences22 and this to a large extent depends 
on representation. 
 
One important factor to note in the performance of this function by the legislators in Nigeria is 
that, although generally the CDF tends to have certain guidelines which amongst other things 
include the participation of the local population in the choice of infrastructure to be delivered 
in their constituency, legislators are not compelled by any law to follow these guidelines. The 
                                                          
20 Mark Baskin, Parliamentary Function: A Core Function, Centre for International Development, Rockefeller College 
University at Albany, State University of New York, (April 2013) www.suny.edu. accessed 14th April 2016. 
21 Social Accountability and You, www.sayzambia.org accessed March 2016. 
22 Jane Mansbridge Adams Representation Revisited: Introduction to the case against accountability, Democracy and Society 
Vol 2, (2004)155. 
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operation and implementation of this policy initiative tend to be done at the discretion of the 
individual legislator. This control of the CDF is based on the premise that: they want to ensure 
project delivery in the face of ineffective development in the constituency districts by 
bypassing central bureaucracies and responding directly to concrete demands from their 
constituents.23 Hence, the function is mainly considered as a constituency work. In choosing 
the CDF as a case study, this thesis examines how representatives engage in constituency work 
and tries to see to what extent they perform the role of representing constituents by taking their 
preferences into consideration.   
 
As noted above, the CDF is not peculiar to Nigeria alone; it is found in other countries and 
likened to the “pork-barrel” or “earmarks” in the United States.24 The practice was first adopted 
in India but gained prominence when Kenya established a CDF in 2003. Due to its success in 
Kenya, the practice has spread to other African countries.25 Presently, about 23 other countries 
in Africa operate the CDF26 mostly by the same mechanism and name. However, the degree to 
which these funds are controlled by legislators and the extent to which local citizens participate 
in them vary from one country to the other.27 
 
B. Scope and Justification of The Study 
 
The main aim of this thesis is: 
i. To explore representation as an activity through a better understanding of the 
meaning of representation and how the acts of representation should be performed.  
ii. To apply the technique, theories and concept of representation as an activity to the 
empirical case of the implementation of the Constituency Development Fund. 
iii. To use this concept of representation as an activity to evaluate the form, content and 
purpose of representation in Nigerian politics and the institutional framework that 
guides it.  
 
                                                          
23 Gerald Mabveka, Constituency Development Fund: The Case of Public Procurement Fund Adherence in Malawi (2017) 3. 
24 Both terms are used interchangeably in the US. It is a process where legislators obtain funding from a central government 
to finance projects that benefit the legislator’s local constituents. 
25 Constituency Development Fund: Scoping Paper, International Budget Partnership, Open Budgets. Transform Lives, Jan 
(2010) 5. 
26 Micah Challenge, Constituency Development Fund Transparency in Grassroots development or Political Patronage, 
www.tilztearfund.org. 
27 A van Zyl, What is wrong with the Constituency development Fund? International Budget Partnership Open Budget 
Transforms Lives (2009) www.internationalbudget.org. 
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Throughout the thesis, key ideas of representation as an activity is developed. It is also 
suggested that engaging citizen participation is an effective way of representing their interests. 
Examination of the concept of representation is taken from the perspective of the individual 
legislator by inquiring into their representational performances as against the institution itself. 
In order to give a better explanation of the responsive specialisation of legislators and get the 
essence of political representation in Nigeria, the research will be confined to democratically 
elected representatives in the National and State Assemblies. 
 
The thesis examines the legal and institutional framework underlining representation in Nigeria 
with a view to ascertaining the extent to which the failures of representation is founded on 
them. One important element in the examination of the institutional framework is the design of 
the institution itself - features and characteristics that are inherent in the system – are examined 
to see whether they facilitate or hinder representation. Also, the power of the regulatory 
authority to make implementers of programmes comply with their policy thrust is important. 
The extant laws which back the CDF are examined to determine whether they support effective 
citizen participation and accountability that would foster proper representation of constituents. 
 
In trying to explore the obligation representatives have towards constituents, this thesis 
examines the adherence of the representatives to the principles of law and ethics in the course 
of acting on behalf of citizens. These principles are upheld by democratic institutions and 
advocated so that those who act through them will act according to their rules. It is argued that 
adherence to these principles enables representatives to be more focused on constituency needs 
and interests. For this reason, the strengthening of democratic institutions as a guiding criterion 
for optimal government intervention is an important element in this thesis. If the 
implementation of government policies like the CDF is to be on point, then the institution needs 
to be structured to affect the outcome of the policy process to provide better workable models 
of representation. The representatives need to uphold the legitimacy of the institution and this 
can be done by their acts of representation.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis critically examines the relationship between the representatives and 
their constituents, as this is a pre-condition for understanding how representatives are able to 
represent constituents’ interests. The ability of the legislators to engage effectively with 
constituents and act according to their preference is examined. This ability has implications on 
how the representatives represent their constituents and tells us whether or not they represent 
17 
 
well. Of course, to make a reasonable assessment of the representatives’ ability to represent 
well, there is need to determine whether there are guidelines. It is realised that without 
institutions giving proper guidance representation is empty. This guidance helps in the insertion 
of culturally ingrained standards as conduct which can be used as criteria for the measurement 
of an individual legislator’s action to determine how they are capable of looking after the 
interests of others in a responsive manner. By studying the effects of these factors, to determine 
whether the lack of representation is based on them, this study aims to offer new insights to a 
clearer understanding of political representation both at the local community level and the 
national level in Nigeria.   
 
The theoretical background of the research relies on Pitkin’s definition of representation as an 
activity, which presupposes that citizens elect members of the legislature for the purpose of 
defending and pursuing their (citizens’) interest.28 Under this view, representatives are meant 
to act in a manner which ensures that there isn’t a conflict between them and their constituents.  
They must try not to be at odds with the wishes of constituents and they ought to consult the 
people to get their wishes and opinions, which are the interests they are able to define in matters 
that affect them.29 I draw out two key ideas from Pitkin’s definition, of representation which 
suggests that representation should be in the ‘interest’ of the represented and in a manner 
‘responsive’ to them. These key ideas provide a basic conceptualisation of how representative 
acts should be performed. The inclusion of these two concepts make the activity of 
representation to be executed in a particular way. Representatives are also self-aware of the 
cause and effect of their action and this in effect marks it out as representing well or not. Put 
in a more explicit form, representation ought to be in line with the interests of constituents and 
by being responsive the acts of the representative must be in line with the preferences of the 
constituents – which may not necessarily be those of the representative. Consequently, this 
means that, selection of choices ought to be made after proper evaluation of constituents’ 
preferences and the collective impact of the policy by aggregating the effects on the 
constituent’s welfare and not based on the notion of what is good for the society on the grounds 
of the moral reflection of the individual legislator.30 For this to be in place, an increase in 
popular deliberation and proper linkage, which is literally contact between the legislators and 
their constituents, is a requirement for political representation. 
                                                          
28 Pitkin (n 11) 209. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Pitkin (n 11) 209. 
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In taking this view, I conceive representation to be an accountable aggregation of interests.31 
Citizens are able to see the acts of representatives and evaluate them on these acts and 
representatives become accountable to them. Representatives are held accountable so that they 
can be responsive to the interests of constituents and that obligation is implicit in their position 
as legislators. If representatives know that they will be held to account for what they do, they 
are most likely to act responsibly towards those who would hold them accountable. Hence, the 
need for democratic societies to select systems of representation that favours direct 
participation and continuous communication between the representative and the represented. 
This is what will give a better account and an understanding of how the role of democratic 
representation can be realised. 
 
B.1 Why the Constituency Development Fund? 
 
The CDF offers a suitable case study of how legislators in Nigeria are able to represent 
constituents by their individual acts. It is small in scope and the location of action is in their 
constituency districts. It involves direct interaction between representatives and constituents 
and the allocation of projects that are of benefit to the community lies at the heart of the 
initiative. It therefore, lends itself to an evaluation of how local interests are taken into 
consideration in representative actions and the impact of such actions on constituents can be 
seen. The fact that it captures the substantive actions of the legislators in Nigeria suggests that 
it can tell us the extent to which they use this policy initiative to represent the needs of 
constituents. 
 
Generally, the potential for legislators to act independently is relatively limited as a result of 
certain influences like party and other ties in the political system. For this reason, there are few 
observable policy avenues in which they do anything other than toe the party line.32 However, 
with the CDF, legislators have substantial control over the distribution and application of the 
funds and this makes it a critical driver for legislator-constituency linkage. This means that, the 
CDF is an opportunity for legislators in Nigeria to show active constituency focused behaviour. 
 
                                                          
31 By this, I mean democratic standards that can be used to distinguish the actions of representatives and hold them to 
account. 
32 Soroka, Stuart N, Opinion Representation and Policy Feedback Canada in Comparative Perspective, Canadian Journal of 
Political Science, (2004) 563. 
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Despite this incentive, critics have raised doubts about the use of this policy to meet 
constituency needs.33 They have argued that legislators in their performance of this function 
have undermined the interests of constituents to choose projects that would meet their 
developmental needs. This has led to duplications and citing of projects that are not far-
reaching enough to meet the needs of the constituents, thereby going contrary to the purpose 
for which the CDF is established.34 The weakness in the implementation of this policy may be 
because there are discrepancies between the constituency preferences and the actions of the 
legislators. This brings to question the ability of the legislators to represent.  
 
Another reason why the legislator may not have fared considerably well in the implementation 
of this programme could be because, among other things, there seem to be a lack of 
understanding about what it means to represent. This argument is based on the assumption that 
there is an improper perception of the role orientation of legislators and the articulation of 
interest and preferences of constituents. This could be as a result of status difference between 
the representatives and the constituent.35 This conclusion is reached because a general 
observation of the relationship between representatives and constituents finds that, the 
representatives seem to be the ones giving direction rather than the constituents.36 This paradox 
raises a tension that needs to be dealt with before progress can be made as to what a 
representative character should be. 
  
Overall, the effectiveness of representation is what is considered. Rehfeld argues that 
representation is always in service to some purpose or function, it is not just ‘had’ merely to 
stand for another, it must perform a specific function,37 which is to act for citizens. If the goal 
for which it is had is not achieved through the actions of representatives, then such an act is 
intrinsically inauthentic. With the CDF, legislators among other things that they do are meant 
to bring in development projects and services that would address the needs of their 
constituencies. How well they do this determines the extent of their representation. The 
specification of function is used to generate substantive evaluative criteria with which to judge 
their representative acts and to evaluate how they are able to negotiate the future success or 
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demise of representation based on the decisions that they make. So, evaluating a particular 
action to determine whether it counts as representation is important.  
 
C. Significance of the Research 
 
The significance of this research rests on its originality in the sense that there is limited research 
in the area of representation as an activity in Nigeria. As a result of this, very little is known 
about the scope of representative acts and this research covers this gap. The research also has 
significance in both the academic and the political world. It contributes to the literature on 
political representation in Nigeria when looked at from the substantive sense and through the 
actions of the representatives. It suggests better models of representative processes that will 
provide deeper understanding of the forces that drive constituency interests. By focusing on 
the allocation of developmental projects, such as the CDF, which aims to bridge the gap in 
infrastructural development in local communities, it brings to the fore the challenges of 
political representation in an area which has not benefited from much research. 
 
The fact that this research is centred on a policy issue that is already a subject of public debate 
will help to guide the policy direction of the CDF in the future. It will enable an evaluation of 
the CDF policy as it is implemented in Nigeria with the aim of revamping it to make it more 
effective and efficient in meeting the expectation of policy makers. Also, the importance of 
this is seen from its implication on how the CDF can be used as a veritable instrument to bring 
about development in local communities. This can be achieved by emphasising accountability 
and the inclusion of the people in matters that have direct and lasting effect on them.  
 
Apart from giving an insight about the citizens and how they perceive the legislative arm of 
government, the study shows how legislators are linked with their constituents. In another 
sense, it also contributes to a way of promoting representative democracy in Nigeria by 
analysing the factors that affect representation and making suggestions that guide policy 
makers in the proper act of representation which can be achieved through the representative 
behaviour of the legislators. The study adds to the literature on how representative acts can be 
evaluated and their impact measured in order to determine effectiveness because it looks at 
tangible acts of the representatives. It provides models that offer better understanding of 
political representation (that brings about a sense of inclusion of the people to their 
government) in Nigeria. 
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D. Hypothesis and Methodology 
 
D.1  Hypothesis  
 
The hypothesis of this research is that: for representation to be effective, legislators have to 
represent in a manner responsive to the interests of constituents. This hypothesis leads to a sub 
hypothesis which is: the lack of understanding of what it means to represent could account for 
why legislators fail to represent. I define representation as an activity and this will bring to light 
the obligation of representatives and how they can be held accountable to ensure better 
representation of constituents. 
 
Pitkin’s theory of representation is used to test this hypothesis and to analyse representative 
acts. The legislators’ perception of their constituents, how the constituents exert their 
preferences and how their demands are articulated and transmitted, including how those 
demands are received and acted upon will be examined to determine the desire of legislators to 
represent. This information will be gathered during the survey stage of this research. In the 
context of determining how the concept of representation is understood, the question as to 
whether the prevailing legislator-constituency relations allows citizen participation and require 
legislators to be more focused, transparent and accountable will be examined. This has bearing 
on the linkages between legislators and their constituents. It considers those hindrances that 
undermine the responsiveness of legislators to the preferences of their constituents under the 
CDF. It analyses how participation of citizens affects the implementation of the CDF and how 
the challenges of articulating constituency interests and social accountability can be met. The 
remaining part of the thesis looks at the legal and institutional framework and how law and 
ethics can be used to evaluate the responsibility of the representative and as a tool for effective 
representation.  
 
The thesis is ordered following this thematic arrangement and the sub-national setting is aimed 
at capturing the localised effect of legislators’ actions on representation offering an insight into 
this aspect of their function unlike what they do in the Parliament. This approach is preferred 
as against a cross sectional analysis that may present different inherent characteristics in 






D.2  Methodology 
 
The study will follow a mixed method approach which will consist of desktop research and an 
empirical research using semi structured interviews. The desktop research will be used to 
analyse secondary materials such as the historical, legal and political literature on 
representation. It will collect existing information on the research topic in order to ascertain 
the form, purpose and structure of representation generally and particularly in the Nigerian 
context. Documents and materials in which facts about the CDF have been recorded such as 
press releases, published government records and directives will be used.  Items published in 
the media and websites that are in the public domain and freely accessible will also be used. 
Data will be collected on the kind of constituency projects implemented by legislators from 
2010 to 2017. Evidence from the National Bureau of Statistics Nigeria (NBSN), the Ministry 
of Finance and Budget in Nigeria and other statistical bulletins will be relied upon to get a 
clearer statistic of budgetary allocation that has been made with regards to the CDF to measure 
the extent to which the policy intentions are being met.  With regards to these secondary 
materials, I acknowledge the fact that, due to the sensitivity of the case study, some documents 
may be classified and as such unavailable to the public. However, where such a document is 
used, I will ensure that its contents are not used in an unauthorised manner. 
 
The qualitative field work will consist of semi structured interviews with a sample of 
representatives and constituents to provide an insight into the typical circumstances of the 
relationship that exists between them. This will establish whether there is a link between both 
parties and show how legislators are able to respond to constituents’ preferences. The fact that 
there has been no study in Nigeria that has been able to get the views of both the representatives 
and the constituents on the same issue to see how the actions of one affect the other makes the 
timing of this research appropriate. This research will throw more light on the perception of 
both groups in the performance of this activity and this may be applied to other policy areas. 
 
The interviews will be conducted with the aim of obtaining the perception of the interviewees 
from a sample of both groups on the common topic of allocation of projects under the CDF. 
The focus will be on the dynamics in the selection and implementation process and how these 
projects meet the needs of the community. The first group will be accessed from a 
representative sample of legislators which will consist of 10 legislators each picked randomly 
from two state Houses of Assembly chosen out of the pool of 36 states in Nigeria. This 
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constitutes about a third of the representatives in both houses that are made up of 32 members 
each. The two states are Lagos State and Rivers State and they are chosen because of their 
involvement in the CDF right from its inception. Lagos State in the south-western part of 
Nigeria was the first to enact the CDF law in Nigeria and has set up committees and 
administrative agencies in charge of the implementation of CDF. Rivers State has been 
implementing the CDF policy since 2010 though without any legal framework other than a 
directive from the Federal Government. 
 
Interviews from this sample will provide qualitative information on the perception of 
legislators of what their representative role is and how they have been able to link with their 
constituents. The interviews will examine methods used in engaging with constituents and 
decide which infrastructural projects or services to be allocated in a constituency district. This 
linkage determines greatly how representation is to be achieved and also gives an insight into 
whether specific representation which is prevalent in Nigeria, serves to enhance or hinder the 
representation of a general kind. This will also show how it impacts on the social justice and 
accountability. This knowledge will give an opinion about representation and to see what 
implications flow from the relationship with constituents.    
 
The second category of interviewees are the constituents. I conducted 20 interviews with this 
group and they were split into half between the rural dwellers (those that reside in the rural 
communities) and the urban dwellers (those that reside in urban communities). Participants in 
this sample were selected randomly but were judged based on interest to the researcher. I used 
a technique of purposive sampling known as the critical case sampling to get residents from 
the communities where it has been identified that the CDF projects are allocated. Since this is 
an exploratory research with limited resources, dealing with a single case, this approach can be 
decisive in giving the constituents’ view as to how the CDF is used to represent them as the 
CDF operates in exactly the same way in other constituencies. It should be born in mind that, 
this research does not seek representativeness in order to achieve statistical generalisation, but 
instead it aims to explain representation by the use of empirical data. The focus therefore needs 
to be on participants’ experience by exploring the subject area through the eyes of the 
participants which enables us to make logical generalisation. In addition, this sampling 
procedure is in line with studies using grand theory methodology. Since the goal is not a case 
analysis of a particular constituency, the sample to be used does not need to be large. Most of 
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the findings made are based not on a single constituency district, but on all the other districts 
in the sample. 
 
The participants cover a wide range of occupation both skilled and unskilled. Some ‘traditional 
heads’ (referred to as chiefs) are included in this sample because they are often the first port of 
call when the representatives visit the constituency districts. The interview cut across gender 
but there is an age restriction of 18 years and above. The reason for this age classification is 
because these are the groups of people that are likely to engage with the legislators. Interviews 
with this group offer an insight to the extent of their participation in the allocation of projects 
and how interest demands are articulated and transmitted to the representatives in order for 
them to respond adequately to it.     
 
To identify how representatives represent, findings from the empirical analysis compare 
representative acts and matched this with citizens’ preferences to see the extent to which they 
agree. How close they agree will depend on the relation or interaction between both parties. 
The investigation will examine how the former engages with the latter taking into consideration 
the socio-economic and socio-cultural situations prevailing in the society and finding a middle 
course which can be taken in advancing our understanding of the political behaviour of both 
parties.  
 
In the course of the interview, participants were asked to describe their perception of 
representation using the CDF and the interview was conducted along the following themes:  
i. Their perception, experience and views of representation.  
ii. Their connection to representatives (whether the legislators and constituents were 
in touch with each other). 
iii. Their experience and views of the CDF (whether they consider it to be an effective 
policy). 
iv. The obstacles and barriers they perceive that hinder the implementation of the CDF. 
v. Ideas and suggestions that they think can improve the implementation of the CDF 
and representation generally. 
 
Participants were contacted informally or by email and digital recording was used for the 
interviews which lasted about 45 to 60 minutes. The aim of the study was explained to them 
and they were assured about anonymity and confidentiality. A major limitation that was faced 
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in this research was that, generally people in Nigeria are not used to academic research of this 
kind so they were a bit sceptical in giving information. The sensitive nature of the research also 
contributes to this scepticism. However, as a parliamentary staff I was able to use my office to 
gain access to the right people who participated in the research. Other challenges faced while 
conducting the interviews were monetary and time constraint, this made it impossible to obtain 
a large sample. 
 
Finally, the research has been guided by the ethical principles on research with human 
participants set out by the University of London and in line with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
All participants were duly informed about the purpose of the research and their consent 
obtained. Also, I have ensured that all personal data is kept safe and secure and used only for 
the purpose of this research and on completion of the research, all data will be destroyed.   
 
E. Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis consists of an introduction and seven chapters. Chapter 1 examines the concept of 
representation in historical terms. It explores accounts of representation from ancient and 
medieval times and how these have fashioned modern thoughts on representation. The chapter 
examines a brief origin of representation and the development of representation in Nigeria. The 
thesis explores models of representation examining the delegate and trustee divide which 
explains representative behaviour to see how they conform to the wishes of the people. The 
responsible party model is also examined to see the extent to which the representative processes 
in Nigeria conforms to it. The chapter offers a framework of interest articulation and 
responsiveness as key components which demonstrate how representative acts should be 
performed. It shows how this is important in enabling an understanding of representation as an 
activity in which the interest of the represented is constituted. In this regard, some of the 
problems associated with ascertaining constituents’ interests are discussed and highlights given 
on the acts of a willing representative. 
 
One of the claims of this thesis is that, the lack of understanding of what it means to represent 
accounts for why there are failures to actually represent. In Chapter 2, in an attempt to create 
an understanding of representation, I explore the four different ways that the concept of 
representation may be used as elaborated by Pitkin. Rather than drawing a distinction between 
them, I point out their important interconnections. Although this model draws mainly from 
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substantive representation because this is where representative acts can be evaluated, the 
synthesis of these four makes us look at representation from the point when the person is 
authorised to how the activity of representation is performed. This approach captures the 
multiple particularities of political representation. It also offers a way to avoid viewing 
representation as just the formal authorisation of the representative in electoral terms, which 
results in a failure to question their actions and look at what sort of relationship exist between 
the representatives and the represented.  The argument in this Chapter focuses on the need for 
representatives to understand what it means to represent in a democratic society.  This is the 
framework upon which the research is anchored and it will set the pace for the research. 
 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the rule of law and ethical principles examining how these 
relate with representation. The Chapter develops a framework of how the idea of right and 
wrong makes representatives more focused on constituents’ interests. It argues that their 
adherence to the rule of law and democratic principles influences their actions and determines 
how they act in an acceptable manner for the interests of constituents. Such actions must be 
guided by those rules and values that are upheld by the society. The institutions play a huge 
role in advocating democratic values that would guide the attitude and behaviour of not just 
the citizens but also the implementers of policy. There is no doubt that the choice of rules and 
the obligations imposed determines how behaviours will be directed towards the desired goals 
and how the rules will be enforced.38 This chapter also addresses the question as to how 
institutions can include obligations that would set out the context within which representatives 
in the implementation of policy are expected to fulfil their mandate. It explores the extent to 
which the actions of representatives are based on norms and values that underlie the democratic 
institutions from which representatives operate.  
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the case study, the Constituency Development Fund and its 
implementation. It examines the extent to which legislators are able to represent constituents 
in the performance of this activity. In the implementation of this policy, the understanding of 
function matters and so analysis of the main function is examined. Public expectations of 
legislators and the existing relationship and its effects on the implementation of the CDF are 
also examined to determine the level of transparency and openness as these are enhancers of 
representation. Other areas that the representative seems to be responsive to constituents are 
                                                          




examined to determine whether it poses a negative incentive to the legislators to be responsive 
to constituents’ preferences in the implementation of the CDF. Finally, the justification of the 
CDF as an engine for representation is offered and in doing so the thesis argues that certain 
standards, which the constituents can use to determine whether legislators represent them well 
or not, are necessary. Constituents need to evaluate their representatives by their ability to 
provide infrastructural projects on the basis of the particular need of the community. In doing 
this, the public-economic variables determining the demand and supply of constituency service 
and how this relates with representation is analysed. 
 
Chapter 5 examines the relationship between representation and participation. Here the thesis 
explores the extent to which representatives employ methods that increase civic participation 
of constituents. The function of participation and how it serves as an incentive for proper 
democratic representation is discussed. In the light of political inclusion, the virtue of trust 
building and good gatekeeping are identified as necessary elements for representatives to excel 
at their function of democratic representation. Equality and inequality issues are also 
determined, because they are important drivers in the relationship between legislators and 
constituents. Finally, this chapter looks at linkages between legislators and constituents and the 
tools that are used to achieve these linkages. The main focus here is on developing the right 
relationship that may foster effective representation. Thus, the problem of evaluating 
representative’s action by citizen’s participation is discussed with the position taken that 
representation is also a function of citizens’ participation. 
 
Chapter 6 looks at representation and institutional design, to see how various features in the 
institution affect the ability of the representatives to represent. Specific features are analysed 
to see the extent to which they serve as an incentive or a hindrance to the legislators in the 
course of acting on behalf of constituents. One of the points made in this chapter is that for a 
democratic institution to live up to its ideals it relies to a large extent on the activities of those 
who represent as well as the ability of the institution itself to allow them to carry out this 
function effectively. Those features which tend to increase their ability ought to be reinforced 
while those that serve as hindrance should be removed. 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 includes the conclusions and recommendations. It returns to the question 
posed in the introduction and provides answers. Key findings are summarised, and some 
reflection is made on the theoretical and empirical implications of the relationship that exist 
28 
 
between the representatives and their constituents. Suggestions are made on the best possible 
way to improve the constituency development initiative through the process of representation 








THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 
 
1.1 Introduction: Early Conception of Representation   
There are varied accounts in history that inform our thinking of political representation. In 
cognate terms, the concept has been adapted to other usages before being seen in a strictly 
political context. As Saward explains, the word repraesentare in ancient Rome means 
presenting a character in theatrical terms adopted for the stage and this is the literal bringing 
into present something previously absent.39 At the very general level, representation has been 
referred to in theoretical and symbolic terms as a situation in which one thing or person or body 
could stand for another.40 In other words, an early sense of one person or body being able to 
speak for as well as symbolise another body of people emerged though not in the form of the 
represented authorising the representative.  
 
Notions of consent underpinning the authority of political representation emerged in more 
recognisable forms from the Greek city states. These city states, though highly fragmented, 
were pre-eminent in political studies and experimentation among the philosophers of the time 
who were seeking the best way in which society can be ordered and organised.41 Citizens as a 
whole known as the Assembled people were involved in the administration of the state.42 
Positions were distributed by lot and a person could occupy these positions only once in a life 
time giving an opportunity for most of the people to take part in politics.43 It is worthy to note 
that certain people were still excluded such as children, slaves and non-natives. As such a 
situation where all members of the society were involved in government and in which all 
decisions were arrived at, a mutual unanimous agreement was still not achievable.  
 
Over time, certain important matters of the state were not handled by the assembled people but 
by elected magistrates.44Though the states were small, a system of indirect democracy was in 
place where the assembly had to choose an electoral college who elected the officials that were 
in charge of the day to day functioning of the state. This procedure gave birth to representative 
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democracy. The administration of the state was no longer done by the people as a whole, but 
by a small efficient group that represented the people.45 This group of representatives could be 
dismissed by the Assembly. As open as the Athenian society was at the time, direct 
participation in government was still a selective and exclusive process. Representation in this 
context can therefore, be said to be a means of limiting the participation of people in direct 
government.46 Thus, it seems strange that the term in which we describe representation in 
modern societies of today is far from how it was conceived in the Athenian society where it 
actually originated. 
 
The middle ages saw representation in religious and other political forms due to the rise of 
monarchy and the Roman Catholic Church. The Catholic Church was seen as a universal 
political entity and the overriding value was order as laid down by God. The universe was being 
governed by natural law which was God’s law and every citizen including kings and emperors 
were subjected to it.47 Representation was designed to facilitate the conservation of peace and 
was a means of power to the Monarch.48 The Monarchs represented their realm and the Pope 
represented the church. Each represented their own entity and tried to create some kind of 
political consensus. The conception of representation at this time was not based on the principle 
of the rights of the majority to determine an issue. This tradition of representation initially 
contemplated only real individuals as persons with rights and interests. Subsequently, it 
recognised the idea of collective unity, social community and the advancement of the common 
interests in society.49 Thus, a situation where a person acting as an agent on behalf of another 
emerged.  
 
By the 12th century, the development of parliaments that had power of deliberation and decision 
started to emerge. These ‘parliaments’ had power sharing arrangements particularly regarding 
levying of taxes among crown, bishops, nobles and wise men and the first of such parliament 
was in Spain in 1188.50 Also, there was recognition of parliament in England in 1254 when 
Knights of the Shires were elected in the county courts and empowered to speak and bind the 
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whole country.51 By the 14th Century, members were expected to convey the grievances of their 
constituencies to the King and his Counsellors giving rise to a system of redress.52 Thus the 
function of the parliament was to serve as a two way channel of communication between the 
people and the rulers. There was recognition of representation in Italy, but the situation there 
was different. The people initially governed themselves and there was no conception that the 
legislature might consist of persons elected by the people. However, in their demand for a 
broader franchise and a government to be responsive to the broader electorate, they merged the 
idea of rule by the people with the idea of representation.53 It could be argued that the early 
conception of political representation still has repercussion on most contemporary Anglo-
Saxon societies of today as the power of the Monarch still survives and is prevalent in these 
systems.54 
 
By the 17th century, representation was characterised by a different conception. The idea in 
which individuals are subsumed into the concept of representation dominated political theory 
and practice. As Ankersmit points out, there was less competition about who should control 
the state but there was a united effort to check the power of the sovereign.55 Thus, in the earlier 
times, while representation was seen to serve the function of power and to legitimise the 
authority or the existing rule,56 the concept in recent times has obviously made its way through 
centuries informing later views such as virtual, republican, democratic, trustee, delegate and so 
on. The earlier views that were more theoretical and religious, with time transformed into more 
political concepts where a king or a parliament representing a body of people or a constituency 
tend to be answerable to the people. Certain features of representative government like 
elections of representatives are still in place and are observed in most government that are 
described as representative. However, the fact still remains that, though initially conceived as 
a means of limiting the participation of people in direct government, representation was as well 
a way of indirectly extending the power of decision making to the people.  
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The next section provides a brief historical development of representation in Nigeria. Some 
degree of historical knowledge that would help in understanding the role of representation in a 
developing country is necessary for an acquaintance with the practice of politics in Nigeria.  
 
1.2 Representation in Nigeria, the Different Phases 
 
In tracing representation in Nigeria, reference must be made to the pre-colonial entities that 
form the present-day Nigeria. These entities had ways of advancing their own causes, political 
ideals and ideologies of representation. There was the Sokoto Caliphate, Bornu Empire, Benin 
Empire, Oyo Empire, Old Calabar and other political entities that made up the territory. These 
territorial frameworks had their unique systems of representative government. The Chiefs, 
Obas or Kings as the case may be were the representatives of the people. There was in place 
an identifiable division of functions especially administrative that sought to represent the 
interests of their subjects.  These systems were based on customary law in the south and the 
dictates of Islamic law in the north.57Although, tenure of the rulers was for life, it was still 
subject to the will of the people who could dethrone the King or Oba by banishing or forcing 
them to commit suicide if they felt that the King or Oba went contrary to the will of the people 
or the gods of the land.58 
 
The British colonial rule brought elective representation in Nigeria. During this time, the 
Southern and Northern protectorates were amalgamated by the then Colonial Governor-
General Lord Lugard in the year 1914, but the country remained under colonial rule until 1960. 
Though there was a Nigerian Legislature at the time, it was not representative and citizens had 
limited participation. Election at the time was limited to coastal cities of Lagos and Calabar.59 
Subsequently, elective representation was introduced in stages from the town council in Lagos 
to the legislative council.  
 
Presently, the country operates a representative democracy in the presidential form following 
the US model after a prolonged authoritarian rule under the military.60 The country has a 
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bicameral federal parliament known as the National Assembly.61 Representatives are elected 
from 109 senatorial districts and 360 federal constituencies in the 36 states including the 
Federal Capital Territory (FCT). These single member constituencies are divided into 6 
geopolitical zones.62 The country’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has 
adopted a delineation model that is suitable for local area with the purpose of bringing a sense 
of fairness and equality in representation across the country. This is believed to make the 
representatives more in touch with the people thereby enhancing representation.  
 
This brief account shows that representative government has been in the fabric of the Nigerian 
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Table 1.1    Showing the Federal constituencies and their geo-political zones.  
 
 
Source: Department of Operations, INEC Office Abuja Nigeria.  
 
So far, the structure of the discussion shows that the concept of representation has evolved 
from a situation where people were directly involved in decision making in the society to a 
situation where this function is left to be handled by a few individuals on behalf of the people. 
This later situation seems more adaptable to modern society. This is due to the complexities of 
modern society and because people are engaged in other activities, they must use elections to 
entrust government to people who will devote their time to the task.63  However, despite this 
development, the element of a democratic idea has not entirely changed. There are still notions 
of political equality among citizens and power of the people today just as it was in the past. 
Madison describes it as: 
 
…a superior political system which has the effect to refine and enlarge the public view 
through a chosen body of citizens whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of 
their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it 
to temporary or partial considerations.64 
 
In the above view expressed, Madison observed that in this circumstance, representation will 
be more in consonance with the public good. But here lies the problem; the presence of 
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representatives acting on behalf of the people, the exact relationship between them and the 
people they represent is what will determine if the system meets the criterion of democratic 
representation or not. To address this problem and establish the link between the representative 
and the represented, an understanding of the role of representation is required. In the next part, 
I will examine views that have been put forward with regards to what representation should be. 
This will set the scene for representation as an activity that the representatives have to perform.   
 
1.3   Theories of Representation  
 
Having seen the trend of representation in history and how it may have shaped our perception 
of the concept, there is need to discover what the term ‘to represent’ means in a democratic 
society. Theorists have put forward a variety of uses of the term that tend to conform to specific 
assumptions about representative action and the interaction of ideal preferences of citizens 
whether as individuals or as a group.65 Representative action is considered to be exclusivist, 
which means doing one thing and forgoing the other and it occurs in different chaotic contexts, 
but at the end of it, specific political actions are considered appropriate as against others.66 
Thus, the synthesis of how these actions are considered appropriate in a complex social and 
political reality has to be made. The choice of what action or reaction is appropriate as a proper 
reaction or intervention has been considered and I review these theories in order to see how 
representation can be adapted to the political environment and to see how representatives are 
meant to accommodate constituents’ preferences and acts for them in a responsive manner. In 
doing this, I explore earlier views and work from there to a more contemporary view. 
 
Thomas Hobbes provided one of the first extended discussions of representation in the 
seventeenth century in his major work the Leviathan, where the concept is viewed as a social 
contract. To him representation is the institution of a common wealth where men agree to give 
authority to a certain man or group of men such that all the actions of that man or group of men 
are said to be the action of the whole people.67 What gives the right of representation according 
to this view is that one-off authorization given by the people to the representative to represent 
them. Representation in this sense presupposes that every action taken by the representative is 
already endorsed by the represented as their own action even before it is done and the 
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representative is the only judge of what constitutes the common good in the society. Also, the 
subjects have no claim on their representative as they have committed themselves totally in 
advance to the representative. Thus, the representative is not answerable to citizens in any way, 
they are only answerable to their own conscience. Under this theory, citizens cannot challenge 
their representative or have the right to ask for better representation. In fact, there is no such 
thing as the representative representing well or not. 
 
Hobbes concept of representation is criticised on the grounds that representation cannot be 
exhausted by a mere authorisation to act, nor should it depend on the pleasure of those they 
represent.68 Pitkin criticised Hobbes idea of representation as too formalistic, she argues that a 
sovereign with absolute authority in perpetuity without an obligation to consult with their 
subjects cannot be thought of as representation or a representative government, and 
representation does not mean merely acting with authority from another without any limits.69 
 
Another eighteenth century theorist that has contributed to the concept of representation is 
Edmund Burke. In his famous speech to the electors of Bristol, he expressed his famous view 
of representation in the following words: 
 
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which 
interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and 
advocates, but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, 
that of the whole, where not local prejudices ought to guide, but general good, resulting 
from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member, indeed; but when you have 
chosen him he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament.70 
 
Burke’s theory of representation has to do with ‘unattached interest’. Extracts from his writing 
refer to political representation as representation of interests which are objective and 
impersonal. To him, representation is to be done by an elitist group that knows what is best for 
the nation. He holds that, inequalities exist in every society and since a mass of people are not 
capable of governing themselves, then society needs to breed and train certain group of persons 
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who would be superior in terms of wisdom and ability who can perform this function best. 
These true aristocrats are the ones that should be allowed to rule and act on behalf of the people. 
He does not feel that the representative should seek the views of the people since it has to do 
with matters of reason and judgement.71 His view, therefore, is that MP’s once elected, are free 
from any restrictions.72 The decisions they take in parliament are as a result of rational 
parliamentary deliberations to get the right answers to political questions and since the 
constituents are not present, it makes no sense to say that their views should be sought before 
such decisions are made. He went further to formulate the theory of visual representation as 
opposed to actual representation where it is presumed that those elected by a few are presumed 
to represent all.73 
 
Apparently, Burke’s view of representation like Hobbes strongly negates any authoritative 
instruction from the constituents.74 It precludes democratic responsiveness to the represented 
and makes the representatives less responsive to sanctions and instead to be motivated by civic 
virtues.75 Constituents are perceived as inferior to the representative who has the superior 
ability to deliberate and decide on their behalf. The relationship of the representative is to the 
nation as a whole, there is no special relationship with the constituents who elected them. 
Elections are merely a means by which the representatives that make up the natural aristocracy 
of rulers will be found. So, the representatives are trustees caring for the needs of the people 
and they ought to act from a sense of their notion of what is right and wrong. 
 
This concept of representation has been characterised as an aristocracy of virtue and wisdom 
governing for the good of the entire nation.76 It found classical expression in certain early 
European democracies as it captured the feeling at the time. It became more or less the 
foundation stone of modern parliamentarianism as seen in some prominent legislatures in 
Europe.77 For instance, the reason for the prohibition of instruction during the French 
revolutionary period was said to be because the revolutionary government of Europe thought 
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that it might threaten the unity of the nation.78 Although this theory has been criticised mainly 
on account of its inconsistencies, it is still popular for analysing the behaviour of contemporary 
politicians.79 
 
Looking at more contemporary views of what it means to represent, Max Weber sees 
representation as a situation where the actions of certain members of a group are ascribed to 
the rest of the group and is binding on them.80 Weber’s explanation can be regarded as a social 
relationship as he rightly calls it. A situation where each member’s action is ascribed to all can 
be described as solidarity.81 For there to be true representation, certain members should be 
ascribed authority to act for the group and not all the members as this position implies. 
 
Miller and Stokes identified congruence as an expression of representative relationship 
between the representatives and their constituents. They examined the extent to which the 
representative’s roll call voting behaviour matches the opinion of their electoral districts. They 
found that constituents tend to have some level of control over their representatives, but the 
representatives tend to be unsure of the exact nature of constituency preference. This is because 
constituents are not clear on the policy position of their representatives.82 They also have been 
criticised for taking this stance. To Heinz, congruence cannot be a self-evident measure of 
representation. For this to happen, certain conditions need to be fulfilled, citizens should be in 
control and be free to choose their representative. In doing this, they choose representatives 
that share their views and they must have the power to deprive such representatives of office 
when they fail to carry out their functions as expected.83 
 
Achen also criticises the use of correlation coefficients in the study of representation. He 
developed an alternative model to test the relationship between the representatives and their 
constituents. He found that winners are less representative than losers and there is no difference 
between them with regard to issues.84 
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Verba and Nie addressed representation from the point of responsiveness similar to the 
approach taken by Miller and Stokes and they defined it as the degree of citizen’s participation. 
Here, participation was brought in as a variable in the theory of responsiveness. They viewed 
responsiveness to be how well the priorities of the citizens and the leaders match and called 
this ‘concurrence.’85 They too have been criticised on the basis that, the analysis is neutral on 
direction and is characterised intrinsically with ambiguity.86 In trying to find the correlation 
between participation and concurrence, they failed to state whether it is the leaders that are 
responsive to the citizen or the citizens are responsive to the leaders. 
 
Eulau and Karps, who also viewed the theory of representation from the point of 
responsiveness, were of the view that, if responsiveness is restricted to a single component, it 
will be unable to capture the complex realities of real-life politics. Consequently, they proposed 
that responsiveness should be viewed as a complex compositional phenomenon that entails a 
variety of possible targets in the relationship between the representatives and the represented.87 
They proposed four components of responsiveness which constitute representation and stressed 
that each can be treated as a target but all four are to be considered in an analysis to determine 
representation. These components are policy responsiveness, which deals with the issues that 
agitate the political process, service responsiveness which has to do with the individual 
legislators efforts to secure benefits for individuals or groups in their constituency, allocation 
responsiveness which deals with  the effort of the representative to obtain benefits for the 
constituency through government interventions like the ‘pork barrel’ and finally, symbolic 
responsiveness which has to do with the creation of a sense of trust and support in the 
relationship between the representative and the represented.88 
 
On the whole, it can be seen that, the concept of political representation has agitated the minds 
of political theorists for a long time. Studies have attended to several questions, but as Coleman 
observed, classical notions of political representation were focused on the formal mechanisms 
of representation, failing to take into consideration the way the citizen and their representative 
interact or fail to interact.89  From the more contemporary views, it can be seen that, this is a 
relevant focus of attention. There is need for a theoretical shift from mere formal authorisation 
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to acting in citizens’ interests. Concentrating on the formal and institutional aspects alone 
without looking at how representatives and citizens interact leads to a situation where citizens 
feel disengaged. A situation where representatives cannot take on the views of constituents 
does not offer an accessible route to political reconnection.90 This will merely result in the 
representatives ‘playing politics’ without impacting on the constituents in any way.  
 
The reason for emphasising the relationship between the representatives and the constituents 
is that, the distance between suggests that representatives cannot be held to account for 
whatever they do. A restyling of representation which is more responsive to constituents and 
take on their views in representative action and decision making is necessary. As Coleman 
argues, democracy works best when voters and representatives connect, exchanging views, 
accounting for themselves to each other and, ideally, sharing a common world.91 With this in 
mind, the next section will examine some explanations of representative behaviour, its 
implication will advance understanding of how representatives are able to represent 
constituents by acting in their interests and following their preferences. 
 
1.3.1 Models of Representation 
 
The brief sketch of the theoretical context makes it clear that the idea of representatives 
representing constituents’ interests and following their preferences is relevant and this seems 
to be what is acceptable in modern political societies. However, models of popular 
representation appropriate for modern societies can assume a variety of configurations. Three 
models have been historically prominent in the study of representative behaviour. They are the 
delegate, trustee and the responsible party models. Debates over representation have pointed 
towards the delegate model and the trustee model as the main styles of political representation 
and they place competing and contradictory demands on the behaviour of representatives. 
While the trustees in carrying out their representative role rely on their own best judgement, 
the delegates in the course of representation reflect the views of their constituents.92 This 
distinction has implications that affect how representational performances of the 
representatives are conceived and measured. Although, political theorists have treated this as 
mainly the problem with political representation, in line with the views expressed by Andrew 
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Rehfeld, it can be viewed in terms of representatives taking on the role of decision makers 
rather than on account of their law-making function. An examination of each of these views 
will be needed to understand their implications. 
 
1.3.1.1 Representatives as Trustees 
 
As discussed earlier, Edmund Burke was one of the first to elucidate the trustee view of 
representation. To him, representation is of interest and interest has an objective, impersonal, 
unattached reality.93 Members of parliament are perceived as unequal members of the society, 
an elitist group discovering and enacting what is best for the nation with their aim at the national 
good and they alone ought to be judges of what is that national good.94 This view holds that, 
power in the hands of the multitude admits to no control, representatives have the wisdom and 
ability of practical reasoning and if constituents’ wishes go contrary to the national good then 
representatives are not obliged to give effect to, or be responsive to those interests.95 Thus, 
representatives having decisional authority over laws and popular sovereignty is seen as the 
governing ideal. Proponents of the trustee view are Schumpeter and Wahlke Schumpeter claims 
that political action should be the business of the elected officials and not the voters and as 
such they should not be instructed by the voters.96 Similarly, Wahlke found the trustee 
orientation to be the most common in four American states with less than 20% classified as 
delegates.97 
 
1.3.1.2 Representatives as Delegates 
 
 An alternative view attributed to Rousseau argues that representatives are delegates of their 
constituents and therefore subject to the will of those who gave them the mandate. The principle 
behind this is the idea of self-government as a condition of freedom advocated by Montesquieu. 
This emphasises the view that the legislative power must reside with the people but, as a matter 
of convenience, the people have to do through their representatives what they cannot do by 
themselves.98 
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Although, there has been a further divide among the scholars on this account, generally, 
proponents of this view have not been silenced. This model is considered to be deeply rooted 
in democratic values as representatives are meant to act on the instructions of their 
constituents.99 Two versions of this model have emerged with peculiar arguments on how the 
representative should act. The first view sees the representative as merely running errands for 
the represented and as such must always do their bidding without question. The other less 
extreme view allows representatives to use their own judgement to a certain degree.100 The 
latter scenario could be a situation where the instruction may not be clear or the matter may be 
so weighty and complex that constituents may not be able to give proper instruction. This may 
also be due to the fact that they may not have all the information available to them. In such a 
situation, there is no doubt that the common-sense position will be the latter but even in this 
more realistic view, the instruction from the constituents seems to be the overall concern.  
 
Relating these views of representation to the realities of working politics and representation 
which ought to act in the interests of constituents in a responsive manner, it can be concluded 
that as a trustee, the representative is conceived as capable of independent acts and judgement. 
Since their relationship is to the nation as a whole, there is no special relationship with the 
constituents. Contrary to this view, the delegate view posits that representation ought to press 
for close correspondence between the views of an electoral constituency and the actions of the 
representative.101 They further argue that the aim of representation ought to be for the good of 
the particular constituency represented because a special relationship to a part does not 
necessarily hinder the service to the whole. To them it is parliament as a whole that can speak 
of representing the whole nation, an individual member’s responsibility ought to be to the 
constituency who gave him or her mandate. Thus, in representing the interests of the nation, 
the representative must not go contrary to the expressed wishes and interest of the constituents, 
especially with regard to matters that affect them directly. Pitkin views this as what is 
acceptable for representation in the substantive sense. She goes on to argue that, where the 
nature of the issues to be dealt with are unattached abstractions, (issues that are not personal to 
a particular group of people) it can hardly be said that the consultation of the constituents is 
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ideal,102 but whatever decision that is finally taken by the representative must still be that which 
is in their interest.103 
 
A critical examination of the delegate and trustee views shows that both seem to have a 
different perception about constituents, hence the variation on how they should be instructed. 
A major concern to both is the notion of what is conceived as the ‘common good.’ While the 
trustees believe that this ultimately exists and can be achieved as long as there is a consensus 
to search for it, the delegates who are more sceptical of the notion of ‘common good’ see 
politics not as a search for consensus but as a constant effort of compromise between 
irreconcilable societal interests.104 
 
Both tend to associate representation with electoral phenomenon and accountability. As 
Maravall notes, election could act as protective mechanism for the responsiveness of 
politicians.105 To Fearon, it is an opportunity for the voters to select good types of politicians 
than as sanctions to deter erring incumbents.106 The trustee view has its ultimate goal in 
preventing the representative from straying too far from the interests of their constituents as 
the electorate engages in retrospective voting to assess the past performance of representatives 
in a bid to hold them accountable. Policy makers obviously act according to their own free will 
in the interests of the common good, but they uphold that there should be a clear 
correspondence between the personal policy preference of the representatives and the actual 
policy outcome. The delegates on the other hand tend to behave in accordance with the 
preferences of constituents and representation occurs when legislators consistently adopt policy 
positions in line with constituents’ demands. Election to the delegates therefore serves 
primarily as a means of selecting representatives who promise to comply with constituency 
preferences. 
 
Theorists have conducted some examination of the model which best supports citizens’ 
preferences. Miller and Stokes in their study came up with the finding that congruence (when 
representatives and constituents agree on the same line of action) is closest to the delegate 
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model on the issues of civil rights and to the trustee model on the issue of foreign policy.107 
Fiorina in her study also measured representation as the fit between the policy position of the 
representatives and the preferences of their constituents.108Studies have also been done on 
responsiveness of different institutions in the United States and it was found that policy 
responds dynamically to public opinion and responsiveness was high because it was in line 
with the intentions of the founding fathers although it varies by institution.109 Stimson in a later 
study in the United States stressed that the House is sensitive to public opinion changes and 
constantly adjusts its position in line with the delegate conception of representation.110 
 
Generally, proponents of both models often advance their argument to the exclusion of the 
other. However, as Pitkin recounts, circumstances vary and as such may make a particular 
model more suitable than the other.111 Certain conditions may be of such emergency or so 
technical that the necessity of the trustee role may not be questioned. Similarly, there are some 
real-life circumstances where going contrary to the interests of the citizens may not be 
defendable. Theorists have come to the conclusion that both models of representation seem to 
have their vulnerabilities and their peculiarities and as such there is a reason for their 
coexistence.112 Fenno has also stated that, the implication of their justification is that neither is 
totally dishonest if taken in a particular context.113 
 
1.3.1.3 Responsible Party Model  
 
Unlike the two opposing models of representation discussed above, this model assumes that 
political parties compete with one another by developing contrasting policy programmes which 
are widely published to persuade prospective voters. The voters themselves being cognisant of 
this contrast will vote for candidates that represent the programme which is closest to their own 
preferences. This is on the notion that representatives in acting for constituents will always 
pursue the programmes or interests of the party under whose banner they are elected.114 This 
model actually seeks to make the delegate model more effective and efficient.115 It envisages a 
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situation where winning parties commit themselves to follow programmes sacredly sworn to, 
which voters could then use to evaluate their actions.  
 
The most important feature of this model is that, it introduces the intervening mechanism of 
the political party.116 The ideal case of this model sees members of parties voting enbloc with 
their party caucuses as this is seen as an implied contractual obligation with their supporters.117 
Invariably, this model introduces electoral programmes and voter information that serves as a 
constraint on the abilities of the party to ignore public preferences and it raises questions about 
the means of representation. 
 
Empirical studies at party level are also in existence. Stokes analyses party manifestos in Latin 
America to determine the level of commitment that parties show to their electoral programme. 
It was found that mandate could be widely and severely violated when politicians viewed 
preferences as erroneous and unstable. In such cases, the conclusion was that mandates were 
bad predictors of policy.118 At the European level, studies attribute the lack of congruence 
between the public mandate and policy at the party level to coalition government and party 
weakness.119 Esaiasson in a study of four democracies found that voters policy view were  more 
in agreement with the collective party representatives than with their own local 
representative.120 Similar studies have been carried out by Barnes in Italy121and Holmberg in 
Sweden.122 
 
These models of representation do not exhaust all possibilities that can explain representative 
behaviour, but they fill some of the obvious points that need to be borne in mind when 
examining a representative process. In the next section, these models are applied to the local 
political system in Nigeria to see the extent to which they can be used to explain political 
representation.  
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1.3.2 Discussion and Relevance to Nigeria  
 
In examining the nature of fit between models of political representation and the representative 
process in Nigeria, there are areas where such models can conform to the Nigerian political 
environment and other areas where their application can be said to be only to a limited degree. 
It is also worthy to note that, even in the local political setting, the distinction between the 
delegate and trustee views is important. Where issues of popular representation are concerned, 
the views of the citizens is inherent. Constituents may not have the expertise or the time to 
commit to the details of most policy domains, but the fact remains that they have some sense 
of what they would prefer and what they would not prefer. 
 
Bringing back this discussion to the context of this research, it can be argued that, in the 
allocation of projects using the CDF, representatives would hardly be faced with such decisions 
that are impersonal or can be classified as “unattached”. The projects in question are those 
which will impact directly into the lives of the constituents and as such, consulting with them 
becomes a matter of necessity. The fact that the constituents are in a better position to know 
what projects are most suited to meet their local needs means, their connection to the 
representatives is imperative in order to get their views. These projects are specifically targeted 
to the rural areas and most of the representatives do not reside in these areas, so taking a 
decision on infrastructural projects to be cited in the community without the input of 
constituents, definitely goes contrary to the objectives of the CDF.  
The responsible party model is applicable to a limited degree to Nigerian politics. The degree 
of party discipline in legislative voting seems to be readily ascertainable in most European 
jurisdictions,123 but the same cannot be said for Nigeria. The relatively weak parties124 may 
make this model a bit problematic to be used as a measure of legislative behaviour. This is not 
to say situations where legislators follow party wishes are not there. A majority of the roll call 
votes in parliament will always follow this model but sometimes there could be some major 
defections. For instance, after the 2015 Nigerian elections, the National Assembly in the 
election of the Senate President went contrary to the dictates of the ruling political party All 
Progressives Congress (APC) and made their choice of candidate to be the Senate President.125 
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This defiant behaviour has also been seen in other areas in the legislative process. However, it 
can be said that in Nigeria, party voting dominates the legislative process but at the same time 
it may be difficult to say that legislators act in an accountable and responsible manner towards 
their party. Therefore, an enquiry shall be made in subsequent chapters whether these 
imperfections actually serve as an incentive or as a hindrance in the consideration of 
constituents’ interests in the course of representation. In doing this, the individual 
representative’s action must be distinguished and the structure of the representative system and 
the way they are drawn needs to be examined to determine whether they are appropriate for us 
to infer such a model.  
 
On the general plain, we tend to expect that representatives ought to follow the constituents’ 
instructions especially in matters that directly affect them. As such, preference is for the 
delegate model. This model appears to be more democratic and captures the interaction 
between the representative and their constituents. Throughout this thesis, there is an interaction 
between the empirical description of representation and the theorizing of the concept as a 
democratic activity that is built upon the base of the delegate model. Modern representative 
democracy has always had participatory elements, not just through voting to get representatives 
elected, but through interaction in many forums.126  As this two-way level of communication 
between both parties continues to evolve, there is direct exchange between the citizens and 
their representatives. They are able to communicate their preferences to the representatives 
who are meant to act according to such preferences. Under these paradigms, the members 
through their acts lend legitimacy to the government by creating a link between policy and the 
citizens.  Therefore, in considering how a representative should act, it is the nature of the issue 
at stake, the political choices to be made and the constituency to be represented, coupled with 
the capacities of both the representative and the represented that determines a system’s 
representational performance. In the next section, a conceptual framework following Pitkin’s 
theory of representation is developed and analysed to show how representational acts should 
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1.4  Representation as Acting for Others: Interests and Responsiveness  
 
There is no doubt that models of representation based on delegates, trustee or the responsible 
party lead to different empirical evaluations of representative performance. Despite their 
importance, these models have not attracted much investigations from theorists. Suffice it to 
say that theorists who concern themselves with how democratic representatives advance policy 
process on behalf of their constituents are few when in actual sense the centre of gravity of 
political representation in a democratic society ought to be the citizens.127 There is always this 
feeling among theorists that having institutional restraint in place can preserve democratic 
representation and prevent illicit motivation of the representative. That is, once arrangements 
that secure fair election and promote democratic deliberation are in place, it can be used to 
check erring representatives and make them act in line or do the bidding of their constituents. 
This, unfortunately, may not be adequate, as citizens will always demand better representation. 
Therefore, the way representatives attend to their advocacy work by implementing policy 
preferences and taking actions that will impact positively on the lives of constituents is 
important to democratic representation. 
 
Consequently, the identification of the role orientation of the representatives might help in 
identifying the behavioural consequences of their action. The starting point could be to base 
the account of representation on the activities of the representatives and the extent to which 
they take the preferred interest of their constituents into consideration when carrying out these 
activities. Miller and Stokes, one of the first to investigate the relationship between 
representatives and constituents, identify congruence in their research as what would serve the 
purpose of providing evidence of representation.128 By this, they mean, how the acts of 
representatives match with the preferences of constituents. Despite the fact that they were 
criticised,129 an appreciation of this theory is still needed as a start point for evidence of 
representative acts.  
 
Pitkin’s theory emphasises substantive acting for others and not just a formal authorization or 
accountability to others as what counts as representation.130 She conceptualises representation 
as an activity defined by certain behavioural norms which brings out the obligation of 
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representatives and the participatory elements of citizens in it. Whilst it is not exhaustive of the 
possible theoretical directions for conceptualising representation as an activity, Pitkin’s work 
provides an accessible introduction to the idea of acting for others which is useful for the 
context at hand, that is, how representatives are able to represent the constituents using the 
CDF. 
 
Taking this view of representation, this section discusses what the representative is meant to 
do in the course of representing constituents. The activity performed is looked at in terms of 
how trustworthy and accurate the representative is in rendering of service to constituents. What 
goes on in the performance of the activity itself is important. In the course of the performance, 
there are standards or limits that serve as criteria to measure whether the particular activity can 
be counted as good representation or not. Such an activity must be in furtherance of the interests 
of constituents and they must be able to make their input as to what will serve their interests. 
This is what serves as a guide or standard for the actions of the representatives. 
 
In taking this approach, I acknowledge that representation takes various forms depending on 
the perspective from which we want to look at it. What is stressed here is the substantive acts 
as the core of representation. This creates spaces for a notion of what may count as 
representation and to determine whether legislators are able to live up to such ideals. In doing 
this, we attend to questions like what is it about the representative that makes them represent?  
Is it about their action or perhaps something else? Such questions are pertinent in order to 
decide if representation is taking place. 
 
Where actions of representatives are properly guided and there is some relation with the 
constituents whose interest they further, then there is a possibility that this may enable the 
citizens to agree with the representative on the same agenda. This is referred to by Miller and 
Stokes as ‘congruence’131 (both representative and constituents agreeing on the same agenda) 
and by Verba and Nie as ‘concurrence’ (agreeing on the same line of action).132 Whatever term 
is chosen, it has been argued that, representation is had for the interests of the citizens. In order 
for it to represent their interest, citizens must be able to say so themselves and not someone 
else evaluating this on their behalf. This puts more emphasis on effective communication 
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between representatives and their constituents, thereby reviving ideas of participatory 
democracy. 
 
Based on the premise that citizens form opinions and have preferences that are capable of being 
represented,133 key aspects of ‘interest’ articulation and ‘responsiveness’ become an integral 
component of representation. Both concepts are important features of democratic 
representation that cannot be ignored in the bid to assess whether representatives actually 
represent constituents well or not. An acknowledgement of these basic concepts is likely to 
orientate representatives towards the right direction in their bid to carry out their function of 
representation. Putting these two ideas of ‘interest’ and ‘responsiveness’ together generates a 
working understanding of representation as a democratic practice. The need for transparency 
in democratic representation can be seen from the relationship that exists between the 
representatives and the represented. If representation is a practice that is concerned with acting 
on behalf of citizens, then it must show this by how the interest of people are taken on board 
and the representatives are responsive to constituents’ preferences. 
 
Although, empirical finding reveals that interest articulation and responsiveness to the people 
are components that sit uneasily with the concept of representation, to the point that rather than 
respond to them representatives tend to transform them,134 these two contexts are not 
heterodox. They tend to be common to most democratic bodies. Their absence seems to 
compromise to a very large extent the democratic ideal. This affirms that political 
representation actually draws its legitimacy from the people it represents and it is their interests 
that should form its bedrock. An evaluation of each concept is necessary for a better 
understanding of what constitutes proper representation in a democratic setting. 
 
1.4.1 Interests  
 
It has been argued that, a representative can represent not in terms of rights or obligation but 
to speak for, act for and look after the interests of their respective group.135 This makes interest 
one of the most important standards used to evaluate representative action.136 Representatives 
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often tend to claim that they know what constitutes the interest of those they represent.137 The 
question that needs to be asked is, does this claim constitute substantive representation in itself? 
If representatives claim that they represent the interests of their constituents, do they really do 
this from their perspective of what they feel representation should be, or are there standards for 
evaluating their actions? This brings us to the pertinent question of how we can differentiate 
actual representation from representation that is a mere sham.   
  
Luttberg in answer to the above question state that: “policies passed by government must reflect 
both the preferences of the governed and most desirably, the public’s interests.” 138 By this 
view, the ideal of representation is the identity between the will of the people and the actions 
of the representatives. In order words, representatives should make the decisions that the people 
ordinarily would have made had they been the ones to decide for themselves.139 Following 
these views it can therefore be argued that, if the representatives are to excel in the 
representation of constituents, it follows naturally that it requires a special type of behaviour 
or some kind of obligation.140 The representative has substantive obligation to act on behalf of 
the interests of others whose interests may be identical with that of the representative, but the 
obligation to represent accrues only by virtue of that interest being someone else’s.141 The point 
therefore, is that representatives cannot be representing their own interests but those of others. 
The possible targets when representing constituents are the goods, services or infrastructure 
that representatives can bring to them. If these goods are merely those that would enhance the 
political status of the legislator without meeting the needs of the constituents, they cannot be 
said to have represented their interests. On the contrary, they may have represented an interest 
which is entirely theirs or that of a few selected elements in the community without having real 
impact on the generality of the constituents. 
 
Also, the focus on interest of constituents’ permits the making of summary judgement on the 
representational relationship between the representatives and constituents to see its strengths 
and weaknesses. This judgement in the long run will refer to the degree of congruence between 
the constituent’s preferences and the representative’s action. Although, the treatment of 
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representation here may seem partial, it enables us to trace some of the main lines of political 
representation by focusing on the individual actions of legislators in a democratic society. 
Representatives are meant to serve as agents and represent a wide range of interests in their 
constituencies. These interests are not meant to fluctuate based on what the representatives 
merely present to their constituents, but should stem from the constituents’ needs, desires and 
values.  
 
Thus, political representation being an intrinsic part of any democratic society makes it 
imperative that representation that is people centred is what should count. People are capable 
of having interests and preferences that are coherent enough for the representatives to represent. 
The processes by which these interests and preferences are formed depend on variables they 
are confronted with or options that are put before them by their representatives in the course of 
their interaction.  As Philips reasons, interests are realised in the course of decision making 
when various options, implementation strategies and competing concerns are discussed. If the 
constituents are not allowed to take part in the decision-making process they will not have the 
avenue to insert their interests.142 
  
1.4.2  Responsiveness 
 
The term responsiveness has sometimes been identified as an alternative for representation.143 
Dahl is of the view that “a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness 
of the government to the preferences of its citizens.”144 Responsiveness here is taken to be the 
measure of how representative actions match the preferred interests of the constituents. This 
no doubt can only be brought about by participatory and representational ideas of 
democracy.145 
 
Eulau and Karps earlier discussed, expounded four components of responsiveness: policy 
responsiveness, service responsiveness, allocation responsiveness and symbolic 
responsiveness. They are of the view that, these constitute the matrix of representational 
relationship and as a whole form the target of what it means to represent.146 To them the four 
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components must be considered together in analysing the concept of representation. Single 
aspects of representation cannot be taken as what constitutes representation but rather, various 
political activities put together is what the representational nexus requires. It is only in this 
compositional approach that the representation as responsiveness can be meaningful. 
 
Despite this view, most studies on responsiveness have been limited to policy 
responsiveness.147In the same manner, focus here is on the allocation responsiveness. The 
relationship between the modes of responsiveness and how the focus on one aspect affects 
others is beyond the scope of this research. However, as will be demonstrated later, allocation 
responsiveness is an effective way of evaluating representative relationship. If attention is 
given to this component it does not neglect other components and does not preclude the 
representative from being responsive in those other aspects. What matters is that all the 
constituents feel represented.148 The only distinction with regards to policy responsiveness and 
allocation responsiveness in this evaluation is that, in the policy making process, 
representatives do not stand alone. They do this process in association with other 
representatives and as such these policies cannot be attributed to them individually. On the 
other hand, the public good they are able to bring to their constituents in their allocation 
responsiveness, can be attributed to them directly. This can be achieved as a result of their 
interaction with constituents to get their preferences. 
 
It has been argued that, one of the factors that explain citizen disengagement from politics is 
because the representative system fails to forge meaningful connections between the politicians 
and the people they represent to make them feel represented.149 The two-way relationship 
between the representative and the represented is an essential part of political representation. 
Succinctly, Pitkin’s definition of representation as ‘acting in the interest of the represented in 
a manner responsive to them’150 implies a system in which representatives listen to and 
acknowledge the preferences of the people they represent.151 The reason for advocating a close 
relationship between representatives and their constituents is mainly to seek greater 
responsiveness from them, seeing that, this is done less by any form of legal enactment. It is a 
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principle of practical politics that legislators, though not legally bound, are morally obliged to 
conform in all important decisions to the wishes of their constituents if it can be ascertained.  
 
There is now that increasing prevalence of certain practical conventions152 to hold 
representatives to be more accountable to the citizens.153 Political theorists are of the view that 
elections can be used as a mechanism to make politicians more responsive154 as the constituents 
see this as an opportunity to select good representatives and this is a way they tend to 
communicate their choice to the representatives. Also, constituents engage in retrospective 
voting based on the past performance of the representatives and they make their judgement 
based on the previous actions of representatives.155 This gives them the power to sanction 
representatives who have not lived up to their expectations. 
 
However, the views expressed here are not based on electoral responsiveness and 
accountability alone, because it is realised that there is an imperfect measure of the relationship 
between votes and electoral outcome.156 This is especially so in a developing representative 
democracy like Nigeria. Therefore, a simpler means of measuring the responsiveness of 
representatives to their constituents could be by their substantive acts of representation. If the 
ethics of advancing public policy and acting in the interest of constituents is included in 
politics, this may create competition between different representatives who will provide 
incentives to secure adequate responsiveness and accountable representation.157 An account of 
democratic representation that gives more weight to the norms and values of inclusion by 
mobilizing citizens to get their informed and critical participation will enhance the role that 
representation plays in a democratic polity and give the grounds with which to assess the 
performance of representatives. Thus, in measuring the actions of representatives, the criteria 
simply become responsiveness to constituents preferred interest, participation of citizen and 
accountability. Democratic representation needs to give weight to these values for the concept 
of representation to be effectively evaluated and measured. The next section examines how 
some of these models can be put to use.    
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1.4.3 Representation and Allocation Responsiveness 
 
The need for representatives to be equipped with standards that help differentiate good from 
bad representation when they act on behalf of their constituents has been noted.158 The question 
that needs to be answered now is how these principles can be included by representatives so 
that their actions can be effectively evaluated. In doing this, the criteria to be used to measure 
responsiveness as a systematic property of political representation needs to be ascertained. The 
allocation of physical projects and the manner in which they are provided by representatives 
are used in this instance to explain whether they have been responsive to their constituents or 
not. These are specific instances of responsiveness as against mere speculations of conditions 
in which representatives stand ready to be responsive. In such situations, what merely shows 
is a potential for representation rather than an act of representation. The act of representation 
is seen in the actual activity and here participation of the constituents also becomes important. 
This helps to determine how well the priorities of citizens match the actions of the 
representatives to the point that they both agree to the same agenda. In doing this, the citizens' 
activeness and their interests on the one hand and the representatives' perception and their 
actions on the other need to be examined in order to come to a conclusion that they are in fact 
in agreement. This will be regarded as the target for responsiveness. This makes the proof of 
representation that is sought to be concrete transactions that are based on citizen participation 
and interest articulation. 
 
Looking at the activities of representatives to see the extent to which these factors actually 
come to play, will require reflecting on the idea that representational focus of the representative 
may vary in terms of nation, region, state, district or other territorial level of society.159With 
the CDF, the focus of representation is the constituency as this is where the acts of 
representation need to be performed. This means that while it may be possible to find other 
focus with regards to policy responsiveness, the same cannot be said for the allocation 
responsiveness as it always has its main target. As such, the representational acts of the 
representatives can be viewed in terms of individual acts of responsiveness in their respective 
constituencies. The representative who is in an elevated position is meant to take the initiative, 
the effects of which can truly be seen in the fusion of citizens participation and representational 
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ideas. This is what gives an understanding of how the legislators represent their constituents 
using the CDF. 
 
Since the focus of the CDF is the constituency, it serves as an added incentive to the 
representatives as the performance of constituency service has been argued to be an effective 
way to be responsive to constituents and this has a high benefit for the representative.160 With 
the CDF, legislators are able to distribute services or projects in their various constituencies, 
but the point in being responsive is whether in the allocation process they seeks to anticipate 
the needs of their constituents or in fact stimulate their wants.161 For this purpose, citizen 
participation has been highlighted as an important element in representation and responsiveness 
to their interests. Hence, mere participation of the constituent is not what accounts for 
responsiveness, rather what is being emphasised here is that they must be present in order to 
choose for themselves what is in their interest and not the representative choosing what they 
think will be in constituents’ interest. This will also give simpler measurement criteria and 
make it possible to look at how some of these decisions to allocate services or projects under 
the CDF are arrived at. It will bring to focus those that were done with constituents input and 
those that were done on the assumption of what is good for the constituents by the moral 
judgement of the legislator. Thus, the CDF may be an incentive to represent, but it places an 
obligation on representatives to provide goods to constituents. In doing this, they may be faced 
with some challenges. The next section discusses some of the problems that a representative 
may face in the course of representing constituents. 
 
1.4.4 Problem of Heterogeneous Constituency 
 
In trying to describe the concept of representation in ways that are appropriate, one pretentious 
aspect of representing constituents’ preferences is the fact that the representatives have multiple 
constituents and they show heterogeneity of opinion. This inherent feature of the study of 
representation tends to complicate the issue of articulating constituents’ interest. The difficulty 
is in coping with a large number of constituents with varying interests which has made theorists 
conclude that constituents have limited capacity to influence decisions and outcomes and are 
not capable of making effective policy choices to be communicated to the representative.162 
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For this reason, Eulau has suggested that given this limited capacity on the part of the 
constituents, representational theory ought to first deal with the assumption of a status 
difference between the representative and the constituents rather than ignore its existence.163 
 
There is no questioning the fact that a problematic situation arises where the representative is 
dealing with certain policy areas. However, in the allocation of constituency project, the 
assumption is that, representatives are able to arrive at what seems to be an acceptable summary 
of the will or interest of the constituents if they have access to them. Philip and Roy are of the 
view that there is likely to be perfect homogeneity of the electorate and no representational 
problem if it is a single constituency and the matter is, maybe, between two choices.164 This is 
highly likely if the member is drawn from that constituency, in which case doubts will be 
minimal.165 
 
However, irrespective of how few the choices might be, situations may arise where the 
representative might not be able to access the clear will of the people such as where they may 
be equally divided on the choice of intervention that they want the representative to bring to 
their community. In such a situation, the preference may be undefined and impossible to 
ascertain. This scenario points to the fact that realistically there are situations where it might 
be difficult or impossible to get constituents wishes and further their interest in order to achieve 
representation. It is important to acknowledge this one realistic point of imperfect articulation 
of interests. Therefore, the task of this thesis is to assess the relative significance of these 
variations in the implementation of the CDF policy to determine the extent to which they hinder 
the legislator’s capacity to represent. Perhaps an explanation that can be considered may be 
that, it is unlikely that in a single member constituency, a situation where there is complete 
disagreement as to what needs to be done may arise. This is because constituencies are mainly 
defined by specific territorial districts. Hence, the within-district variations are not always so 
strong that they make such a difference in representation. Also, the objective of the use of this 
model is that, it is in consonance with the reality of political representation because its 
relevance actually depends on the constitutional setting. Where it is found that there is no 
consistency, then the system of representation that is in place can be said to be less democratic 
than we actually may think. This is because the ideal representative democracy should be that 
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which identifies with the interests of the people. Having noted this point of deviation, it is 
important that emphasis be on the individual action and how ready they are to make their action 
count as representation. This brings us to the next point of discussion, to examine the 
willingness of the representatives themselves to represent the interests of their constituents.  
 
1.4.5 The Will to Represent 
 
The assumption is that, before legislators put themselves forward for election, there is the desire 
or will to represent those who will elect them into office. The actual motivation for this may 
not be known. It could be a form of moral obligation or fear of electoral reprisal. The fact is 
that almost every representative has that concern for the constituency and this is regarded as a 
sine qua non for popular representation.166 
 
This is true for a definition of representation which is focused on the interests of constituents. 
The question is whether there is an action and the action is for the constituents and whether 
their interest is considered through democratic consultation with them. If it is, then 
representation is achieved, on the other hand, if it is not then there is no representation. Thus, 
a hypothetical case of a representative who upon election, leaves for the city without having 
any more relations with constituents can hardly be said to be representing their interest. At best 
they can vote according to their conscience in parliament which may coincide with the will of 
the people. Such a ‘hit or miss’ pattern of representation goes contrary to democratic principles. 
According to Pitkin, in acting for constituents, the representative needs not be found 
persistently at odds with the views of the constituents, a conflict about what is to be done should 
not take place and if it does an explanation is called for.167 Therefore, a society is entitled to 





This introductory chapter examined the concept of representation looking at its origin in history 
from the Greek city-states where it initially started as direct democracy and gradually 
transformed itself into representative democracy. It traces representative democracy in Nigeria 
to the pre-colonial era and analysed how representative democracy finally came to take root in 
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the system. The examination of this history has implications for the understanding of 
representation in contemporary society today. 
 
 In determining representative behaviour, it has explored the delegate model which says that 
the representative needs to act on the instruction of their constituents and the trustee model 
which says that representatives acting on behalf of their constituents are meant to rely on their 
own good judgement. Also, the responsible party model has been examined and the position 
held by this view is that the representative in acting on behalf of constituents will follow the 
programmes of the party under which they were elected. Overall, it is argued that 
representatives depending on the issue they deal with can either act as delegate or trustee. The 
responsible party model has some limitations as a model that can be adapted to Nigeria due to 
the weakness of the political parties. However, the instance where such a model is strong tends 
to be in the voting processes in the Parliament.  
 
In understanding the role orientation of the representatives, the thesis looks at the substantive 
acts of representatives. It argues for a model of interest articulation and responsiveness as what 
can properly guide the actions of representatives to act in line with the preferences of their 
constituents. In addressing the interest of constituents, it acknowledges the fact that there are 
difficulties that may be posed as a result of the heterogeneity of the constituents. However, 
because the focus of the research is on the constituency district, it is argued that the 
representatives might not be faced with such problems as the within district variations might 
not be so significant. 
 
Thus, the argument is that, theorists in their study of representation have not focused on the 
acts of the representatives in defining what it means to represent. Concentration has been on 
roll call voting and this has proved inadequate. Beyond role call voting, there has been a 
considerable problem in researching the question of representation of interest of constituents. 
Given the concerns about the limits of using this in the investigation of attitudes, interest and 
the extent to which the policy priorities of the legislators match the preferences of the 
constituents, it is important that a new criterion be used. This research uses the model of interest 
articulation and responsiveness as a measure to evaluate how representatives are able to 





It is argued that, representation ought to be seen as a political practice. In this way, democratic 
principles and participation become inherent. This makes it possible to bring in the idea of how 
representatives relate with their constituents, how interest should be recognised and the 
channels through which citizens can make their voices heard and hold their representative 
accountable. In this context, representatives should feel that their positions are dependent on 
popular opinion of the people168 whom they represent as they have an obligation to take into 
consideration the preferred interest of these people in the course of the performance of their 
function. This is what connects modern form of representation in a democratic government and 
would yield a viable theory under the complex conditions of our society today.  
 
The next chapter examines the extent to which the lack of understanding of what it actually 
means to represent affects the way representatives represent. The different meaning of 
representation is analysed and the concept that gives a meaning that enables us to assess 




                                                          







































UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION. 
  
2.1   Introduction 
 
Representation is a word that is used in passing in every day context and as such its meaning 
is fluid. Pitkin in her detailed survey of what the concept means came to the conclusion that 
although, the concept of representation has an identifiable meaning, it was “a single highly 
complex concept that had not changed much in its basic meaning since the seventeenth 
century”.169 However, if conceived of in its political sense, what it means to represent and the 
action that accounts for proper representation are all important if we must correctly define it. 
In order words, to develop a deeper understanding of the concept, it is important to look at its 
various components before evaluating the acts that are meant to be performed. This 
consideration is necessary because like some other words the concept of representation seems 
to describe quite different behaviours in different circumstances while still possessing a 
unifying thread of meaning and this is due to how the concept is understood.  
 
This chapter focuses on the multi-sided idea of representation. It sets out to discuss the four-
part account of Pitkin's components of representation by further developing a comprehensive 
idea of the concept that is based on the understanding of the process and the institutional 
arrangements that completes it. It considers the formal authorization and accountability of 
representatives as well as their representativeness. It also emphasises the substantive acts of 
the representative as what is relevant for representation and what justifies a vertical relation 
between the citizen and the state.170 I will show here that the different aspects of representation 
though distinct can be used to lend clarity to the concept.  This approach enables us to have a 
basis for a thorough study of why representatives fail to represent. If we consider that what 
representatives do and how they do it depends on how they see themselves and their world and 
this in turn depends on the concept through which they see,171 then it becomes obvious that 
knowing what it means to represent would determine to a large extent the representation that 
they offer.   
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Theoretically, the modelling of the concept of representation has caused disagreement among 
Political theorists and it is obvious that most of these disagreements are not so much about the 
nature of political representation as such, but about the concept that is used to study it.172 
Therefore, unlike other research, in exploring the concept of representation, I take into account 
how representation comes about, what a representative must be like, before elaborating on the 
substantive aspects of acting or representing. This has implications for the understanding of the 
relationship between the representatives in their decision-making activity and those they 
represent.  
 
Pitkin analysed four forms of representation: the formalistic, descriptive, symbolic and 
substantive. Each gives a distinct explanation of the concept of representation, none of which 
are complete in themselves to give an explanation of the concept. Yet each explanation 
generates a set of criteria by which representation can be judged and this contributes in 
distorting our understanding of the concept.173 Theorists often try to make this distinction 
obvious by pointing out and proposing different equilibrium between them.174 In doing so, they 
tend to capture some aspects of the concept and leave out others which creates a gap in the 
process. The fact is, representation must be explained having in mind the conditions that render 
it legitimate.175  For these views to keep up with the pace of current empirical findings there is 
need to piece them together to see how they can be used to lend clarity and precision to a 
comprehensive definition of the concept. In practice, several of these forms will often mix 
together to form the complete picture of representation and at the core of it lies the relational 
element between the representative and the represented. 
 
Thus, representation depends on how it is conceived and as a human idea it is entitled to be 
assumed by some and questioned by others. However, the question as to whether representation 
is taking place or the acts that would count as evidence of representation are all pertinent to the 
actual representation.176 Each of these forms can be used as a way of understanding and 
justifying the whole concept of representation. What will offer a deep understanding of 
representation is to bring all four aspects together. Rather than distinguishing between them it 
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is better to link them up, this way it gives a complete picture of political representation in a 
democratic setting. 
 
Mansbridge suggests that, the practice of representation cannot be captured by a simple 
promissory model. Such a practice is better understood by the use of looser ways of describing 
the relationship.177 For instance, there are important consequences for how representative 
relationships come to be and how representatives represent once they assume that position. The 
understanding of the relational quality of the representation, its ambiguity, and social 
construction178 are all important in telling whether what is dealt with is political representation 
in the democratic sense or some other forms of representation. This is because representation 
takes place in other fora, either separate from or in addition to political representation.179As 
such, these different concepts of representation are not altogether a mistake of classification or 
situations where the representative fails to achieve an ideal. Rather, where aspects are put 
together they are able to lend clarity and precision to the whole concept of representation in a 
democratic sense.  
 
 Although, the four forms will be analysed, emphasis will be on the substantive representation 
because that is where the action of representing takes place. The assumption here is that, only 
those who are entitled to represent can actually do so in the political sense of the word. An 
account of representation which is sufficient enough to respond to the political practice in any 
given society should also be able to identify the democratic elements and the institutions that 
uphold them. This will give a sense of the criteria with which to judge representation for what 
it is and what it is able to achieve. The fact that these separate forms can give rise to different 
ways of representation also means that they should be given consideration. That way, we can 
see their relational elements and bring together those aspects that will give a clearer 
understanding of the concept representation. This is necessary since the definition of 
representation determines the kind of goods and policies for which the representatives advocate 
and provides an argument that is likely to produce a better outcome. Thus, good definition of 
representation cannot simply say that there is a representative system when the kind of 
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representation taking place is not known. The proper conduct of the representative and how it 
is institutionalised are all needed to complete the meaning. 
 
The other rational aspect that needs to be considered is that, all relationships are socially 
constructed but the way they are structured may make it difficult for us to give a clear definition 
to it. Representation is a construct of group opinion and ideologies which is evident in what is 
represented in the political process whether it be people, their interest, characteristics or 
values.180 If what is described is democratic representation, then it evolves based on elections 
of political representatives and a universal franchise which enables democracy to take its root. 
Other elements of accountability and representativeness are all crucial in constituting 
democratic practice.181 It cannot be divorced from its institutional arrangement and be 
conceived at some level of abstraction182 as Pogge infers. Therefore, an account of 
representation that is sufficiently generic to respond to the general political practice and 
institutions, as well as specific enough to identify the democratic elements is what is needed to 
enable an understanding of the concept of representation. The next section examines each of 
these individual forms and evaluates their peculiarities, pointing out how they add to our 
understanding of political representation which acts in the interest of the represented.    
 
2.2 Formalistic View of Representation 
 
The formalistic view of representation is seen in terms of two sub-divisions: the giving of 
authority (authoritarian view) and the holding to account (accountability view). The 
authoritarian view states that representatives have the right to act as a result of formal authority 
that they have been invested with by way of election or selection.183 There is no special activity, 
obligation or role they need to comply with, they act based on their own discretion and this 
tends to have binding consequences on others.184 The accountability view, on the other hand, 
agrees that representation is a form of activity and it entails responsiveness to the represented. 
They also hold the view that representatives are held to account for their actions and this they 
see as the essence of representation.185 What is important to theorists of this view is that 
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representatives are subject to re-election or removal at the end of their term.186 They are more 
interested in the actual investiture which is the arrangement as to how representation is initiated 
and terminated rather than in the activity of representing in itself. The giving of authority and 
the termination of that authority forms the core of the relationship between the representative 
and the represented. The implication is that, the represented becomes responsible as though the 
act of the representative is their own.187 This is as long as the representative acts within the 
limit of the authority that is given. 
 
The problem with this view is that, it considers anything done within the limits of the authority 
as representation. No account or reason is given for why a particular action may tend to be 
more representative than the other. Here also, the legal attribution rather than the action of the 
representative is what seems to be important.  Theorists of this view treat issues of voting, 
procedures of how votes can best be counted and the electoral context resolved to assume good 
representation.188 The criterion here seems to be election which grants the authority and makes 
the legislator a representative. Voters are seen to always grant this mandate after every election 
and this remains for the term of office of the representative. For such an authorisation to be 
effective, it has to be legitimate in itself so far as the laid down institutional procedures for such 
a representative to emerge has been followed.  
 
Hobbes is a strong proponent of this view,189 others are the organschaft theorists190 who, unlike 
Hobbes, do not see every government as representative but still fail to distinguish one 
representative act from the other. With this limited view, they are only able to show a way that 
states represent which is by way of election or how representative selection is made. 
Mansbridge who also shares this view made a distinction between sanction and selection. She 
suggests that, the selection model is a more appropriate analytical tool for the understanding of 
the concept of representation. She states that representatives with self-reliant judgment, who 
are less responsive to sanctions, are representing through a principal-agent relationship that 
works best through a selection rather than a sanction model.191 The selection models is based 
on the view that, constituents choose representatives who are internally motivated and whose 
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views are aligned with theirs, rather than engage in the monitoring of representatives who are 
influenced only by sanctions and reward. These ‘gyroscopic representatives’ as they are 
referred to, are not altogether unresponsive to sanctions; rather, the selection seems to be the 
core while the sanctions are at the periphery.192 
 
Although proponents of this view hold that the requirement of both the representatives and the 
constituents actually aligning in interest is demanding, there is still the possibility of removal 
of the representative during election if the constituents are not satisfied. The effect of using 
sanctions as a threat to the representative to do what they may not have done for the fear of 
being removed is replaced with having representatives who are internally motivated to serve 
and most likely share the interest of the constituents. 
 
It is clear that the formalistic view does not preclude the representative from acting in the 
interest of the constituents. It is relevant in the understanding of representation if it is seen from 
the perspective that the representatives have to be authorised first before they begin to act in 
the interest of those whom they represent. The act of representation begins at the point where 
the representative is authorised and continues as they act on behalf of those they represent. This 
however, is not without accountability as they must continually give account to them and act 
on behalf of their preferred interest. It is in this sense that we can distinguish true and genuine 
democratic representation. It is wrong to say that representatives can be given authority to act 
without any obligation or some form of control on how they carry out their activity. No 
representative should be completely non-responsive to sanctions. If representation is restricted 
to the formalistic view alone, it will only tell the representative’s capacity to bind others and 
not the obligation to conform to some standards or acts in accordance with certain special 
considerations.193 Speaking of representation in the formalistic sense alone means that 
representation has been invoked but not necessarily that the act of representing is actually 
taking place. It is in the actions of the representative that the act of representation can be 
determined not in the mere conferment of the powers to represent. There is need to distinguish 
the authoritative aspects of this definition of representation from that of Hobbes which sees 
representation as a means of reinforcing absolute sovereignty and whose action is legitimate 
and binding on those whom they represent, or in terms of the ascription of rights and the 
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consequences of the action of the one who acts as ascribed to someone else other than the one 
who acts.  
 
In representation, there are formal rights and consequences that emanate from the relationship 
between the representative and the constituents. This has to do with the substantive contents of 
what the representative does in the course of representing. By restricting the view of 
representation to authorisation without taking into consideration other aspects of the word, 
representation is incomplete as such there is the need to relate it with what the representatives 
do. This is what will enable an assessment of whether the representative is representing well 
or not. This view is essential in determining the limits and responsibility of the representative, 
but, it does not tell much about the actual nature of representative politics in a democratic 
society.194 It is for this reason that the view has been criticised as incomplete, unrealistic and 
limited in value.195 Its problem lies in the fact that, while in office, all the actions of the 
representatives are counted as representing irrespective of the quality of that action.196 
 
2.3 Descriptive View of Representation  
 
Descriptive representation is said to be when the outward physical appearance of the 
representative resembles that of the constituents.197 The representatives here are expected to 
think, feel, reason and act like their constituents. Advocates of this view feel that without the 
legislature being a reflection of the society there cannot be true representation.198 This view is 
more inclined with the composition of the legislature and how the members correspond to or 
resemble what they represent. What is most important here is that the constituents are made 
present and they are being heard. 
 
According to JS Mill, a representative body is an arena in which each opinion in the nation can 
produce itself in full light.199 Going by this, representation is seen to be more attuned to 
minority concerns as members who share constituents’ concerns are elected into office.200 
Downs who also view representation in its descriptive sense, perceive the job of the 
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representatives as an agent of the political party with the duty to tell the party what the people 
want and on the other hand tell the people about the party.201 Downs approach to representation 
is from the economic point of view and his argument is consistent with the point that, where 
the people have no will or do not know what they want, then they are not represented.202 
Representation in this sense can be equated with giving of information and what makes 
representatives good is how well they are able to give information.203 The belief is that, the 
more descriptive representatives are in the system, the more the feeling of alienation among 
constituents tend to decline. Thus, a sense of contentedness is created amongst the constituents 
and this serve as a motivation for engagement of citizens. 
 
However, it has been argued that attempts to make descriptive representation consistent with 
the principles of democracy to the point that it will be proportional has proved to be elusive, 
useless and insincere because it really does not fill the gap between the representatives and 
their constituents.204 Critics have also argued that proponents of this view are mainly 
preoccupied with the composition of the legislature and are ignorant of the importance of 
governance.205 This view of representation seemingly neglects political actions and this makes 
it vulnerable to criticism.206 Although, representation here seems to have moved from just 
‘standing for’ or mere resemblance with the citizens because the giving of information can be 
said to be some form of activity, it neither entails authorisation nor accountability. It is only 
restricted to the act of talking.  If we consider the different range of activity that might be 
subsumed in the act of representation, we will come to the conclusion that representatives are 
not elected just for the mere purpose of talking. As a part of government, they are meant to 
govern in the interest of the constituents and apart from talking, they have to be seen to 
physically engage in activities that bring good to their constituents.  
 
Recent studies have shown a link between descriptive representation and policy output.207 It 
has also been found to lead to the inclusion of minorities.208 However, representation as a 
resemblance of the people raises the question of what characteristics are worthy to be reflected 
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in the course of representation and this tends to vary with time and place. Constituents vary 
with regards to their religious, ethnic and socio-political affiliations and this in itself is very 
fluid as people tend to change all the time. Therefore, if this resemblance is used as a 
justification for representation, then it poses a problem because the degree of accuracy will no 
longer guarantee the degree of similarity of action.209 
 
Eulau has argued that, the characteristics of legislators with regards to their relations to 
constituents determine to a large extent what the representatives will do.210 Therefore, in line 
with this argument, what is essential is to show how representatives act in such a way that the 
interests of constituents are taken into consideration. When we assume that people’s 
characteristics will determine their actions, we ignore the fact that the best fit in terms of 
resemblance may not necessarily be the best representative in terms of government activity. 
 
Viewed from the descriptive sense alone, representatives do not have to act for others rather 
what they do is to stand for them. The legislature is said to be representative first, because 
voters tend to select people of their own kind to represent them in office. They can identify 
with these representatives because they share certain characteristics in terms of socio-economic 
and may be intellectual attributes, but this can only be interpreted as their representativeness. 
It does not show the representative as doing anything while in office. There is need to know 
how this representativeness relates with representing in the interest of constituents. The 
question as to whether representatives are responsive to the preferences of their constituents 
must be seen in their actions and not in what they stand for or look like. If descriptive 
representatives are more in tune with the needs of their constituents, then they will likely attain 
a high evaluation and be said to represent well.  Otherwise, the benefit of a descriptive 
representative only goes to show the dyadic relationship that exists between representatives 
and constituents, and nothing else. 
 
Generally, the characteristics of the representatives can be discussed because it may in some 
way determine what the representatives will do. This has to be shown in relevance to their 
behaviour and how it affects their actions and the content or the laws they turn out at the end 
of the day. It is in this way descriptive representation can be essential and in it is the obligation 
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of accountability. Linking it with the formal view might make this definition of representation 
more plausible as people can only be held accountable for what they have done and not for 
what they are. This view by itself may not tell us what representation fully is, but can still 
account for a part of the explanation for what political representation in a democratic society 
means. Proponents of this view may seem concerned about the composition of the legislature, 
it could be argued that they care about this composition because they feel that it will determine 
the activities and actions which will invariably reflect or depict the interest of the citizens they 
represent. This reflects the opinion of Mill when he says that “it will enable all views and 
criticisms to come to light”.211 Thus, representation does not just have to be a reflection, 
correspondence or an accurate depiction of something rather, it should be capable of action and 
that action should be in the interest of those it represents. 
 
Although, using how the legislators correspond accurately to their constituents to evaluate how 
they can reflect or act in their interest has not been very prominent in political studies. It is of 
importance in telling us how they are able to effectively engage with their constituents because 
they can identify with them. This no doubt has been found to lead to high levels of efficacy and 
trust,212 which are all valuable qualities in any representative democratic system. It will no 
doubt, make constituents to feel more empowered and to think that their needs are being 
represented. Invariably, an argument can be made that, the total community of interest has a 
right to participate in the deliberation that goes on in parliament and that is representation.  
 
As Rehfeld argues, a major problem plaguing political representation is the exclusion of 
constituents and one way of dealing with this is to increase the descriptive similarity between 
legislators and the people it excludes.213 By doing this, representatives will have the relevant 
information that will enable them to make good decisions with which to represent their 
constituents well.  This will give them the proper perspective since they are purported to share 
the same characteristics with those they represent. This can also be used to increase the 
diversity of legislators in the house.  
 
Given the importance of the use of descriptive representation to increase the diversity of the 
parliament, its relevance cannot be overlooked. At the same time, if taken on its own it does 
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not give the full meaning of what representation entails or enable us to distinguish good from 
bad representation. This view of representation as it is suggested could be used for the purpose 
of supplying information about the represented. That is, if we accept that representation is 
making present something that is absent.214 However, there are no substantive acts to it as it 
has the implication of assuming that governance is not for the legislature. It assumes that the 
legislature is only there to give assent to questions put before them by the executives which 
implies that governance is only with the executive arm. This in fact is not the correct position. 
Focus on the interconnectedness of the descriptive and substantive dimensions of 
representation is necessary if we must properly define the concept. The discussion will now 
focus on representation as a symbol and the extent to which it adds to our understanding of 
representation. 
 
2.4  Symbolic View of Representation  
 
The symbolic view of representation like the descriptive view has also been conceived as 
‘standing for’. This view regards representatives as symbols that represent constituents who, 
although absent, can be made present.215 Representatives are seen in terms of what they are or 
what they stand for, but not in terms of any activity. This form of representation can be taken 
to be central or definitive as writers of this view consider representation in theoretical terms to 
be seen as a symbolization of something just as a flag represents a nation.216 In this sense, 
symbolic representatives are meant to express appropriate feeling for what they stand for. Their 
connection to their constituents is not in terms of resemblance but in terms of people’s beliefs 
and attitudes. Representation here is borne with recognition and the conditions that brings it to 
existence are   irrational psychological responses. This is arbitrary in the sense that its 
relationship with those it represents is hidden. The crucial test of representation here is whether 
the representative is believed in, and the basis of such belief can be said to be irrational as there 
may not be any justification for such a belief. This conception invariably makes political 
representation a state of affairs rather than an activity. If the constituents believe that the 
representative is representing them, then representation suffices, if not then there is no 
representation. All that is necessary would be the acceptance of the constituents as against what 
the representative does in the course of representation. Representatives have to be believed in 
and such belief must be fostered or created in the minds of those they represent. 
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Looking at it from this sense, one may come to the conclusion that all political leaders are 
representatives as long as those under their authority accept them to be so.217 This means that 
the symbol is supposed to invoke or express a feeling appropriate to what it stands for. 
However, what needs to be asked is the kind of response representatives invoke in those they 
represent. The answer to this may be that representation is conceived here not merely as a proxy 
for their objects but as a vehicle for what it symbolises.218 Put in this sense, representation can 
be said to be a condition when characteristics and acts of a person in a position of power in the 
society is in accordance with the desires of the represented. What is important here is the 
satisfaction of the represented. However, there is the need to understand that this feeling of 
satisfaction may exist in some individuals while it may be lacking in others. Therefore, to 
generalise it as a condition for representation in a whole nation may seem problematic. 
 
The main concern with this view is that, it looks only at the attitudes and beliefs of the 
represented to establish whether representation is taking place or not. Representation is 
measured by the state of mind and the feeling of satisfaction or belief of certain people. It does 
not matter how the constituents are kept satisfied, whether it is in how the representatives look 
or with what they do. Representation here has nothing to do with the accurate reflection of the 
will of the people. It is conceived as working on the minds of people who are to accept what 
that symbol stands for rather than the symbol itself.219 This concept of representation is rather 
passive. What should account for representation is how representatives try to make themselves 
acceptable to the people by their actions which are in line with the needs of constituents. This 
is what will give the justification for the representative being recognised as such. The 
representative does not seem to care for what the constituents want. Rather they tend to make 
them conform to their own, that is, the representative’s views. Whatever means that is effective 
in achieving this purpose is used to make constituents conform. This makes representation a 
situation where the leader exercises his power over the represented.220 A distinction has to be 
made between practical activity that is in the interest of constituents and expressive symbolic 
actions because these are merely ceremonial functions. Representatives here are seen as not the 
active force behind the decisions that are made, rather they are merely symbols of the office.  
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Though symbolic representation in some sense can be seen as an instance of representation, it 
does not give a full explanation of the meaning of representation. Using symbols to depict 
representation may be considered as working on the minds of people who are to accept what 
that symbol stands for rather than the symbol itself. This means that for a representative to 
represent symbolically such a representative must be believed in. That means members of the 
legislature must in the first instance be accepted by the citizens to be such representatives. If 
the characteristics and acts of representatives are in accordance with the desires of their 
constituents, then representation suffices. It must be noted however that this definition in itself 
imposes a restraint in terms of responsiveness to constituents. Interest responsiveness in this 
instance is difficult to assess as there are no acts or reasons for which the representative is 
accepted. It is worth noting that, it is not in terms of symbols alone that representation can be 
achieved. These symbols have a higher chance of acceptance from constituents when this 
acceptance is as a result of substantive acts done in constituents’ interests. When people accept 
symbols or in this case representatives, there must be a reason why they accept them. Therefore, 
there is need to find that realm of action that representatives are engaged in to give substance 
to why they are so accepted. This form of representation is what is considered next.    
 
2.5 Substantive View of Representation 
 
This view of representation is centred on the activity and the role of the representatives. It has 
been held to be the most important dimension of representation.221 Representation here is seen 
as a certain characteristic activity that is defined by certain behavioural norms or certain things 
that the representative is expected to do which differentiates it from other forms of 
representation. The status of the representative here is defined not just in terms of formal 
arrangements that initiate or terminate the representation or symbols or descriptive samples, 
but in terms of the nature of the activity that is performed by the representative. It is this view 
of representation that will enable us to discuss the obligation of the representative as an agent 
or an actor for others.222 This is what will tell us whether the representative actually represents 
the people.  
 
Research on substantive representation owes much to Pitkin’s work. Pitkin’s understanding of 
representation places substantive acts of representatives at the heart of political representation. 
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Her definition of representation as “acting in the interests of the represented in a manner 
responsive to them”223 connotes that their actions are imperative for them to say they are 
representing. She argues that the reason their role is referred to as representative is because 
they are to speak for, act for and look after the interest of those they represent.224 This definition 
see representation as a guiding principle of actions. Based on this principle, it has been argued 
that there is a grant of power to men of special knowledge and capacity subject to responsibility 
for result.225 Whether this is true for representation will depend on how representatives uphold 
and function in their representative capacities. Persons that are entrusted with the power to 
represent are entrusted with such power because it is thought that they will deliver and perform 
on behalf of those who entrusted them with the power. There is that reasonable expectation that 
they will bring back good to them. This somehow makes them accountable. This form of 
representation requires a special kind of behaviour and obligation which the representative is 
expected to exhibit.226As Pitkin argues, they are not expected to act in any way they like, but 
to act putting the interests of those they represent and not their own interest into consideration. 
They are expected to be more cautious and less willing to take risk and to act in the knowledge 
that they would eventually be held accountable for their actions.227  
 
Although for some writers, representation might have no implication for accountability, but if 
seen in terms of looking after the interest of others, then that implication becomes obvious. 
This is true irrespective of the view of representation that is held. Once it is agreed that such 
powers are not meant for the use of the representatives themselves, but for others, it naturally 
follows that they must act in line with certain principles. This is because there is that presumed 
prior existence of the represented and the implications that representative acts must be for their 
benefit. Thus, a situation where people have expectation from the government arises and the 
government is meant to live up to that expectation.  
 
There is no doubt that, the importance of a representative government is, in part, due to the 
diversity and complexity of modern societies which makes it expedient for people to have 
representatives especially in government. These representatives tend to have that specialisation 
of function that they are expected to bring to bear in the service to their constituents. As true 
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representatives of the people, they do those things that their constituents would want them to 
do. This does not necessarily mean that constituents give the command to the representatives 
who must follow it at all times. What it means is that there are certain issues which are dear or 
of importance to the constituents and the representatives should not be seen to be deviating 
from those concerns or issues rather they should respond appropriately to them.228 Here the 
autonomy of representatives is also being upheld. Its importance to representation lies in the 
fact that there may be situations where constituents’ preferences may be incoherent or even 
changeable over time and in conflict with their true levels of interests. In such situations it 
becomes the responsibility of the representatives to judge those potential conflict and practical 
constraints through a process of participation and deliberation with constituents and arrive at 
an agreeable course of action.  
 
It follows then that representation is not a one-off arrangement, it is not an ‘event’. It is a 
‘process’229 which entails constituents entrusting their affairs into the hands of representatives 
at various intervals through periodic elections. After the elections, there is still that constant 
engagement with constituents in order to keep in touch with their interests. This connection 
will enable constituents to evaluate the actions of representatives to see how well they perform. 
Given the importance of this function, there is need for such standard of accountability without 
which the acts of the representative cannot be measured. 
 
Classical theories on political representation have argued that citizens entrust the authority to 
act on their behalf to representatives who should be free from the wishes and opinion of the 
people.230 They argue that representative government by its essential nature is meant to be like 
a trusteeship.231 This school of thought is of the view that the nation entrusts the Parliament to 
act on its behalf as a trustee and it exercises its powers under the terms of that trust. The 
individual members are said to hold that trust as well and are expected to fulfil it.232 
 
However, it can be said that since trust is a legal arrangement that should be for the benefit of 
the beneficiaries, then invariably a trustee can be held accountable and must be responsible to 
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administer such trust to the benefit of others.  In the same manner, it is that feeling of 
expectation and obligation that surrounds the investiture that will elicit from the representative 
the desired behaviour that will make them act in line with the terms of that trust and in the 
interest of constituents. This is implicit in the substantive notion of representation, as it 
connotes that the power of government given to representative is meant to be used for the 
benefit of others and not for themselves. They have a duty to act in a certain way. In doing this 
the interests of citizens must be taken into consideration.  
 
Invariably, the concept of representation is useful to us when we talk of humans and how their 
actions are involved rather than as symbols of abstractions like the symbolic view present, or 
as notions of resemblance as the descriptive view present. The substantive view is the view that 
is invoked when a person is formally ascribed to act as a representative. It is also this view of 
representation that tends to give the representatives the right perception of what is required of 
them as representatives233 and the standards with which to judge their action. By using their 
action to determine representation, it does not only show the performance of the representative, 
it also shows the reason for non-performance. This can be measured effectively and possible 
solutions that could make performance better pursued.  
 
The other views of representation has been shown not to describe effectively a good 
representative overall because they fail to include their representative acts.  Thus, it is important 
that, for a complete understanding of the concept of representation, that representative acts be 
involved. The representative characteristics can only be complete and relevant in so far as it 
affects their action and nothing else. This is why substantive representation has been and 
remains the most important way that citizens influence political outcomes through their 
representatives. Going by this view, representatives implicitly have limits and standards to 
which they must conform. There is also that normative duty on them to act in ways that are 
acceptable. From such actions it can be deduced whether or not representation has taken place.  
 
The reason for the distinction between substantive representation and the other accounts of 
representation is their incompleteness as they fail to explain representative acts nor give 
account for the way a representative ought to represent. However, the fact is that, the 
representative process starts at the point when the representative is elected into office. 
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Although, this does not mean they represent constituents automatically by virtue of that 
election, it shows that they have been formally authorised. Also, the elected members may 
reflect the social topography of the constituents, but this also only shows the representativeness 
of the parliament and how members are able to act as informants without performing other 
form of activity. By emphasising on action, attention is paid to the crisis in representation that 
needs to be brought to the fore and this makes such act allude to some ideal in representation. 
This is necessary so that, citizens are able to express their dissatisfaction if they are not 
represented in the right manner. This to a large extent depends heavily on the role of judgment 
and the indirect influence of the citizens. Through the electoral system, representatives are 
expected to comply with certain norms by which they can be recognised and judged always 
during their time in office and not only at the end of their electoral mandate. Thus, by accepting 
their candidacy, they submit their actions to the judgement of the people and it is no longer for 
them alone to judge the positions which they take but for the citizens as well to do.  
 
It is worth noting that much of the controversy surrounding the concept of representation has 
been due to the fact that the study essentially has focused on roll call voting.  In as much as this 
may be important, it has diverted attention from the output and what the representatives do in 
the course of representation. Even though a lot is known around the concept of representation, 
studies have been silent on the substance of representation. The lack of empirical evaluation of 
action is evidence that the absence of substance hinders our understanding of the concept of 
representation. Representative action is that concrete transaction without which specific 
implicit assumptions which will produce testable predictions for accomplishing representation 
cannot be made.  As much as a parliament is interested in legislating,234 it must also be 
interested in how its members are representing because the extent to which its policy objectives 
are achieved depends on how members represent.    
 
Thus, in discussing what representation connotes, I argue that the removal of substantive action 
in the study of representation hinders the progress of how the policy process works in any given 
society. This will constantly result in incorrect inferences about what political representation 
is all about. There are consequences for getting this wrong or only partially correct because the 
introduction of an accurate account of the concept of representation could reshape the process 
of representation itself and account for better representation. 
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Overall, given such an array of suggestive meaning for the concept of representation, it 
becomes obvious why the meaning of representation in political reality is less accessible and 
frequently contested. Since the different explanations are unable to give a complete picture of 
the concept, the best way forward is to bring them together to give a systematic approach in 
the study of representation. This way, scholars can make connection with the formal 
authorisation, the representativeness and the acts of the representative in the study of 
representation. This also means that in the study of representation, there is need to move beyond 
the study of political behaviour in the parliament and a complete reliance on roll call voting 
alone,235 towards the activities of the representatives to see how they account for representation. 
In doing so, a distinction need not be made between the different forms of representation, rather 
what is needed is to consider their relationship and how combined they can provide a fuller 
meaning to the concept of representation. Representation in the substantive sense is meant to 
grow out of the other three usages. A critical analysis of these views points to the fact that they 
each give account of an aspect of the concept but together they give a deeper understanding of 
the concept of representation. With this view in mind, the next section will look at how this 
understanding of representation is applicable in Nigeria.  
 
2.6 Applying the Forms of Representation to Nigeria.  
 
The analysis in this section applies the understanding of representation to the context of this 
study. It is seen that political representation is not an objective process that has uniformity in 
all jurisdictions. While some jurisdictions use representation as a means to identify civil 
liberties, political pluralism and political participation and to provide a choice for the electorate 
to select candidate in a free and fair election, others employ authoritarian methods that on the 
long run have the effect of impeding the cause of democracy. This seems to be the situation in 
Nigeria. As a result of this, many areas that are analysed in this discussion may come true in 
the politics of Nigeria, but a lot of them might likely prove deviant.  
 
Firstly, in line with the formalistic view, the process of representation is brought about through 
formal election of members into the National and State Houses of Assembly and these 
legislators stand as representatives on behalf of the people. Simply put, these members are 
elected from single member constituencies by constituents who desire to elect candidates that 
they feel will represent their (the constituents) interests. It can be said that election is the most 
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important element in the concept of representation in the Nigerian Political system as it is 
equated with the granting of authority. However, viewed from the point of election alone, one 
would be forced to come to the conclusion that most of the representatives are illegitimate 
occupants of their offices as their election, conduct and mode of selection do not meet any 
plausible account of legitimacy.236 This is because, in the Nigerian electoral system, parties put 
forward their candidates that have emerged from their individual party primaries and voters are 
left to make their choices from the candidates that are put forward by the parties. The role that 
money and ‘godfatherism’237 may have played during this process raises the question whether 
constituents really have a choice in the matter. This question is raised in the light of politicians 
who as representatives are easily bought and very likely to change sides when their personal 
interest is compromised. For instance, about one-fifth of the representatives elected in the 2015 
elections were politicians who crossed over to opposition parties on account of alleged unfair 
and undemocratic treatment by their original parties.238  
 
The underlining character of politics in Nigeria with its manifest intra-party crises and 
nomination of candidates for election into political offices is mainly inconsistent with the 
constitution and the electoral laws.239 The indiscriminate abuse of democratic principles which 
sees candidates handpicked by political “heavy weights” in the party with utter disregard for 
the internal democracy of the parties goes a long way to show that ascertaining the level of fit 
between models of good democratic practices and the actual political processes proves very 
defective. In view of the dynamics and the selection-distortion, the argument may be that voters 
have lost their power of control because even though they decide to remove the representatives 
on the grounds that they do not share their interest, they still do not have the power to choose 
one who will share their interest. Thus, relying on the formal view alone to understand the 
concept of representation in Nigeria may be a problem.   
 
                                                          
236 As noted by prominent writers in Nigeria, the history of election in Nigeria has been characterised by election rigging and 
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So far, it has become obvious that democratic norms in Nigeria do not reflect the transparency 
they deserve.240 Constituents are limited in their ability to elect political leaders directly 
constrained by the powers maintained by a few powerful elites in the political system. This 
ensures that change in the representation process will proceed albeit slowly if it happens. 
However, it can be argued that the value of the formal view is in the formal authorisation itself. 
Since political representatives operate within a formal structural context which ought to shape 
the boundaries of their activity, it is argued that how they go about these activities in line with 
the rules both formal and those that are rules of party conduct are essential in judging how they 
function. The formal framework enables us to compare the seemingly irreconcilable goals of 
the individual representative and the broad objective of good democratic values that is etched 
on the principles of equity, fairness and transparency. The extent to which their activities align 
with the broad objectives of advancing the interests of their constituents in particular and the 
overall democratic cause in general is the level to which they can be said to have succeeded in 
the acts of representation. Thus, elections and the formal investiture is an indispensable part 
that makes representation complete and legitimate, but the activities of representatives 
irrespective of how they are authorised is what can be used to hold them to account.   
 
In considering the CDF, for example, it is designed to make the representatives act in a 
responsive manner to their constituents. Ideally, elected representatives who fail to represent 
their constituent's preferences and interest face the increased risk of being defeated in the next 
election. The desire to retain power ordinarily should be an incentive to act in the interest of 
constituents. Without the threat of electoral replacement, representatives may be driven by their 
own selfish motivations.241  Thus it can be argued that election encourages the dissemination 
of the representative’s presence and transforms their function in an ongoing regulated job 
where they have to contest within the existing policies and reconstruct the legitimacy of the 
process by their acts of representation. Although electoral authorisation is essential to 
determine the limits of their responsibility and political power, it does not tell us the nature of 
political representation in the society. What it shows us is a responsible and limited 
government, but not a representative government.242  
                                                          
240 Samuel Oni in his work ‘The Legislature and Constituency Representation in the Fourth Republic of Nigeria’s 
Democratic Governance, Ife Psycologia 21(2) 2013 232 describes the legislative institution as underdeveloped, 
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241 Larry M. Bartels, Joshua D Clinton, John G Geer, Representation for Oxford Handbook of American Political 
Development, working paper 03 (2013) 6. 
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The descriptive view of representation maintains that the identity of representatives determine 
how they act and as such matters for policy decisions.243 This view predicts that increasing a 
groups political representation could lead to an increase in their policy influence and how they 
are responsive towards those groups of people. Although, there is very little and conflicting 
evidence in both developed and developing countries on whether politicians favour those who 
belong to their group in policy making in their actions, understanding the impact of the 
representative’s identity is important as it has distributional implications.   
 
In the Nigerian context, whether or not descriptive representation has led to the representatives 
acting in the interest of their constituents is debatable. Regardless of this fact, the effect of 
descriptive representation and how it can improve the way representatives represent can still 
not be underestimated. If members who share the preferences of the constituents are placed in 
parliament, they will be more inclined to relate with their constituents and get the overall 
interest of the community which invariably is their own interest. This will encourage 
participation of citizens and enhance political empowerment amongst the constituents. Also, 
the feeling of contentedness in constituents to know that they have their own representing them 
in Parliament is enough to spur that needed engagement and participation from the constituents.  
 
Hence the use of descriptive representation in Nigeria can be seen in the distribution of 
positions in government institutions. Like other Constitutions around the world, the Nigerian 
constitution also gives specific guidelines about eligibility to be a member of the National 
Assembly and State Houses of Assembly. In terms of age, the members of the senate must be 
at least thirty-five years old and the members of the House of Representatives thirty-years old. 
They must be citizens of Nigeria with a minimum educational level of a secondary school 
certificate or its equivalent.244 I may also add here that such a person must be an indigene of 
the state constituency district from which they are being elected.245 
 
Although, these statistics may not guarantee that legislators reflect the society, and as such 
would be able to represent their interest. It can be argued that, if legislators represent 
constituents that are more diverse than they are, there is the tendency that they may be limited 
in their views as to what their preferred interest would be. Nigeria being a multi-ethnic state 
                                                          
243 Besley T and Coate S, “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy”, Quarterly Journal of Economics (1997) 112 
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244 S. 65, 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as Amended). 
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with more than 250 languages and subcultures, there is wisdom in using descriptive 
representation. This brings me to the claim that, there is the likelihood of minority districts not 
being able to have their way as the majority will always out vote them on policy issues. This 
can be fixed by quota laws and policies like the Affirmative Action Policy endorsed by Nigeria 
from the Beijing Declaration and Platform Form for Action (BPFA) provided for in Goal 3 of 
the Millennium Development Goal (MDG).246 This is currently being employed in Europe and 
other Latin American Countries.247 
 
The third view of representation talks about symbols and from the analysis it is seen that 
descriptive likeness is not the only basis on which representatives can “stand for” constituents 
making them present by their presence. The symbolic view proposes that, under the right 
circumstances representatives stand for constituents. This also means that this view of 
representation can be central to the meaning of the concept. This is so because representatives 
can be deemed to embody and be the symbol of unity of the people they represent.248 This they 
do by conventional relationship with them and as such they are expected to display attitudes 
that are appropriate to the constituents they stand for and this in turn evokes a belief in the 
people that their interests would be represented. There may be no logical justification for this 
belief other than the connection that is purely conventional. It is for this reason that writers 
who emphasise symbolic representation as central usually stress the role of irrational 
psychological responses in bringing about the condition for representation.249  
 
Although symbolic representation cannot be taken as definitive, it is an instance of 
representation with its own peculiarities which may not necessarily discard the meaning of 
other kinds of representation. It is important for the constituents to believe in those that 
represent them, but that is when they make themselves acceptable by their actions. As Pitkin 
has argued, in the definition of representation, the acts of the representative and the meaning 
of representation are intimately connected.250 
 
It is therefore argued that, the concept of representation cannot be right without bringing in the 
issues of how the representative acts in a responsive manner to further the interest of those they 
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represent. The lack of measures that capture accomplishments, especially outside the 
parliament, may be the reason for the lack of proper understanding of the concept of 
representation is not had because it seems the political reality outside the parliament is not 
known. As Ankersmit notes, political reality does not exist before the representation but only 
exists through it.251 This means, the visual acts of representation give us the tools with which 
to analyse the process of representation.  
 
The CDF as the case study presents the direct measure for legislative accomplishment and this 
is based on actual acts which can be measured through simple correlation of constituent’s 
interest. Using the CDF as a specific subject of analysis enables one to focus on the institutions, 
rules and norms that guide the policy outcome and this can be translated to other policy areas. 
It uncovers findings that would show whether the representatives represent well or not. The 
possible direct effect of their action can be seen on how well it matches the need of the society. 
Invariably, it is also the need of the society that determines its particular policy. In this case of 
the CDF, the infrastructural deficit, especially in the rural communities is what drives the CDF 
policy. The proper implementation of it depends on the representatives being responsive to the 
interest of constituents. Responsiveness to constituents is what matters in measuring the actions 
of the legislator to determine whether they represent constituents well or not. The CDF shows 
a particular example of how the actions of the legislators can be measured against the 
preferences of the constituents. Using this policy initiative, legislators can act on behalf of their 
constituents by bringing in infrastructure to improve the living conditions of constituents. If we 
attend to what they do, we see that they act to represent the interest of their constituents and 
thereby promote the functioning of the democratic institutions in diverse ways. 
 
Consequently, in the effort to understand the pattern of representation in Nigeria, I argue that, 
not taking the actions of the representatives into consideration leads to making an incorrect 
inference as to what representation is and this invariably affect the outcome of the 
representation itself. Thus, if we must arrive at a clear and accurate understanding and 
characterisation of the concept of representation, an explanation of the concept must be done 




                                                          





The different accounts of representation are only one of empirical measurement. At the core of 
it is still the question of whether the representatives are representing the interests of constituent.  
No doubt political representation occurs when there is a relationship between the constituents 
and a representative, but the quality of this relationship to a large extent depends on the 
behaviour of both parties and the representative’s role perception. The fact that representatives 
have been authorised and resemble their constituents only tells us a part of the story, it does 
not tell us whether they are representing their interest or not. The composition of the parliament 
only tells of its representativeness and accounts for its legitimacy but does not say how the 
actions of the representatives are to be carried out in the interest of the represented. Therefore, 
in the course of investigating the conditions under which representation occurs, there is the 
need to have a proper definition of the concept of representation.  
 
Many scholars equate being a democratic representative with being duly elected into office.252 
In as much as this is a first step for the making of the representative, the acts of the 
representative also count as important in determining what political representation entails. The 
representative after having the requisite authority has to fulfil certain functions within the 
democratic polity and this requires that they employ certain methods and relationships253 How 
these functions are performed is what determines how well they represent. This means that, 
representation as an activity not only requires a distinctive function but also a characteristic 
effect within a democratic polity.254 In piecing together the various aspects of representation, 
we are able to identify the source of authority and the mechanism of accountability that can be 
used as a standard for the representatives to comply with. It will also elicit in the representatives 
the proper behaviour that will enable them to excel in representing in a democratic fashion. 
 
Most literature do not adequately identify standards to evaluate representatives and hold them 
accountable.255 These standards need to be related to their actions. Thus, the view that focuses 
only on the procedures of authorisation and accountability are said to be minimalist view of 
representation.256 It sees a situation where there are fair elections, basic liberties and the rule 
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of law is operational to an extent, as indication that democratic representation is taking place. 
This is not always the case. The question that needs to be asked is what if these systems of 
authorisation are faulty? On such occasions then it will be taken that the democratic 
representation is bad or good only because the procedures are faulty. However, in situations 
where they are good does that also make the representatives represent their constituents well? 
Formal political institutions like election are important in the understanding of political 
representation because it gives the opportunity of not only authorising the officials, but also 
sanctioning representatives who fail to represent in a democratic manner.257 Still, it does not 
follow that the proper exercise of the procedure of authorisation is what constitutes democratic 
representation. There is the need for us to recognise the central role that election plays in the 
making of the representative and still understand that the activities of representatives while 
performing their function is what contributes to the proper operation of the democratic 
institution. Being elected into political office does not necessarily mean that a person is 
representing in a democratic manner. Such a person must be seen to advocate policies that are 
in the interest of constituents before they can be said to be representing well. Unfortunately, 
what is seen is that theories of representation have failed to pay attention to the actions of the 
legislators outside the parliament. Without the knowledge of what representatives do outside 
the parliament, our understanding of political representation is limited. If their actions are not 
considered, there is no way of knowing whether they are consistent with or in violation of 
democratic standards.258 The standards to which representatives are held to account is the 
central function or characteristics of their activities. The distinctive work that they do by 
representing contributes to the proper implementation of policies and thus to the proper 
function of the democratic system as a whole. When politicians who are informed about the 
needs and conditions of marginalised societies fail to ensure that their actions are responsive 
enough to alleviate the suffering of the constituents in communities, they cannot be said to 
represent those constituency interest, but some other interest which may be their own personal 
interest. Such constituents can readily see that they have not been represented and ensure that 
such representatives are not returned to office.  
 
Given the dynamics of representation and constituents interests, I argue that only actions that 
are responsive to the preferred interests of constituents should bring us to the conclusion that a 
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legislator is representing constituents. If representation is defined in terms of activity as 
opposed to just formal authorisation, description or symbolism, it has the potential of binding 
citizens to their democratic institution and fostering loyalty to the institution.259 It also serves 
as a connection between the constituents and their representatives giving meaning to 
democratic commitments.  In addition to that, it shows the changes in the way that constituents 
are being represented and the scope of political representation in the society and this is crucial 
to the proper implementation of policies.  
 
The activities of representatives also suggest the form of control that can be exercised over 
them. It is a fact that citizens who vote for representatives as a result of their campaign pledges 
get it wrong by assuming that they have given formal authorisation to those who will further 
their interest. As Mansbridge puts it, representation is no longer promissory.260 Therefore, to 
assume that the formal character of the legislature is what would secure the proper operation 
of democratic institution will get it wrong. What is important is to view the activities of the 
different representatives who influence and implement policy proposals and hold them to 
certain standards only then can the proper operation of democratic institutions be effectively 
secured. Seen in this light, it allows citizens to judge and subject representatives to certain 
ethical standards so that those who alter the distribution of goods to citizens can be held 
accountable for their actions. Such representatives should be subject to criticism when they fail 
to meet these standards. It is hoped that this will be a way to adequately address such 
vulnerabilities on the part of local constituencies.  
 
By virtue of being elected, representatives are given the authority to advance policies on behalf 
of their constituents and this provides the institutional incentive for the representatives to be 
responsive to the interest of their constituents.261 By such authorisation, they acquire the 
necessary right for being legitimate democratic advocates and it is only reasonable and moral 
that they should be held accountable.  Representatives need to recognise the facts that their 
authority to act depends in part on the moral ends they serve and the perception of the citizens 
of those moral ends.262   Addressing these norms assumes that, representation is intended to be 
something more than mere authorisation or reflection of perspectives. Rather, it is an effective 
way of governing whereby citizens choose representatives to act in their interest in a manner 
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that they will not have the time or the inclination to do and such constituents are entitled to 
keep legal or moral control over their representatives.263This authority and legitimacy that is 
conferred on the representatives are very important and should be guided if they are to enhance 
democratic institutions. Such level of authority and legitimacy requires that representatives 
engage properly and represent the interest of those who would hold them accountable because 
citizens are entitled to justifiably criticise their actions. The extent to which their actions are 
lawful and morally justifiable is what determines whether they are representing their 
constituents or not. 
 
From the descriptive point of view the quality of representation is believed to be increased for 
members of certain group because representatives tend to have certain experiences that are akin 
to that group. By virtue of their distinct experiences and unique connections they may seem to 
be able to represent that group. In this way, representatives are able to look within that group 
for conceptions of interest and principles derived from their own backgrounds as a basis for 
action. This Mansbridge terms to be gyroscopic representation.264 It is legitimate as long as it 
falls within the substance of representation and has to do with the actions of the representatives 
rather than what they stand for. 
 
Although, one may not always tell the specific behaviour that underlines each type of 
representation, yet it is possible to see the power relation in each form of representation and 
the normative criteria that is appropriate to each for which representatives tend to strive. 
Nevertheless, this analysis highlights the notion that other factors are readily visible in defining 
the concept of representation, but the substantive acts of the representative is a crucial 




This chapter has highlighted some key areas within the meaning of the concept of 
representation that have previously been seen as separate definitions of the concept. It has 
pointed out their inability to give a complete picture of what representation entails. I argue that 
for a deeper understanding of the concept, there is need to link the formal, descriptive, symbolic 
and the substantive meaning of representation together. In this way, representation is redefined 
as an activity of the representatives in the interest of the constituents. This definition is what 
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conforms to the consistency of usage in a democratic society.  This theme is developed and 
used in the thesis to describe the relationship between the representatives and the constituents 
and thus makes a significant contribution to the literature on representation. 
 
In the course of the analysis, each view of representation has been evaluated and it is found 
that their analytical techniques without the substantive acts did not sufficiently cover the 
practice of representation. The formalistic view emphasises the authorisation and the 
accountability of representatives, while the descriptive and symbolic view talks about how 
representatives reflect and are perceived by the society. The meaning of representation as 
acting for others does not dismiss any of these views, rather it sees them as different 
components that are necessary for the acts of representation to be complete. Representatives 
cannot act in the interest of those they represent if they have not been authorised and with this 
authority comes accountability.265 This responsibility is what is implicit in the position and this 
is what connotes being a representative. The problem therefore does not seem to be with the 
institution of representation alone, but in the lack of understanding on the parts of both the 
representatives and the constituents alike about what it means to represent. The great challenge 
then is to create an understanding of representation and to do this, the acts of the representative 
and how they act in constituents’ interest must be looked at. This is what connects the citizens 
to their representatives and gives a complete picture of democratic representation. 
  
                                                          







THE ROLE OF LAW, ETHICS AND RESPONSIBILITY IN REPRESENTATION 
 
3.1    Introduction   
 
This chapter explores ways that could be devised to enable representatives’ focus more on the 
interests of constituents and provide better representation to them. The present position has 
shown disillusionment with the lack of responsiveness to citizens in the representative process. 
Indeed, responsiveness of representatives to the interests of constituents is strictly associated 
with their understanding of their representative role coupled with the capacity of the democratic 
institution and processes to bolster the dimensions of rights, equality and accountability in any 
system.266 However, the major challenge lies in the fact that the role of the representative is not 
always clear and there is no universally accepted description for the duty of a representative.267 
This being the case, every representative seems to have their own definition of what it means 
to represent. This does not mean that every view is justifiable. There must be superior choices 
between alternative actions that are ethically acceptable against others. Since democratic 
representatives are judged by what they accomplish, it follows then that, there should be some 
guidance in terms of the rule of law, rules of ethics and responsibility that state how they should 
act in relation to constituents. 
 
The above principles can guide representatives to be more effective in their jobs. These 
guidelines which form the basic elements of most democratic societies are fundamental to their 
proper functioning and a system that overlooks them may be considered deficient. Through 
these guidelines effective representation can be realised. Their acceptance in any society would 
enable the realization of compelling combination of good qualities in democratic 
representation. Taking the approach of what the law provides and what is expected of 
representatives ethically, the level of responsibility of the representatives while carrying out 
their representative roles can be estimated. This also will have an impact on the trust citizens 
have for their representatives and illustrate the added-value of proper guidance in 
representative action in their bid to be responsive to their constituents’ interests.    
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3.2    Why Rules for Representation. 
 
It is important to note that once elected, representatives have certain powers and for them to 
display moral and ethical values in the exercise of those powers, certain well thought out 
standards need to be put in place. Standards concerning their behaviour need to be set up and 
enforced if they are to be held accountable for their activities. This means that a system that 
allows for better regulation of their activities is necessary. This may bring about more 
responsive representation, which is consistent with some form of public service motivation that 
the individual legislator, who intrinsically values the possibility of implementing policies for 
the interests of the citizens may have had before being elected to the office. This is viewed 
from the premise that, no sensible representative aims to be ineffective or to be a bad 
representative of their constituents. However, in carrying out their functions there are some 
challenges that legislators are confronted with which may contribute to them acting in an 
undesirable manner contrary to the interests of their constituents. So, if careful attention is paid 
to rules and ethical principles they would serve as guidelines to the representatives and mitigate 
some of the challenges of representation. 
 
Generally, in most societies, rules tend to develop as a result of perceived problems in the 
political systems and the need to solve those problems within those systems. The development 
of these rules or regulations is meant to meet particular elements in the system. For example, 
deliberative democracy, which is arguably the most influential development within democratic 
theory, has provided the avenue through which focus can be placed on the aggregation of 
citizens’ preferences as the fundamental mechanism for legitimacy.268 The advancement of this 
theory no doubt is in a bid to make the representatives more responsive. The question of 
whether certain guidelines are in place and enforced in the course of performing their function 
is also pertinent for such representation to be effectively measured against those standards and 
be termed good representation. This is often less considered in political discourse because 
mostly, representation borders mainly on behaviour. It is for this reason that there tends to be 
unsatisfactory account of the activities of representatives and how they should conduct 
themselves when acting on behalf of constituents. If measurable guidelines are provided, they 
will not only serve as a yardstick to measure legislative actions but also be a way through which 
constituents can accurately infer proper representation of their interest. 
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Consequently, the ability to make a precise prediction on how these regulations can impact on 
the representation of constituents would also allow us accommodate the argument that other 
factors are also responsible for the lack of representation. It is not just as a result of the citizen’s 
heterogeneous characteristics. The issue of lack of understanding on the part of constituents as 
well as the representatives earlier discussed is also a reason why there is lack of proper 
representation. All these factors play a role in the representation question and their effect cannot 
be ignored. However, while parity between the diversity of the constituents and role orientation 
of the representatives may exist in some situations, the guiding principles that representatives 
follow in the course of representing needs to be considered if the concept of representation can 
be fruitfully theorised and evaluated.  
 
3.3   The Role of Law in Representation. 
   
In examining the role of law in representation, I argue in line with the view of Ibrahim that 
good order is having a system based on abstract rules which are applied on functioning 
institutions which ensure the application of these rules.269 This, in order words, means that the 
actions of those who represent the people need to be guided by the rule of law. This is not just 
considered as an instrument of government, but as a rule to which the entire society including 
those who represent the people would be bound. This is what accounts for good governance 
and advances democratic representation. It entails imbibing the four main posters of good 
governance which in the view of Seidman involves the following: 
 
“governance by rule which means that decision makers decide not pursuant to their 
intuition or passing fancy, but according to the agreed upon norms and grounded in 
reason and experience. They are accountable and justify their decisions publicly, 
conducting government business openly so that the public and the press especially can 
scrutinise their actions and finally ensuring that persons who are likely to be affected 
by potential decisions have the opportunity to make their input.270 
The universal democratic principles advanced in the above submission are the rule of law, 
accountability, openness and participation of citizens. Together these characteristics tend 
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towards ensuring the predictability in any government action. Their persuasiveness as an 
instrument of social change cannot be overemphasised.  
 
3.3.1 The Position of Natural Law 
 
Before an in-depth discussion of the role of law, it is important that we explore the position of 
natural law. As Aubert notes, there is a large number of conceptions of law including coercion 
or force as a central element.271 It is also trite to say that the position of the rule of law with 
regards to representation is mostly shrouded with lack of obligation. If a legal norm is not 
adhered to because the state’s enforcement apparatus is too weak or because no one takes it 
seriously, then that norm is not sociologically valid.272 The way in which some kind of 
obligation can be imputed is if the broader view of natural law from which the rule of law 
derives its basic moral principles is invoked. In that wise, the rule of law cannot be separated 
from its moral sources, as many of its principles are derived directly or indirectly from natural 
law.  
 
Natural law can be viewed as interpretation of the unseen, unwritten law that is identified on 
the gut level as instinctively right or wrong. It relates to our understanding and interpretation 
of behaviour in the broader society and guides us in our judgement of human behaviour based 
upon reason and conscience. The challenge with it is that, its position is always difficult to 
prove to the sceptics. This is due to reference often made to intuition and gut level 
understanding of what is right or wrong, proper conduct and improper conduct in the society. 
However, its relevance here is that, representative obligation can be derived from its realm. 
This is seen from the perspective that; every representative action is examined to see the extent 
to which it is right or wrong and this is based on its morality or otherwise. 
 
As Dewey argues every public act brings a person into association with others who interpret 
these acts as either just or unjust, serving public interest or personal interest and intuitively 
right or wrong.273 The interpretation of these actions are also shaped by a variety of forces at 
play in the citizens themselves. These include personal as well as institutional values.  These 
personal and micro level values help citizens determine what they term to be right and 
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acceptable and what they term to be wrong and unacceptable behaviour. In making these 
decisions people tend to conform to the culture of the society in which they belong. For 
instance, if a society encourages corrupt behaviour it would be difficult for individual members 
of the society to stand against it because they would be standing alone. The society as a whole 
has to abhor such behaviours by the cues, rewards and punishments they dole out and this is 
what gives the citizens the right standing to speak out against ills like corruption in the society.  
Thus, natural law provides a justification for instinctive assessment and the public interest 
provides a useful frame of reference to judge whether the tenets of democracy are being 
violated or reinforced in a representative action. Where there are violations, then the rule of 
law which upholds the inviolability of government principles should be triggered. These 
principles are necessary components that would account for responsible representation.  
 
Having stated this link, it becomes obvious that a combination of both realms is what is needed 
for the proper guidance of the society. Propagating the principles of the rule of law alone 
without its natural law roots might leave out certain salient features of morality that may enable 
the law to achieve its regulatory result. According to Phillip von Mehren and Tim Sawers, the 
law has to be seen as an important reinforcing variable in the process of social change and not 
merely a product of it.274 The law counts as a major agent of transformation required for 
development or proper representation to happen. Those moral principles embedded in the 
specific positive law have a huge role to play for this to happen.  
 
Since societies rely on the law to bring about social change, the starting point of this 
transformation for the law will be in transforming the institutions through which the 
representatives act. This is done by empowering them with the right incentives or sanctions 
that would enable accountability of those political officers who act through them and in their 
name. Hence, the changing of institutions lies at the heart of this transition, but for this to 
happen there has to be a simultaneous change in those patterns of behaviour that together 
constitutes the institution. As individuals operate within the institution, they must adapt to the 
institutional culture and it behoves on the institution to shape those values that the individual 
must exhibit. This is because the behavioural pattern tends to enhance or compromise the 
institution and to affect their proper functioning.  
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The underlining factor seems to be how behavioural patterns need to be changed in order for 
proper representative system to emerge. For the law to be able to elicit the required behaviour 
of persons in the society, there must be an expression in the law which the citizens as well as 
the implementers would feel a compulsion to adhere to. Mere policy statements alone may not 
convey that compulsion from the citizens. There is need for that meaningful enforceable ethical 
code that is linked to systemic practice and procedure backed by legislation. This is what 
distinguishes law from a social norm which although acceptable by society is not enforceable. 
Together, the law and the implantation of norms would bring about the application of certain 
conformity inducing measures that could be applied directly or indirectly as criminal sanctions 
or rewards.  
 
In doing this, the law addresses two sets of people, the citizens whose behaviour the law 
principally wants to change and those responsible for implementing the law. Difficulty has 
been seen in the inadequacies of the law in transforming behavioural patterns of not just the 
citizens but the implementers as well. This is why it is sometimes seen that, despite the law, 
implementers are not able to develop or adopt a positive mental orientation that would enable 
government to achieve the aims of its policies. There is no doubt that even the best legal 
framework will be of little value in advancing good representation unless it is adequately 
implemented and enforced. Several obstacles prevent the implementation of this ideal and this 
stem from the fact that government agencies might not have the needed authority to enforce 
these regulations. The judiciary and law enforcement agencies might be labouring under the 
same institutional constraint that is affecting the legislative arm. Due to these inadequacies, the 
implementation and enforcement of policies are seen to be sometimes ineffective.  
 
In considering some of the constraints faced by legislators as they act on behalf of constituents, 
one finds that in some countries, especially developing countries, doing politics might 
sometimes be morally hazardous. This is because there is the temptation of corruption and other 
malfeasance that tends to go with it as politics requires persuasion, manoeuvres and 
compromise.  If there are tough regimes that force politicians to account in the course of 
carrying out their functions, they would know their limits and how far they can go for questions 
not to be raised about their actions. In a situation where there is nothing guiding them, they can 
do as they please and get away with anything. Therefore, if the institution with the help of the 
law is strengthened, then politicians would be able to act in an acceptable manner and 
democratic representation which affects the life of the citizens positively can be ensured.  
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Salient elements of state policies have to be formulated through law in most contemporary 
societies and this is how development can be achieved. This development in itself implies 
change and as the government through their various development policies try to change the 
behaviour of citizens as well as regulators, the right kind of laws needs to be in place. This in 
effect is necessary to maintain government legitimacy as seriously intended government policy 
can only be translated into implementable laws when its rules guide the behaviour of not just 
the citizens but also the regulators alike. The challenge in doing this however, lies in how the 
enacted laws which are mere words can succeed in changing the behaviour of the citizens, the 
political actors and the institution at large. Part of the solution rests on how these laws when 
passed are effective in bringing about the regulatory behaviour that as intended by the policy. 
In deciding whether or not to obey the law, the addressees take into account not just the legal 
constraints and resources but also the non-legal aspects which are all about the infinite variety 
of social and physical features of the society.275 This means that the rule, the implementing 
agencies expected behaviour and the non-legal feature of the society all come together to 
determine a person’s behaviour in the face of the law.  
 
In Nigeria, the socio-economic and cultural rights of citizens are enshrined in Chapter II of the 
Constitution.276 They are termed the fundamental and directive principles of the state policy. 
Apart from upholding the provisions of this law, legislators are to ensure that laws are made 
that would make government more accountable to the people from whom they derive their 
sovereignty. The extent of their representation is a process and content of the laws that are 
made. Such laws must demand accountability, transparency, certainty, efficiency, evidence 
based decision making and responsibility. This is what makes laws a big force for development 
in any given society. By upholding the rights of the people, the law can also create an incentive 
for those representing or working on behalf of the people to carry out their duties in the proper 
manner and serve in their interest. Loopholes in the law must be closed in order to foster proper 
behaviour. Since humans can judge behaviour based on both reason and conscience, when 
loopholes in the law are created that allows representatives to do what they want, it serves as a 
rationale for the abuse of the rights of the people and the safeguarding of their interests. 
Although, some can feel that enacting more rules that bring about changes can only result in 
creating a culture of mistrust in the society, there is no doubt that enforceable regulations would 
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allow for policy driven politicians to be good representatives and empower them to implement 
policies more effectively. 
 
3.4       The Role of Ethics and Responsibility in Representation 
 
Closely related to the rule of law are the principles of ethics and responsibility that 
representatives are expected to adhere to in the fulfilment of the functions of their office. 
Broadly speaking, this has to do with standards, rules, norms and precepts that relate to their 
role. It also has to do with the concomitant responsibilities that they must undertake to fulfil. 
While ethics comes from the concept of accepted traditional values, and is viewed from the 
perspective of principles, ends intuition and virtues, responsibility is seen as accepting and 
carrying out fairly well-defined roles. Although, sometimes these roles change with no 
agreement on the parameters of acceptable behaviour, it still implies an obligation to act in a 
certain manner. Together these principles are generally used to explain acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour in the society. The problem however is that these principles that should 
form the centre piece of the representative system are often less acknowledged when they ought 
to be emphasised. These principles do not just serve as a guide to public office holders, but 
they also set standards that they must respect in the course of performing their functions. 
Although, they do not tell the representatives what to do, they help to constrain the 
interpretation and understanding of their role and the functions of their office by guiding their 
judgements and their subsequent actions.  
 
In advocating these principles, political theorists have argued that, representatives in the course 
of performing their duties are expected to demonstrate honesty and integrity; they should make 
decisions with objectivity and be open about ways in which they arrive at their decisions; they 
should set aside their own interest when acting on behalf of constituents; they should show 
leadership to others and be prepared to be held accountable.277 These principles lay out in broad 
terms the ethical demands made on those who are in representative positions. It implies that 
representatives should act in ways that are compatible with the acceptance of their office and 
with its concomitant responsibilities. These principles need to be understood as providing a 
sort of ethical code which representatives are expected to abide by in performing their 
functions. The responsibilities of their role imply an important sustenance of the public trust. 
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The fact that the decisions they make affect the lives of citizens gives the ethical significance 
in ensuring that a common set of standards is adhered to in the execution of their functions.  
 
The main challenge in ensuring that these principles take hold in the political atmosphere is the 
fact that there is no formally established body that seems to be overseeing political ethics of 
politicians in the same way as is done in other professions. This brings out the contention as to 
what the exact standards should be in both general and specific cases. Also, recognising these 
sets of principles may not necessarily mean that there is a consensus on exactly what they 
would demand. This is because individual principles may conflict with each other or be 
indeterminate between rival courses of action. This realisation not only makes political ethics 
challenging but also goes to show that a lot of reflection about the demand of political 
representation is appropriate.  
 
As discussed earlier, the ethics of a group of people is shaped by their culture and this is related 
to their responsibility and their adherence and obligation to the rule of law. In the realm of 
politics, this is played out in the way the people tend to safeguard their democratic ideals 
against the influences that may work to undermine those ideals. If citizens believe in their 
political ideals they will tend to protect those principles that are dear to them. Dewey and Turft 
who are strong advocates of safeguarding the democratic ideals are of the view that, what is 
needed is the development of the social capacities of every individual in the society.278 By this 
view, citizens have the responsibility to safeguard and defend the principles of democracy and 
a responsible government must advance democratic values through advocating ethical 
behaviour.   
 
Thus, responsibility is a virtue that should be reinforced in both the citizens as well as the 
government as a whole. Being responsible means individuals in the position of authority, as 
well as the citizens, must take steps to enhance the ethos of citizenship. Citizens must be 
informed about their rights and recognise their interests and also be ready to hold the 
representatives accountable for their actions. The government too must advance democratic 
values that become part of the society in such a way that citizens believe in it and protect it. In 
this way, the representatives would be conscious of being watched and behaviours that do not 
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promote representation would be reduced considerably. This is in line with the view that those 
who exercise their power and authority are accountable to those over whom it is exercised.279 
 
Political office when won claims general authority over the polity, but the people who occupy 
such offices are accountable both in terms of whether they have fulfilled the formal 
responsibilities of their office and in terms of whether those that they represent approve of their 
actions. Accordingly, theorists have made a distinction between these two judgements in the 
sense that, it involves formal accountability (did they act properly) and political accountability 
(do the people approve of what they have done).280 It is further argued that, political systems 
that blur the distinction risk subordinating ethical considerations to expediency or eliminating 
the distinct political dimensions of judgements.281 
 
Indeed, it is seen that, this accountability regime that is advocated comes in tension with 
authority, each constrained by the other. However, these ethical principles guide the 
representatives as they navigate through competing demands. These principles are brought to 
bear within particular context of their functions as they act on behalf of their constituents. It 
helps them to recognise their responsibility. For them to recognise their responsibilities, they 
require an understanding of the nature of representation, of the different interpretations of that 
role and the function it serves and a grasp of how that role is to play out in the political system.   
 
Thus, these ethical principles would overall provide a medium for judgements which would 
help to clarify some components in decisions made by the representatives in the course of 
acting for constituents. It does this by prompting some kind of reflection on the representatives 
as to whether they can act in a particular way and accept being held accountable for their 
actions. It enables citizens to hold up every action of the representatives and questions can be 
asked whether it meets the criteria of honesty and demonstrates objectivity; was the decision 
uninfluenced by personal interests or consideration; is it compatible with the leadership that 
the representative office provides and does it reflect integrity for which the representative is 
prepared to be held accountable. All these questions focus on how far decisions that are made 
on behalf of others meet ethical standards.  
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It has been observed by political writers have observed that, practices of dubious propriety are 
wide spread among politicians but most government are unwilling to impose any form of 
regulations.282 It is proposed that a change in the ethical climate can only come about as a result 
of transformation in the moral character of representatives when they abide by democratic 
principles. Although there can be no certainty about such general estimates, it can be argued 
that the openness of the parliament today makes it possible for the public to be able to scrutinise 
the parliament and members. Also, the eagerness of the press to be able to expose wrong-doing 
is what will preserve the sanity of any given society. Furthermore, the ethical committees in 
the parliament need to be provided with more support and resources to investigate charges of 
corruption among members of parliament. They need to develop ethical codes to make them 
more restrictive in order to be able to cub illicit acts among representatives. 
 
In doing this, there is need to understand that ethical codes will not be of value if the 
implementers of government policy do not recognise that there is an ethical problem. They 
need to understand the problems with regards to a particular issue otherwise they will fail to 
know what standards are expected of them. Also, if they do not consider it to be in their interest 
to take a stand against certain behaviour, then little attention will be given to those general 
principles that make up the core values of an ethical society. Notwithstanding these difficulties, 
the code of conduct when in place sets out the specific standards of conduct expected in a range 
of realistic circumstances, representing the preferred interpretation of the core values or 
principles that are important to any society. Although this may seem a somewhat narrow 
approach to political ethics and responsibility, its essence in this analysis stems from the fact 
that, it has been possible to identify normative values that are inherent within it which 
designates it as a discrete and potential ingredient to the proper representation of constituents. 
It brings to the fore the possibility of better representation through the inclusion of standards 
and prohibitions and some procedural details. Having these in place would have the effect of 
guiding the conduct of representatives and the extent to which this can be possible with regards 





                                                          




3.4.1 Can Representatives be Ethical and Responsible? 
 
In recent years, character-based as well as virtue-based ethics have attracted attention from 
writers. Josephson identified numerous traits that can be used to describe an ethical person. 
These include trustworthiness, integrity, reliability, loyalty, responsibility, fairness.283 Hart 
also links virtue to government action by stating that a connection exists between the virtues 
of an individual and the honourable government representative by contending that, the 
government representative can become an honourable bureaucrat through the possession of 
traits which includes the commitment to the values of the society and having the interests of 
citizens at heart.284 Dobel focuses on personal integrity as what would ensure correct public 
sector behaviour. He argues that the ability of people to organise their activity around core 
commitments that they view as central to their lives is what gives rise to personal integrity and 
proper behaviour in the public sector.285 In another related work he maintains that, since 
character traits are malleable, organisational and cultural setting can have at least some 
influence on the attitude character and values of its members.286 In assessing the link between 
environmental influences and individual character traits, Hampshire and Alasdair MacIntyre 
express the view that, individual character traits are not innate, but are capable of being 
cultivated.287   
 
From these submissions we can infer that, although, from the individual point of view ethics 
focuses on the character traits of the representative, but for a complete view of an individual’s 
character, the role of the institution and the society at large in shaping that individuals’ 
character and values has to be taken into account. It is possible that virtuous people may exist 
in the society but they can be corrupted by the destructive values of the society. This is because 
individual values are shaped by their experiences with major institutions in which they operate 
and such institutions may impact either positively or negatively on the individual’s character. 
Cooper puts it rightly when he stated that the structure of the organisation is significant in 
exercising influence on the ethical conduct of individuals.288 
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Thus, the ethics of a society is what describes the guiding beliefs or ideals of individuals in the 
society. Through this, individual character can be developed and common virtue can be 
fostered. Those representing the people have to exhibit those virtues and act in accordance with 
them. They need to be aware of what the norms of the institution are and be conscious of the 
ethical dimensions of their work. This is what makes them good representatives. The 
organisational structure of the parliament would have at least some influence on their attitudes 
and value traits and be able to promote certain types of values while discouraging others. 
Organisational culture that discourages unethical behaviours in members while cultivating 
standards by which they can measure their behaviours should be adopted. This would go a long 
way to encourage the correction of deficiencies in the system thereby minimising conditions 
that lead to unethical behaviour. This is necessary in order to build healthy societies. 
 
Nevertheless, this may not be a one size fits all concept, what is required is to discover what is 
good for a particular person or in this case a group of persons. Traits such as trustworthiness, 
integrity, reliability, loyalty, respect, responsibility, fairness are what citizens want to see in 
their representatives. The opposite of these are self-interest, self-protection, self-deception, 
self-righteousness and all these are vices that would never foster good representation.  
Consequently, the cynical question of whether representatives can be made to be ethical and 
responsible can be answered with reference to societies where there seems to be evidence that 
those who work on behalf of the public are more idealistic and concerned about the public good 
and less concerned about making money.289 Although, the same cannot be said about 
representatives in Nigeria, the fact still remains that, there is no universal way the legislators 
in Nigeria can be characterised. Given that they are varied and heterogeneous due to the ethnic 
diversity an accurate description may not be possible. This makes attempts to understand the 
concept of representation more problematic. However, at the very minimum, one can conclude 
by saying that, representatives reflect the character personalities and nature of the people and 
the values in the society at large. The idea that ills like corruption is a vice that tends to thrive 
in a society may be an indication that the society itself encourages questionable behaviour. 
 
Therefore, accepting political ethics and responsibility as essential attributes can bring with it 
some level of restraint in perpetuating bad behaviour amongst representatives, especially if 
they get such cues from the political system. The essential condition for healthy representation 
                                                          




is when the political system as a whole is able to control unethical behaviour and when the 
representatives are truthful and have the culture of public service in addressing the real 
problems of the society in conjunction with the citizens. When democratic institutions work as 
they should, it would discipline the representatives and enable them to observe the basic 
restraints that is required to uphold the reputation of their office. The representatives would 
then be able to work within the institutional morality that sequences their obligation in a clear 
manner. They would then be able to speak in the name and in the interests of those who gave 
them mandate. Max Weber in his great essay puts it rightly when he stated that, politics as a 
vocation is right when politicians are guided not of themselves by an ethic of ultimate end, but 
by an ethics of responsibility which gives priority not to personal conscience or ethical ideology 
but service to the people.290 
 
3.4.1.1   Individual Ethics vs Institutional Ethics 
 
It has been noted that there is an individual and an institutional dimension to ethical issues. The 
question that arises is where should more emphasis be placed in the quest to develop ethical 
behaviour in the society? In response to this some authors have argued that less emphasis 
should be placed on the individual character and more should be on the institutions or 
organisations because they are ultimately in the position to determine what the individuals do. 
Cooper a strong advocate of this view contends that, the structure of the organisation is 
important in maintaining the ethical conduct of the individual administrator. He is of the view 
that, the institution is the shaper of the character, values and identities of these individuals and 
it can exercise significant influence on their conduct.291 Rainney on his part sees the importance 
of organisational culture as a shift which emphasises social influences, informal processes and 
the motivational power of attention from others.292 Both writers agree that, the organisational 
culture can either encourage or discourage ethical behaviour.  
 
Taking a different angle to the organisational discourse, Bowman recognises that the leadership 
figures in any organisation tend to send some type of signals to others in the organisation and 
this includes their indifference. He notes that, the question is not whether norms or conduct 
will develop in the organisation, but rather what they are and how they are communicated and 
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whether members are fully conscious of the ethical dimensions at work.293An organisation’s 
leadership can shape the organisation’s culture by setting a positive ethical tone. They help 
define the ethical norms, values and acceptable behaviours. The deliberate role modelling they 
provide are the primary shapers of these organisations because they are in the position to set 
the priorities of the organisation.294 
 
Thus, it follows that the individualistic view alone is incomplete without the institutional role 
being considered. The view from the individual perspective focuses on character traits in the 
sense that good character would likely produce ethical and good societies, but this character is 
also shaped by the organisation and society at large. As stated earlier, it is possible that virtuous 
people exist within the political circles, but they are then corrupted by the organisation and the 
acceptable norms in that organisation. This is because unethical organisations corrupt people 
while an ethical organisation may have the opposite effect. This is also taking into 
consideration that other aspects may also play a role in determining representatives’ ethical 
conduct in the society.  
 
Looking at it in terms of parliament, the fact is that every parliament has a culture and a 
patterned way of thinking about tasks and the way they respond to situations. This has links 
with the individual personality and makes the individual member respond to situations in like 
manner. Therefore, the idea is for the Parliamentary leadership in this case to nourish a 
transparent institutional culture by offering incentives for ethical behaviour and reducing 
opportunities for unethical behaviour among members. This they can do by the ethics 
committee formulating the right code of conduct for members and enforcing these according 
to the appropriate parliamentary rules. 
 
Irrespective of how this is viewed, it can be submitted that the two tend to be related because 
individuals make up the organisations and society. While it can be said that, the institutions 
have an influence on the individual behaviour, the idea of freewill also implies that individuals 
can exercise control over their actions and decisions. In essence, they can be held morally 
accountable for their actions. This means that, irrespective of the influence of the society and 
the institutions, individual character can be developed and common virtue can be fostered. 
There are several good examples of character-based approach that can be imbibed by 
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individuals to improve ethical behaviours and build better societies. When individuals imbibe 
the virtues of trustworthiness- which means people are expected to tell the truth and keep 
promises, be helpful and concerned with other people, obedient by following rules and the law, 
be brave enough to stand for what is right, they become better citizens in the society. These 
character virtues are not recently discovered values. Philosophers like Aristotle have discussed 
the “golden mean” where he states that “moral behaviour is the mean between two extremes- 
at one end is the excess, at the other deficiency. The moderate position between these two is 
when a person is said to be acting morally.295  
 
Given that it is the societies’ moral and expectation that establishes the standard, what matters 
is a good design of institutional arrangements and incentive structure. The conducts of the 
representatives are being evaluated by reference to expectation in the form of moral obligation 
expected by the society. These norms are related to the instituted context which judges based 
on outcomes through the notion of efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness. Ethics in this 
sense can be said to involve everyday process of formulating norms, values, rules and 
principles in response to that awareness. This tends to create that acknowledgement amongst 
the representatives that their action makes a difference both to themselves and others.296 Hence 
ethical decisions are a product of moral pushes and pulls. This explains why a person’s values 
determine how the person may act and the decisions such a person would make.  
 
Acknowledging the fact that these values are shaped by the society as a whole would determine 
the extent to which political representatives are committed to the relevant expectation of 
constituents and can be responsive to them. Some may argue that such general evaluations on 
the society specifying behaviour may limit the usefulness of accountability as a means to 
guarantee conformity by the representatives, However, Darwall discountenancing this is of the 
view that, one is morally accountable by reflecting the norms and values of a moral community 
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3.4.2 The Ethics of Accountability  
 
In articulating ethical behaviour and ensuring democratic representation one of the key 
requirements is that the representatives should be accountable for their actions. Dubnick, is of 
the opinion that accountability should be treated as the setting within which government 
emerges or unfolds. Formulating an ethical theory of accountability, he suggests that, it should 
be seen as a fundamental element in the range of governance and not just a secondary 
component. To him it is a relationship which has at its core mutual expectations and this is 
where the ethics of it lies.298 Thus, accountability is a vital principle that is central to democratic 
thoughts. It is seen as a cardinal pillar of good governance and effective representation and is 
aimed at assuring democratic responsiveness from the representatives. It is a means to facilitate 
the exercise of legitimate authority and it is performance based where the person who acts is 
expected to give account. It also means that such a person would also suffer some kind of 
sanctions in the event of non-performance or if the performance is deemed unsatisfactory.  The 
anticipation of sanction for unsatisfactory performance is expected to guarantee performance 
from representatives.  
 
The above theories provide a firm ground for a workable ethics of accountability which can be 
applicable in assessing political representation. It acknowledges the relationship between the 
representatives and the constituents’ in terms of managing their expectations as well as the 
influence of the society on a representative’s action. More importantly, it reveals that the effort 
to enhance accountability in representation can be achieved if seen from the moral and ethical 
point of view. If this model is to prove useful in the study of representatives’ behaviour, there 
needs to be an understanding that legislators rely on a number of mechanisms that influence 
their decision making. Some may be personal such as the reflection of their own preferences 
and tastes. Others may be formalised authoritative sources such as the law or rules of 
regulations. This stands as the aspirational reference point for representative action and for 
those that are committed to bring about change in government reforms. Such reforms must be 
based on the idea that measures are designed to emulate conditions that are unique in fostering 
the ideal type of moral accountability. This is necessary because in the assessment of 
representative activities, those idealised moral accountabilities are often used in the absence of 
standard procedures. Under the ethical theory frame, this is still in line and related with the 
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desire to achieve objectives such as efficiency in performance, transparency in operations, 
openness in decision making etc.299 
 
By positing the ethical theory, the argument here is that, in lieu of practical impossibilities in 
realising institutional accountability, an effort to seek to emulate moral accountability can 
account for the reproduction of responsible representation since such accountability depends 
on obligation and demand for responsiveness. Responsible representation requires the pursuit 
of moral good through representative actions. Such accountability tends to have indirect 
influence on the representatives as it gives the citizens some kind of mediated control over their 
actions.300 Virtue is linked to their action because a connection exists between an ethical 
representative and honourable representative of the people. Such a person is bound to uphold 
and believe in the core values of society and act as a moral and independent agent to protect 
those values. They would act with prudence and have the interests of the people at heart. 
Moreover, they would have the idea that the more one benefits from society, the more one has 
an obligation to reciprocate. The next section discusses a vital element that tends to distinguish 
representatives when they act on behalf of constituents. The more this virtue is attributed to 
them the more constituents can have confidence in their representation.   
 
3.5 The Virtue of Trust in Representation  
 
The discussion thus far has shown that an adequate ethics of democratic representation cannot 
be possible without some regime of accountability which would serve as a guide to the 
representatives. Following this accountability regime is the granting of trust which requires 
that the representatives should exercise lawful discretion in the interests of the constituents not 
that which would be for their own personal interests and the detriment of the constituents. 
Political theorists have identified the level of truthfulness of politicians as a norm that tends to 
determine the level of trust between politicians and the citizens.301 This is the case in both 
established and developing democracies. This requirement of trust is what would guarantee 
accountability and proper representation of constituents.  
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Theoretically, citizens elect representatives who are meant to devote themselves exclusively to 
them and through their clear mandate and static instructions they expect these representatives 
to further their interests. This does not always happen so smoothly, rather what is seen is that 
there is discontentment among citizens in the political system. This has led to a situation where 
the representatives go ahead to serve their own interest at the expense of the citizens. Thus, 
political representation is reduced to a coercive exercise of authority where the citizens are 
ruled in a manner where their choices are always controlled.302 There is no doubt that such a 
situation is bound to make citizens unhappy. For this reason, citizens generally tend to view 
politicians as unfaithful. This feeling of discontentment may be due to the fact that citizens care 
about their society unlike what the politicians may think. Contemporary political theorists in 
assessing this situation have also contended that representative who engage in morally suspect 
and undesirable behaviour and those who violate the interest of citizens are rarely trusted.303 
Also, trust can be lost when politicians fail to solve the problems of society over a period of 
time such as inflation, depression and other social and economic conflicts in the society.304 
They simply loose the confidence of the voters. 
 
Undoubtedly, these symptoms for an integral part of a societies’ life, but they are at the heart 
of representation. Therefore in assessing representative action, the fact still remains that 
representatives are to be evaluated according to the standards that derive from their respective 
offices and these standards hold important insights into how the representative should properly 
conduct themselves. They must be aware that citizens look up to them with expectations and 
they have a duty to live up to those expectations. If a society gets to the point where it is 
perceived that what representatives tell them are lies and that they are all corrupt, then nothing 
said in the public sphere would be believed. This in effect can damage the legitimacy of the 
democratic institution as they simply loose the confidence of the people. Thus, to restore 
confidence in representatives and the political system as a whole, the level of unethical 
behaviour amongst representatives in the society must be controlled even though it cannot be 
altogether eliminated. Without addressing these problems representative democracy cannot 
endure. Since there are other authoritarian alternatives that are always in competition, its 
defence would only be possible through the honesty of the representatives in upholding the 
interests of constituents.  
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It should be noted that, in healthy democracies where the people are served well there is still 
that need for continuous vigilance and part suspicion on the part of the electorate. This is 
necessary to keep the representatives in line. Different countries practice their democracy in 
different ways and the ambit of power that is allowed the representative is determined by the 
system itself. The representative role as framed by the constitutional conventions and the 
political cultures may either struggle against or turn a blind eye to the abuse to which their 
system is prone. It is seen that, although lack of trust for politicians is prevalent in many 
countries, it tends to be higher in some than in others. In many African countries for instance, 
power is stacked, and politics is a zero-sum game where if you win you have everything and if 
you lose all access to state resources, patronage and preferment is curtailed. It is as a result of 
this we tend to see corruption playing an excessive and counterproductive role on 
representative activities in these countries. In contrast, Western liberal democracies that have 
had more time to develop and also learned from their mistakes tend to ensure that political 
power in theory does not confer economic, social or cultural advantage.305 This is necessary if 
the trust for representatives would be at a reasonable level.  
 
Highlighting the discontentment of the citizens as the major reason for the lack of trust goes to 
show that citizens are becoming more aware of their political environment. This may be due to 
a number of factors such as equality in the society. In modern societies, representative’s work 
from the premise where to be a representative is a privilege to be earned from equals and not 
an entitlement to be claimed from your inferiors.306 This is different from the past where 
representatives were the elites in the society who are more educated and thus had all the 
information that the masses lacked. Today representatives are not just drawn from the elite 
group alone they tend to cut across facets of the society. Also, citizens are more educated and 
with the help of social media more enlightened. This has increased the level of distrust felt for 
the representatives. The lack of proper connection between the representatives and their 
constituents may also add to this problem. In these situations, it is difficult for such 
representatives to win the trust of the people. These low-trust models of the representative may 
also be a common response to “scandals” that leave the public feeling their trust has been 
abused. This situation remains unchanged because the people see that even those 
representatives who earn their trust tend to use manipulations to gain this trust.  
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For the above reasons some have argued that direct democracy which involves personal 
participation of the people in the daily management of the public affairs is desirable. However, 
this alternative is utopia for the exact reason that, societies today are too large and complex to 
be governed in that manner. Hence, representative democracy is still the answer for the 21st 
century. Although the contempt continues to grow the people still need to assign public 
business to representatives. Ignatieff, sums it up by stating that the discontentment and dislike 
of politicians are not transitory phenomena but integral to the unstoppable relation between 
democratic sovereignty and representation itself.307  
 
Thus, a situation where representatives get into government, gain power and personal riches 
and ignore the citizens who voted to put them in place creates a state of despair in the nation 
as a whole. However, a correction mechanism can be put in place, if attention is paid to the 
behaviour of representatives and a system of checks and balances can preserve the political 
institution. This needs the collaboration of the courts, the media and the citizens themselves 
who will help to expose violations of public trust and shame those representatives who are only 
there for their own selfish ends. The minimum principle endorsed by most democratic societies 
is that legislators like all other public officers are expected to maintain and strengthen the public 
trust. Citizens have confidence in their representatives when they demonstrate professional 
competence, efficiency and effectiveness upholding the constitution and the laws and seeking 
to advance the public good of all.  
 
3.6 Discussion and Way Forward  
 
There is no gainsaying that right behaviour is a concept that is difficult for all to agree upon. If 
the society does not promote and develop procedures that would support and encourage the 
ability of representatives to act in the interests of constituents, then it would be difficult for 
people who are in representative position to act in an acceptable manner. A general guide to 
action such as abiding by both man-made law and the higher law can serve the society by 
enabling representatives behave responsibly. This responsibility emerges as a social process 
whereby representatives are meant to act in a certain way and in the interests of those they 
represent. It also involves expectation from those represented as their engagement with them 
and acting on their behalf invokes accountability. As representatives of the people, a lot is 
expected from them. Their duty is to promote the interests of the people and inculcate in them 
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a sense of acceptance for their leadership. For them to do this, they must be dedicated to the 
people by operating within the ambits of the rule of law and be ethically responsible and 
trustworthy. It is by imbibing these principles that they would be guided in their actions as 
democratic representatives.  
 
Relating these principles to the context of this study and political representation in Nigeria, 
representation could also be termed to be the capacity to manage social and economic resources 
to attain development for the people. Good representation also means effectively taking the 
interests of constituents into consideration and non-arbitrary decision making. This also 
includes accountability, transparency and participation of citizens. However, all of these seem 
to be in short supply. Rather, corruption appears rampant and representation lacks the 
accountability and transparency it deserves. This state of social desolation did not happen by 
accident, as there are elements in the society that may have given rise to this situation. One 
major culprit that can readily be identified as giving rise to the situation is poor governance. 
Poor governance according to Richard Nzerem is a direct result of the failure to observe the 
basic principles of the rule of law.308 The absence of the rule of law has been identified as the 
determinant of corruption. That is, where the rule of law does not flourish, corruption and 
corrupt practices is imminent. In such a situation, what is usually seen is that those in authority 
have greater discretion and make decisions without due regard to any precept of law. Such 
decisions are made arbitrarily according to their whims and caprices without adequate control 
being exercised over them. The fall out of this are poorly executed policies. So, one can say 
that the rule of law and corruption are inversely related. The disregard for the rule of law and 
established procedure create opportunities for corrupt practices to thrive. This is made worse 
because state interventions are weak. Such systemic patterns of corruption erode the authority 
and effectiveness of public institutions and promote unethical and unfair practices that act as a 
barrier to any well-meaning government reform.309 Thus it is only when the rule of law prevails 
that sustainable development can be guaranteed in any society.  
 
In Nigeria as is the case with many other developing countries, government efforts aim to 
provide development for the people. Despite these efforts, the people remain impoverished and 
vulnerable. Their living standards, health and education decline while the gap between the rich 
                                                          




and the poor continue to widen. The central problem has been the ineffectiveness on the part 
of government and its agencies to exercise control and the absence of accountability. A system 
which does not have in place elements of accountability such as goal measurement, justification 
of results and sanctions for unethical behaviour can no doubt lead to the proliferation of 
corruption. This can be said to be the situation in Nigeria. The absence of accountability 
especially on the part of politicians create opportunities for corruption to thrive.  
 
This above situation coupled with the level of enlightenment of the people seem to make 
representatives take the advantage that has been open to them.  There are several occasions 
when unethical behaviour rather than being punished is celebrated. Public officers who have 
been indicted with corruption despite the public outrage have never been brought to face the 
law to serve as a deterrent for others. It can be said that perhaps the ethical norms of the day 
determine the type of behaviours that are being punished and this serves as a reflection of the 
country’s ethical values. Since the assessment of democratic representation is system 
dependent, what is expected of a representative to a very large extent depends on the norms 
and values that sustain the legitimacy of the polity’s democratic institutions.310 What a society 
allows or disallows will guide what the representatives do. A representative will generally be 
seen acting in a manner that is in line with what others in the system do. This means that the 
degree to which other representatives abide by democratic standards will influence the ability 
of the representative to excel at representing constituents’ interests. Such a representative may 
not be able to live up to the standards of ethics where fellow representatives show no regard 
for proper representation of constituents. The likelihood of such a system also becoming a tool 
of domination of its citizens is also inevitable. 
 
There is need for people in position of authority like the representatives to have the obligation 
to demonstrate effectiveness in achieving goals. This can be done by a deliberate attempt to 
design accountability policy that would create awareness in both the representatives and 
constituents. Also, citizens must also be able to evaluate representatives and not feel vulnerable 
or easily disillusioned with democracy. They must also recognise the challenges that the 
representatives face in trying to achieve proper representation and not be too harsh in 
evaluating their actions. In advocating an ethics for good representation it will not be fair to 
paint an utterly perfect picture. There must be some tolerance of disagreements and 
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compromise which inevitably will arise. The acknowledgement of these inadequacies will 
determine how they would be reconciled when they arise.    
 
The problem of abuse of office and the misuse of public office for private gains is inherently 
unethical but can be distinguished from simple incompetence.  One way of combatting the 
misuse of office can be by enacting anti-corruption laws and strengthening of anti-corruption 
agencies like the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related Offences Commission 
(ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) which are already in 
existence in Nigeria. This can also protect the citizens enabling them to report corrupt practices 
in the conduct of the representatives. A regime of mandatory reporting of all instances of 
suspected corruption and significant breach of ethical codes can also go a long way to make 
representatives aware that their activities are being scrutinised by those they represent. This 
can go a long way to make the representatives stay in line and focus on the interests of 
constituents.  
 
In many jurisdictions, the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act has been enacted and this provides 
citizens with qualified rights to access any official information held by government or 
government agencies. Although this right does not operate where the responsible minister 
believes disclosure of such information would likely compromise the national interest, the 
economy or the investigation of a criminal matter, or would otherwise not be in the interest of 
the public, it is considered essential in ensuring the accountability of government officials 
including the representatives. This is a vital right for the functioning of any country’s 
democracy and best practice of such laws can be found in the UK and other jurisdiction of the 
West. In Nigeria, the FOI Act passed in 2011 is an element of the right to freedom of expression 
provided under the Nigerian Constitution.311 It is also proclaimed in other international treaties 
like the Universal Declaration of Human Right, (UDHR)312 and the International Convention 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).313 With the help of these regulations, corruption among 
government officials and mismanagement of public funds can be exposed.  
 
Related to this, is the right of citizens to obtain reason for official decisions from public officers 
and this includes representatives. Under such law, constituents can be given the unqualified 
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right to be advised of the reason behind the decisions that the legislators in their constituencies 
make on their behalf. The legislators should be able to provide evidence of the information 
taken into account before they make decisions and the procedures followed if possible. This 
would go a long way in contributing to integrity and probity in decision making which would 
also prevent corruption and ensure the proper representation of constituents. Also, the Whistle 
Blower Protection Bill which is yet to be passed as at the time of writing this thesis is a step in 
the right direction in the fight against corruption and unethical behaviours in the society. By 
protecting those who expose wrong doing, the law seeks to increase accountability and 
increased information in the public domain.   
 
3.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter tries to develop a framework to explain how the ideas of right and wrong 
determine the extent to which representation can be achieved. It argues that political influences 
and human ecological influences play a huge role in shaping how representatives act. It has 
established that although right behaviour is a difficult concept to evaluate, ensuring that 
representatives abiding by both man-made and higher laws can enable them act responsibly. 
Hence the conceptualisation of ethics and responsibility among representatives is determined 
by the values in the society. The extent to which these values influence the activities of the 
representatives determine how they can act in an ethically acceptable manner for the betterment 
of the society.  
 
Suffice it to say that, effective representation goes beyond the power that is bestowed on the 
legislators to represent. For them to effectively represent the interests of constituents, there 
must be in place some ethics of responsibility and a system of accountability that would hold 
them to account for their actions and their performance. The proper assessment of 
representative action must also be based on the norms and values that underlie or justify the 
democratic institution in which they operate. A representative may ultimately not be able to 
live up to the ethics of democratic representation and may face criticism on account of this. 
Bearing in mind that the institution may also cause some difficulties means that the focus needs 
to be on placing the right values on the institution. This, invariably, will elicit from the 
representatives the right kind of behaviour. Once it is seen that democratic representation is to 
be identified according to the function in realising the proper operation of the institution then 
the standards can be applied to the actors that operate within the polity. Democratic 
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representatives do act ethically and unethically and it is for the institution to have mechanism 
in place that would discourage unethical behaviour as well as encourage ethical ones. This it 
can do by putting incentives and sanctions in place that would reward or punish actors in the 
system.  
 
Generally, ethical norm of the day determines what type of public behaviour is acceptable. 
Hence, actions of representatives might also serve as a prism to reflect the values that the 
society holds dear. The importance of this societal guidance lies in the fact that men are fallible 
and as such control over their behaviour is necessary. This guidance serves as a form of control 
















The view of representation as an activity has not been widely articulated as an explicit 
definition by political theorists. This assumption has been taken for granted as such discussions 
on representation hardly delve into what representatives do to represent constituents. In the 
previous chapter, the nature of representation has been analysed in depth and the importance 
of substantive acts are noted. This discussion has delved into the very act of representation 
itself analysing what it means to represent.314 In the existing body of literature, different 
perspectives of representational mechanisms were recognised one of which is the allocation 
responsiveness.315 This involves the focus on constituents and benefits to them and requires the 
representatives to do some kind of activity while representing constituents. Representation in 
this sense is said to be complete when the actions of the representatives are involved and that 
is what defines the concept.  
 
Seen in this light, there is need for research to monitor the developing profile of representational 
activities and the changing political properties of the political system where the legislature 
acts.316 In line with this, the chapter looks at representation as a constituency service. It 
examines activities undertaken by legislators to determine the extent to which they represent 
constituents’ interests. The aim is to move from using activity as a casual description of 
representation to a more practical means of understanding real world politics. What is sought 
is to relate the concept of representation to the actions of the representatives rather than their 
positions as representatives. Such an understanding requires real acts that they engage in for 
which we can rightly and directly measure how they represent constituents.   
 
The reason for this approach is not farfetched. Members’ activity is an important way to 
understand the concept of representation. Political scientists have proved this by differentiating 
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members according to the level and type of activities and the advantage of these activities to 
their constituents.317 Matthew makes a distinction between “show horses” who seek the 
legislative limelight and “work horses” who do the work behind the scene to produce good 
policy that would maintain the legitimacy of the legislature.318 This shows that members’ 
activities remain an important factor in understanding the representational relationship.319 
Unfortunately, most of the activities of the representatives especially those that they perform 
outside the parliament go unrecorded. As a result of this, less is known about what the 
representatives do when they are outside the parliament and when they act on behalf of 
constituents. 
 
The CDF is used as a case study in this research to test the efficacy of service delivery of the 
representatives. The role they play and the manner in which they engage with constituents in 
the implementation of this policy is examined. Their legislative accomplishments in terms of 
the benefits they bring to their constituency is also examined to see whether they reflect the 
expressed preferences of constituents. How decisions about the projects to be allocated in their 
constituency are arrived at are tested. This is compared with the constituents’ response about 
their views on those projects and helps in identifying whether representatives are able to use 
the CDF as a tool of representation that is responsive to the interests of constituents. This would 
also help to overcome some of the measurement related problems that are faced in determining 
the point at which the legislators and the constituents agree. Finally, it provides new evidence 
about how the actions of representatives and the relationship with their constituents affect 
representation.  
 
The Chapter proceeds by evaluating the CDF analysing its operations in other jurisdictions that 
are successful in implementing its policy. It later examines how the CDF operates in Nigeria.  
This is necessary in understanding the working of the CDF and how it can be used as a tool to 
represent constituents. The extent of constituents’ involvement and the attentiveness of the 
representatives to their preferences all have important consequences to representation. How 
well the choices of projects and the decisions of the legislators align with the constituent’s 
preferences coupled with members’ conceptualisation of their constituent’s needs, and their 
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ability to make contact with them, determines how they represent constituents’ interests.320In 
other words, representation is looked at as a normative property of the relationship between the 
representative acts and the opinion of the constituents as a whole. Problems that are associated 
with the implementation of the CDF and why it may pose a challenge for legislators to use as 
a tool to represent constituent is brought to light. This demonstrates that, other factors may be 
impeding the desires of the representatives to represent constituents. Apart from the 
institutional framework of the CDF policy, the nature of relationship between the 
representatives and their constituents, operates as a hindrance for the CDF to be used as an 
effective tool of representation to meet the generality of the constituency needs. 
 
In evaluating how representative acts are performed, a simple approach of the theory of 
representation in which it considers the representational relationship on a singular issue and 
dimension which is the use of the CDF in representing is taken. Focus is on the representation 
of each constituency by their elected representatives and within this structure, a simple 
empirical model of representation is construed. No argument however is made here to the effect 
that, the approach taken exhausts the meaning of the concept of representation or what it means 
to represent. This cautious approach is adopted in consonance with Achen’s observation that, 
in reality, no persuasive general theories of representation have yet been formulated which 
would allow for the measurement of representation satisfactorily from any philosophical 
viewpoint.321 Invariably, the chapter raises the following question: How well does the action 
of the representatives match the preferences of the constituents? Does the degree of interaction 
reflect significant differences between what the representatives do and what the constituents 
want? In order to have a better perspective of the use of the CDF as a tool for representing 
constituents and as a constituency service, it is necessary to have an insight into how the CDF 
works. Overall the chapter will contribute to the discussion on the relationship between the 
representatives and their constituents and how well they are able to act in their interests.  
 
4.2    Overview of the Constituency Development Fund 
 
To gain a proper perspective into this form of representational activity by members of 
parliament, there is need to understand that parliamentary involvement in community 
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development has become a trend that is prevalent in many countries.322 The CDF as a policy 
tool has been identified to make this initiative possible in developing countries. This is a policy 
that benefits specific political subdivisions through allocations and/or spending decisions 
influenced by Members of Parliament.323 The funds are intended to address the particular need 
of a local community.324 This form of constituency intervention is not only found in Africa but 
also in the United States where congressional allocations are called “pork barrel” or “member 
items”.325 In the same vain, systems of politically determined resource allocation to local 
communities can be found in other economically advanced countries such as the UK.326 
 
The mandate of taking development to citizens at the grass root level makes the CDF an 
important driver for constituency service. As a decentralisation effort, it is seen as a policy that 
brings the government closer to the people. Certain principles and guidelines that are consistent 
with international norms and values about legislative performance and socio-economic 
development needs to be followed.327 These principles highlight the importance of project 
selection and implementation that enables the citizens to work together with representatives for 
the development of their constituency. It entails the demand for accountability and regular 
oversight. Through monitoring and evaluation, decisions about what projects are most 
successful in promoting the developmental needs of a particular constituency are made.  
 
As a distributive policy tool, the success of the CDF policy is contingent upon inclusive process 
of consultation with constituents who have the responsibility to identify the areas of need in 
their constituency. These channels of input for the local citizens foster co-operation with the 
representatives and enable them to respond adequately to the local development needs. The 
policy has however, been criticised by some writers who feel that, securing federal funding for 
a district is a way of helping members of parliament (MP) at the ballot box and allowing them 
to claim credit for the benefits the funding provides.328 Questions have been raised as to 
whether the CDF serves as a compensation for the Parliament’s inability to amend the budget 
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of these systems.329 Related literature have also analysed legislator’s effort to perform 
constituency service as what builds a personal vote, with the submission that, such effort is an 
important determinant of observed incumbency advantage.330The views expressed are to the 
effect that the paramount objective for the members of parliament engaging in this kind of 
service is seen to be re-election only.  
 
It needs to be noted that most of the literature offer very little evidence on examining the 
activity of legislators to see if they are in line with the preferences of constituents. They tend 
to focus on the institution, investigating for instance, how the effect of political parties on the 
legislator’s behaviour serves as an incentive for the legislator to bring benefits to 
constituents.331 However, the extent to which these parties are able to choose candidates that 
have high ability to deliver public goods to constituents coupled with the ability of the political 
party themselves to credibly advance policy programme to voters are major problems that are 
likely to affect measurement of the effectiveness of this policy initiative. 
 
In the light of the above, focus here will be on the actions of the legislators independent of the 
institutional environment. The investigation looks at whether in acting on behalf of 
constituents; representatives are being responsive to their preferences and thus achieving 
representation. The significance in using the CDF is that, the measure can be uniquely 
attributed to the individual legislator’s action.  This can be associated with the benefits that 
flow uniquely to the legislator’s constituency and linked with constituent’s preferences. Thus, 
it will enable us to see the extent to which constituents’ interests are taken on board. Finally, it 
will throw more light on the relationship that exists between the representatives and their 
constituents. 
 
Given that legislator’s efforts are not easy to measure, using the level of their responsiveness 
to constituents’ preferences, may provide areas where both parties are able to agree on the same 
plan of action. In such situations, the legislator’s action becomes equal to constituents’ 
preferences. Where this is not found, it shows that either the constituents are not involved in 
the decision making about projects in their constituency or that the legislators, acting as 
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representatives, have acted based on what they think are the needs of the constituents without 
consulting them. The next section will look at countries where the CDF operations have been 
found to be successful; this gives an insight to the implementation of this policy initiative. 
 
4.3 Cross Country Experiences  
 
The development of CDF in many countries has provided practical analysis towards the 
understanding of legislative performance in these countries. Taking a closer look at the CDF 
and comparing it with “pork barrel” as applicable in the US, one finds that there seems to be a 
fundamental difference as the former is more of an informal mechanism that is employed on a 
case by case basis. In the “pork barrel”, members have to make an effort to secure federal 
funding to be used across congressional districts.332 In this instance, the measurement looks at 
the ability of the legislator to secure “pork” or how much “pork” a particular member is able 
to secure for their individual constituency. Meaning that, the member’s ability determines the 
number of pork that they can secure for their constituency. A member with high ability will 
secure millions in pork for their constituency while another member with low ability will secure 
only a few hundreds.333 In the case of the CDF, budgetary allocations are made to each 
representative for use in their constituency and access to these funds is not dependent on the 
legislator’s effort. They all have equal incentive to use this policy to represent constituents. 
 
Another significant difference between the CDF and the Pork barrel is that, the administration 
of the funds, the means of disbursement and the entities that are responsible for oversight are 
all elements that seem to be settled in the case of the Pork barrel. This does not seem to be the 
case in developing countries where the CDF operates. Due to poor implementation and 
monitoring, this policy area seems to be a fertile ground for corruption to flourish.  Despite this 
shortcoming, the practice of the CDF has gradually gained prominence in some African 
countries and other parts of the world. Presently, 23 countries have the CDF in various forms 
including Kenya, Pakistan, India, Uganda, Bhutan, Jamaica, Papua Guinea, South Sudan, 
Philippines, Honduras, Nepal, Solomon Island, Tanzania, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia, Ghana 
and Malaysia.334 Looking at the various jurisdictions, there are variations on how the policy is 
implemented. However, the main object of the CDF seems to be the same which is to meet the 
needs of a particular constituency.  
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In the Indian version known as the Member of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme 
(MPLADS), funds are allocated to a single member parliamentary constituency for use on local 
works recommended by the MP. These funds are placed in a trust fund for the constituency and 
unspent money accumulates overtime such that when an MP leaves office the unspent money 
is at the disposal of the successor.335 
 
In Kenya, the CDF is a strategy for devolution of resources and the attainment of even 
development planning that would enable grass root communities maximise their welfare in line 
with their needs.336 The Kenyan government enacted the Constituency Development Fund Act 
2003 due to the identification of centralised planning as a serious development bottleneck. It 
had to devise strategies for the gradual devolution of the decision-making power to the local 
level.337 Thus in their Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 
(ERSWEC), the government allocates 7.5% of direct government revenue to the CDF. This 
programme aims to promote social and economic development and to reduce poverty, hardship 
and vulnerability in the country especially among the marginalized.338 
 
In order to ensure effective implementation of the policy, various countries have adopted 
various mechanism in the implementation of the CDF to enable it achieve its policy objectives. 
Some countries have provided for a bias allocation process towards meeting the needs of poorer 
communities.339 This is the case in Kenya where allocation of funds is aggregated in terms of 
the level of poverty in a particular community such that, poorer constituencies tend to have 
more funds allocated to them. In this regard, 75% of the funds are distributed equally among 
the 210 constituencies and the remaining is allocated to the poorest constituencies.340 This is 
done in order to bring them at par with their counterparts in other communities. This is also the 
case in Tanzania, where in addition to the poverty indices, they went further to include 
geographical and population size as factors in determining their allocation formula.341 These 
factors are expected to affect considerably the impact of these funds in these areas, as there are 
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marked differences in the utilization of CDF in the various constituencies depending on the 
individual needs of these constituencies.  
 
A peculiar situation found in most of the jurisdictions is that committees and authorities that 
are in charge of the management and implementation of the policy are appointed. The 
appointment of a committee ensures that the implementation and management of these projects 
is not left solely in the hands of the legislators alone. The Kenyan system makes provision for 
a committee of about 12 to 15 persons formed by the legislators and administrators who oversee 
the implementation of the CDF.342 The same has been found in Uganda343 and in Tanzania.344 
The situation in India is different in the sense that the MPs only make recommendations of 
development projects which meets the needs of the communities they represent and this is 
included in the budget.345 Different jurisdictions have adopted different methods in determining 
the involvement of legislators. The critical design feature which acts as the key determinant of 
the degree of control afforded by the representatives in the various jurisdictions is presented 
below. It shows the different approaches of control exercised by the legislators which could be 
greater or lesser. At the top of the table, legislators tend to have a high degree of influence as a 
result of the funds being directly transferred into their personal accounts or they being 
signatories to the fund accounts. While at the bottom there seems to be a low degree of 
influence by the legislator because funds are kept in a separate account and there are two or 
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Table 4.1           CDF Design Elements Impacting the Degree of MP Control 
 


















- MP appoints all members of the CDF     
committee 
 
- MP serves as Chair of CDF committee  
 
- MP serves on Committee as patron instead 
of Chair 
 
- Legislation requires representation from 
certain groups 
 
- Potential Members of Committee    
nominated by the public 
 




directly to MPs 









accounts be set up 
for CDF  
MP is a signatory  
 
 
MP is not a signatory 
only 2 signatories 









Source: International Budget Partnership 2010.  
 
An important fact with this fund is that, in most jurisdictions, the funds are internally generated 
revenue. Few countries tend to mention donors or international actor’s engagement in this 
programme. The general perception is that, the CDFs are unpopular with donors. Studies have 
come up with the view that donors have more concerns than confidence in the CDF.346  
Instances where donors are involved are found in Solomon Island CDF which gets funding 
from the Republic of China and in Tanzania which gets funding for their CDF from 
International Organisations and NGOs.347 
 
The mechanism of distribution and implementation also seem to be varied amongst the 
different countries where the CDF is found. The common characteristics found in all these 
countries is that, the legislator usually acts on behalf of the host constituency either in 
Parliament or in a CDF committee. The projects implemented with a few exceptions are mostly 
funded directly from the state budget and they are usually identified as the legislator’s 
constituency project.348 
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There is no doubt that such a community-based initiative is intended to protect communities 
from impersonal administrations of inflexible and centralised state organisations that often 
overlook individual communities in the course of development. Nigeria like other African 
countries has seen the benefits of adopting this policy, but the extent to which it has been used 
to represent constituents is what needs to be assessed here. In the next section, an analysis of 
the CDF in Nigeria will be done to see how effective it has been in meeting the objectives of 
its policy which has the bottom line of representing constituents’ interests. 
 
4.4 Conceiving the CDF as a Tool of Representation in Nigeria 
 
The enthronement of democratic dispensation in Nigeria after a long Military intervention 
made it expedient for good governance and the rule of law to take its place. There was the need 
for the government to embark upon different measures that were aimed at delivering the 
dividends of democracy to the people.349 The CDF was one of the policy initiatives identified 
for this purpose. The major argument by proposers was that the centralised revenue allocation 
formula adopted by the country whereby the federal government gets 52.6%, the 36 states get 
26.72% and the local government 20.60% is a reason why there is lack of resources especially 
at the local level.350 They argue that the initiative was to ensure even development in all the 
different areas of the country. The projects which are mainly designed and implemented locally 
are to be funded from the revenue allocation of the federal government. These funds are 
allocated per state at the federal level and executed with the active participation of the 
legislators to provide developmental projects for their respective constituencies.351 The projects 
allocated in the various constituency districts are meant to reflect localised needs and 
preferences of the people thereby stressing the importance of consultation with the 
constituents.352 
 
The policy finally took root in Nigeria in the dawn of the fourth republic which started in 
1999.353 Following this request by the Nigerian legislators for more equitable distribution of 
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resources to their constituencies, the Executive under the then President Olusegun Obasanjo 
approved this programme. With an executive pronouncement, the sum of N5 million to each 
of the 109 Senators and N3 million each to all the 360 Members of the House of Representative 
was disbursed to kick start the process at the federal level and this became an annual 
allocation.354  States governments of the federation have since followed suit by allocating 
constituency funds to their members of Assembly annually. This is usually captured in both 
the federal and state appropriation annually.   
 
Although during the Obasanjo’s administration the projects were mainly restricted to small 
projects like water and rural electrification, with time other projects such as construction of 
educational and health facilities, construction of rural roads, bursary and other infrastructural 
development were included. The amount allocated for projects also continued to increase over 
the years. For instance it was stated that between the period 2004 and 2013, N900 Billion was 
allocated to the CDF project at the National Assembly. This statement was credited to the then 
Chairman on the House Committee on Millennium Development Goal (MDG) Senator 
Mohammed Udume, who revealed that the National Assembly has been allocated N100 Billion  
each year since 2004.355 This makes Nigerian CDF one of the most expensive in the world as 
the allocations from inception put together run into billions of dollars. 
 
The reason for this huge allocation could be the realisation of the massive infrastructural deficit 
especially in the rural areas and the need to cover the gap by having the presence of government 
in every constituency. Although comprehensive record for the allocation and implementation 
of these projects from inception is scarce, few records have been put together by credible civil 
society organisations and NGOs that have followed the progress of the programme. This 
research relies on some of these records in the evaluation of the CDF policy. For instance, 
BudgIT Nigeria (a civic technology organisation) monitored the implementation of this 
programme to assess their impact. In 2010 they tracked 436 constituency projects in 16 States 
across the 6 geopolitical zones of Nigeria. They found that 145 of these projects were 
completed, 221 abandoned while 77 were ongoing at the time.356 The general project status as 
presented by BudgIT is seen below.  
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Also, Tracka an initiative supported by the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) 
gives a useful and vivid account of CDF allocation and projects implemented across the 
federation for 2016 and 2017. Their report reveals that in 2016 the Executives decided to give 
the funding a new name: Zonal Intervention Project (ZIP). Under this initiative, N100 Billon 
was allocated for 2515 constituency development projects across the six geopolitical zones.357 
This was included as a capital supplement in the appropriation budget of the federal 
government. The question raised was whether this can still be regarded as the CDF or some 
other type of development fund. A major deviation of the ZIP from the CDF was the fact that 
the Executives seemed to have some kind of control over it as the projects were pre-allocated. 
Also, it was alleged that they would decide the kind of project that would be implemented 
under the programme.  
 
Tracka report indicated that, due to the lack of monitoring by government authorities, 40.4% 
of the projects for that year were unexecuted although they had been signed off and paid in 
full.358 This goes to show the gap in implementation. Also, the legal framework of the policy 
itself is flawed in that it gives room for disagreements between the executives and legislators 
on who should actually be in control of the funds. The corollary effect of this is that citizens 
are restricted from stating their preferences or asking questions due to the complete block of 
information on projects stipulations and status. Below is a breakdown of allocation of projects 
to the 6 geopolitical zones and the 36 states of Nigeria for 2016. 















Table 4.2       2016 Zonal Intervention Projects and Zones  
 
Zone  Number of 
Projects 
Amount 
North Central 348 16,679,462,824 
North East 385 18,039,734,670 
North West  480 15,700,975,463 
South East  460 14,377,900,000 
South South 428 16,331,575,832 
South West  393 17,428,342,218 
Unknown 21 1,442,000,000 
Grand Total 2515 100,000,000,000 
 
 






Another deviation of the ZIP from the regular CDF fund was that there was no uniform 
allocation as has been the case with the CDF in previous years where members were allocated 
equal amount for their respective constituencies. This pattern was also followed in the 2017 
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Constituency allocation where each of the 36 states and the FCT had their individual allocation 
assigned. The table below shows the breakdown of funds allocated per state in 2017.  
 






























From the inception of this policy in Nigeria, it was clear that the legislators were meant to play 
a central role in the implementation of this policy. This is contrary to what obtains in other 
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jurisdiction where they use committees or merely identified the projects for their 
constituencies. Although, the legislators have argued otherwise, there is still a lot of 
controversy with regards to their role in the implementation of this policy.359 Apart from the 
ZIP in 2016 and in 2017 where the projects were pre-allocated, it has been alleged that 
allocations for CDF projects had always been made to the legislators directly. This position is 
widely believed because the Former President Olusegun Obasanjo in an open letter to the 
National Assembly accused the legislators of corruption and taking constituency funds and 
failing to implement the projects.360  
 
Nonetheless, the aim of this research is not to examine the legality of the actions of the 
legislators, but as argued by Udefuna et al, it goes to show the loopholes in the Nigerian 
political system which also affects the implementation of the CDF. The country seeks to 
establish the CDF through an Act of Parliament that has passed its second reading as at the 
time of writing this thesis. This Act seeks to criminalise persons who embezzle funds that are 
meant for development and the benefit of constituencies. According to the draft Bill, the CDF 
would constitute 2.5% of the annual capital budget of the nation.361 As stated earlier, unlike 
what obtains in other jurisdiction, the legislators in Nigeria do not need to exert any effort in 
getting the funds for use in their constituencies. They all have allocations for their various 
constituencies. What is required is for them to ensure that these funds are used for the 
furtherance of their constituency interests. How well they are able to do this is a measure of the 
extent to which they are able to represent constituents’ interests in this regard. 
 
Hence, the main challenge is how these funds are utilized to address constituent’s needs. If put 
to proper use in line with its objectives, it would go a long way to improve the living standards 
of rural communities. This policy invariably provides substantial incentive for legislators to 
show constituency related behaviour that ought to increase competition amongst them to exert 
effort on behalf of constituents. The question that needs to be asked is whether, with an 
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incentive like the CDF legislators are able to represent their constituents in the allocation of 
constituency projects? Do the pressures from the constituents to attend to personal problems 
reduce the incentive for the legislators to represent constituents using the CDF? An 
examination of this activity is necessary in order to determine the extent to which it is used to 
represent constituents. 
 
4. 5  Legislators Activities and the use of CDF 
 
To appreciate the use of the CDF in Nigeria a few projects that cut across the six geo-political 
zones were sampled. A random selection of one state from each geo-political zone is done and 
the implementation of the CDF is examined to assess its effectiveness in meeting the needs of 
the constituency.  The Fig below shows the map of Nigeria and indicates what state is picked 
from each zone.  
 





North West - Kaduna 
North East- Gombe 
 North Central-Niger 
South West- Lagos 
South South - Delta 
South East- Enugu 
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The research uses a descriptive and fact-finding approach to get information that describes the 
implementation of the CDF in these chosen areas. Data from Tracka is relied upon to give a 
comprehensive account of the issue. As a platform designed to follow up budgetary capital 
expenditure and constituency projects in communities, their aim is to ensure that there is service 
delivery by government to the people. In 2016 they tracked a total of 852 projects in 20 states 
of the federation. The project performances in these states were recorded in their national 
report. This research samples 6 of those states in the report. It is worthy to note at this stage 
that all these states had CDF allocation and projects were sited in them. A random selection of 
one state from each zone gives an effective view of how the CDF is being implemented. The 
objective is to find out whether the CDF as an activity that legislators engage in can be used to 
represent the interests of constituents. Physical projects and their location had to be traced. 
Documentary and photo evidence from Tracka report were also used to establish the existence 
of these projects and how they were implemented. The approach here is not to generalise, but 
to create an understanding of how the programme is being implemented and to assess its 
effectiveness as a tool of representation.  The importance of this approach lies in the fact that 
it is useful in describing a population that is too large for the researcher to observe directly.  
 
The fact that ordinarily the CDF as a policy should provide the incentive for legislators to 
represent the interest of constituents makes the enquiry into it a legitimate one. The way to 
ascertain whether a programme like this is effective is to see if it is able to achieve its set 
objectives. The objective in this case is to ensure that infrastructural and social development 
projects are distributed evenly so that all citizens including those in the rural areas would 
benefit. However, the results obtained were not very reassuring. Several of these projects were 
reported to be abandoned. Members of the representatives are reported to be more inclined in 
following their own conscience than to follow the lead of their constituents in areas where 
projects were sited. It was also revealed that constituents lacked knowledge or information 
about the policy objective of the CDF. They did not have proper expectation of representatives 
they were generally dissatisfied. Thus it was revealed that the CDF was ineffective in meeting 
the needs of constituents to a high extent. The analysis below gives a brief account of CDF 







4.5.1  North Central – Kwara State  
 
Kwara State is located in the North Central Senatorial District of Nigeria with a population of 
about 2.37 million as at the 2006 Nigerian census. The state had a total of 8 projects that were 
tracked within the period. The status of these projects is presented below. 
 




Fig. 4.6    Sample of Projects in Kwara State  
 
 
Source: Tracka report 2017 
 
The projects in the state included the following: rural electrification, construction of boreholes 
and drainages for erosion, supply of empowerment materials such as tricycles for the youths 
and grinding machines for women. Other notable CDF projects in the state were the 
construction of class room block in Ansar-Ul-Isam Junior Secondary School in Oke-Aluko 
Community. 
 
Report from Tracka indicated that the supply of empowerment material comprising of 30 
tricycles and 150 grinding machines in Ilorin East and Ilorin South constituency amounting to 
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N63 million was flawed.362 The residents alleged that they were not aware of this provision for 
their constituency and that only a fraction of the equipment must have been supplied. It was 
also found that those who benefited from the projects were mainly political loyalists.363With 
regards to the construction of the classroom blocks in Arsa-Ul-Isam Junior Secondary School 
which amounted to N16 million it was noted that only 2 classrooms were built instead of 3. In 
another location in Adeta Ilorin where 8 classroom blocks were allocated, only 6 classrooms 
were built with no furniture in them.364 On the whole the report indicates that people showed 
their displeasure on how the projects were being implemented and the lack of contribution on 
their part either by indicating what they would prefer or by being recruited as labour for the 
construction of these project. 
 
 
4.5.2 North East- Gombe State   
 
Gombe State is located in the Northern part of the country and had a total of 43 projects tracked. 
The status of these projects is presented below.  
 




Fig 4.8   Samples of Project in Gombe State   
  
Source: Tracka report 2017.  
                                                          
 
362 BudgiTtracka, 2016 Federal Constituency Project Lesson and Findings from Focus States July (2017) 
111info@tracka.ng. 
363 BudgiTracka report p.113. 




Projects in the state included the rehabilitation of electric pole and wires at Kwali Yalmatu 
community at the cost of N5 million and the provision of 500KVA transformer in the same 
community at the cost of N500 million. It was reported that the transformers were installed but 
the community members were dissatisfied as they complained that the transformers were 
unable to supply adequate power to the community. 365 Further engagement of Tracka officials 
with community members revealed that the community being mainly a farming community did 
not care much for having a transformer. The community members it was reported complained 
that they would rather have a community health centre as the only one in the community was 
overstretched.  It was found that this community had an 8 bed facility that was used by the 32 
surrounding villages. Reports from the Guardian Newspaper reveals that, due to the inadequate 
health facility in the area there is high level of maternal and infant mortality in these 
communities.366Other projects in the state consist of provision of potable water, agricultural 
and educational facilities etc in various locations and at various cost. The report indicates that 
members of the community were unaware of these projects until they were informed of its 
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4.5.3 North West – Kano State 
 
Located in the Northern part of Nigeria, the state had a total of 36 projects tracked. The status 
of these projects is presented below. 
 




Fig 4.10   Sample of CDF Projects in Kano State  
 
 
Source: Tracka Report 2017. 
 
Projects in the state include the provision of water hand pumps and solar powered boreholes in 
various communities at various costs. It was reported that the community members commended 
the government for the provision of potable water in their community. They were of the view 
that the project was beneficial to them as it reduced significantly the water borne diseases 
suffered by the community.368 Another notable project in the state was the provision of a 
comprehensive cottage hospital with full modern equipment at Darin-Kow community at the 
cost of N72 million. Others were the construction of township roads at Kawo Town at the cost 
of N60 million. An educational facility located in Doguwa Tudun Wada Community at the cost 
of N78 million was said not to be in accordance with the specification.369 
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On the whole, members of the community seemed satisfied with whatever they saw from the 
government and they tend to be content with these projects.  It was reported that, constituents 
do not have the habit of questioning relevant authorities who fail to carry out their 
responsibilities towards them. Even where majority of these projects are abandoned, the 
constituents seem to be satisfied. The report shows a lot of these projects have been fully paid 
for and yet unimplemented yet constituents hardly raised any question. 
 
4.5.4 South East- Enugu State 
 
Enugu state is located in the eastern part of Nigeria, with a population of about 4.26 million 
people. A total of 24 projects were tracked in the state and their general status is presented 
below. 
 




Fig 4.12 Sample of CDF Projects in Enugu State   
 
 
Source: Tracka Report 2017 
 
CDF projects in the state include renovation of administrative and laboratory block at the 
Community High School Ogor Affa, in Udi LGA at the cost of N25 million. Another notable 
project in the area was the construction of drainage for erosion control in the same community 
at the cost of N40 million. Both projects it was reported gave concerns to residents of the state 
as they complained that the laboratory was built without equipment while the drainage system 
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was built with substandard materials.370 Other projects were the construction of rural roads in 
3 different communities at the cost of N100 million each. The building of a vocational training 
centre for youths and women in Ikanu community at the cost of N50 million and water projects 
at various cost across communities were also amongst the CDF projects in the state. Most of 
the projects according to the report were at various levels of completion. Although this state 
unlike the others had only one abandoned project, the members of the community did not seem 
satisfied with the level of work. They were visibly not engaged in either the decision as to what 
project to be sited in their community or the construction of these projects. Some of the 
complaints were that labour was sourced from outside their community thereby depriving the 
youths of employment opportunities.371 In most of these communities in the state it was 
reported that unemployment rate is at its highest and this has resulted in threat to the peace and 
escalation of crime in the region.372 Although much will depend on other factors and 
government policies in place, the proper implementation of these projects while taking into 
account the needs of communities could go a long way to reducing some of these social 
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4.5.5 South South – Delta State 
 
Situated in the Southern part of Nigeria also known as the Niger Delta region, Delta State is 
one of the 9 oil producing states that sustains the Nigerian economy and accounts for about 
80% of the federal government annual revenue.373 A total of 64 projects were tracked in various 
stages of completion as follows. 
 




Fig 4.14    Sample of CDF Project in Delta State 
 
 
Source: Tracka Report 2017 
 
Among these projects was the construction of youth Skills Acquisition Center at the cost of 
N110 million in Kwale Ndowa West LGA and the construction of a Comprehensive Health 
Care Center at Eruwharen community at the cost of N60 million. It was reported that the Youth 
Skills Acquisition Center was only started after Tracka officials in a sensitisation visit 
encouraged residents to write to their representative in the National Assembly. The residents 
are so far reported to be satisfied with this project as it will encourage the youths to acquire 
skills that would enable them to earn a living. With regards to the Health Center, the project 
was abandoned despite the indigenes engaging with the representative to demand for the 
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construction of the project. Residents were reported to be unhappy about the situation as they 
have suffered immensely due to unavailability of a health care facility in their community.374 
Other projects undertaken in the state were the provision of educational facilities, potable water 
and rural electrification at various cost.  
 
 
4.5.6 South West- Lagos State  
 
Lagos State is located in the Western part of the country and one of the smallest states in 
Nigeria. However, it is the economic hub of the country and the most populated city in Nigeria. 
A total of 57 projects were tracked in the state with their status presented below. 
 




Fig 4.16    Sample of Projects in Lagos State  
 
 
Source: Tracka Report 2017  
 
A range of projects were carried out in the state which included the supply and distribution of 
ICT equipment to 50 students in each of the 10 public schools in Surulere Federal Constituency 
at the cost of N100 million. Other projects were empowerment programmes through 
agricultural training and skills acquisition for women and youths at the cost of N40 million. 
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Tracka report indicated that participants were given fish smoking equipment which they 
thought were donated by the representative from his personal resources.375 Also worthy of note 
is the provision of transformers to 3 rural community in Shomolu at the cost of N19.5 million 
and some poverty alleviation materials for displaced people settled in the state.  The supply of 
buses and cars were also tracked some of which were supplied and others abandoned. Residents 
complained that there was no communication between them and their constituents with regards 
to most of these projects. Those who benefited from the vehicles were mainly political loyalists.  
On the whole, the level of abandoned projects and those not implemented goes to show how 
residents have been short changed by their representatives.  
 
The report so far gives a glimpse of how the CDF is being implemented in Nigeria. It shows 
that representatives are not faring well in the use of this programme as a tool of representation. 
They are not being responsive to constituents’ interests and preferences in most cases. The 
implementation of the CDF policy provides a practical means by which their representative 
capacities can be measured and be seen. Instead of a duty towards constituents, what is seen is 
that representative activities are based on personal exchanges. Representatives have been 
described as engaging in non-binding activities most of which constituents do not understand. 
They convey the image that they are hard at work for the interests of the constituents.376  While 
in many respects the political attitude and opinion of representatives hardly reflect the attitudes 
and opinions of those they represent. They tend to mostly prefer activities that the constituents 
would perceive as representing regardless of the substantial effect it has on the constituents.377 
Their aim has been to divert attention from the relevant site of their representation which should 
be in their constituency. Therefore, the importance of examining the representative abilities of 
members by focusing on their activities in their constituency cannot be overstressed. Its value 
lies in the fact that it could serve as a conduit through which constituents can learn about the 
behaviour of their representatives and how they are able to carry out the functions of 
representation.  
 
The manifestation of disengagement that can be seen in people’s political behaviour and 
attitude could arguably be said to be the reason why there is an increase in political theorists 
taking up the normative question concerning the quality of political representation. All of this 
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is in a bid to distinguish between instances where citizens ‘feel represented’ from instances 
where they are ‘actually represented’. Richard Fenno’s seminal work on legislators and their 
constituency provide a useful framework to understand distinctive ‘home styles’. This has to 
do with the effective ways that representatives engage in constituency work. The whole essence 
is to ensure that high priority is placed on constituency service. In order to achieve this, a 
representational relationship needs to exist between the representatives and their constituents. 
Although in Nigeria this relationship has been found to exist, it needs to be pointed out that it 
has never been an equal relationship. The constituents have generally been spoken to rather 
than spoken with. This may be the reason why some writers have come to the conclusion that, 
in relating with constituents’ legislators merely patronise them.378 It is pertinent to say that, 
representatives need the connection with constituents in order to represent them better. They 
can only act in line with their interests and preferences and get their recognition and positive 
evaluation if this connection exist. This positive evaluation has been argued to pay off for the 
members on Election Day,379 but most importantly it would help promote better targeting of 
projects to the needs of constituents in the case of the CDF implementation.  
 
Thus, a key element that enhances effective representation is citizen participation. The 
implementers of the Kenyan CDF principally governed by the CDF Act 2003 understand this 
fact. This is why committee members in charge of projects are drawn from communities and 
are appointed by the MPs on a 3-year renewable term.380 This participatory approach is seen 
as an effective strategy for delivery of services to the people in resource development and 
mobilization. It is a paradigm shift from the top down approach to one where development 
agents as beneficiaries are at the same level in decision making concerning development. It 
shifts more decision-making responsibilities to the intended beneficiaries to plan and take 
active part in the implementation of their development initiatives. It also enables constituents 
to be more certain of the welfare contribution of representatives when they are involved in the 
decision making and they can infer ability to represent from these activities or constituency 
service.381 
 
In identifying the CDF programme as a policy tool for the decentralization of development 
there are certain things that needs to be borne in mind. First, the awareness that it is a politically 
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driven development initiative and that its importance in constituency-based politics in Africa 
to enhance the supply and demand for constituency service is key. While viewing the initiative 
alongside the national strategy for development, its main goal seems to be to nurture the 
integration of diverse communities into a common set of social values in support of the existing 
system.382 For this to happen, there is no doubt that there has to be strong MP involvement and 
leadership. However, as representatives of the constituency, the role they play in facilitating 
constituent’s participation in making claims upon government services is fundamental to how 
efficient and honest they are able to use the CDF in representing their constituents.  
 
Invariably, the unobserved variation about how legislators deliver goods to their constituents 
and how constituents are allowed to make input in decisions affects the extent to which they 
are able to represent them. The argument here is that, in the implementation of the CDF, the 
basis for a successful representational relationship is needed and this can only be achieved 
when there is participation of constituents in the decision-making process. When this is 
achieved, the representative activities would be in line with the constituent’s interests.  The 
people will feel that their inputs are taken into consideration and that their representatives are 
listening to them. Constituents may not expect them to deliver miracles rather what is expected 
is for them to listen and show that they have listened. How constituents’ preference is being 
articulated and gauged will go a long way in determining how the representative can better 
represent their interests. 
 
4.6 Considering Constituency Preference 
 
As earlier mentioned, constituency preference is an implicit component of representation, and 
is connected with the discussion on representation. Representatives at the time of election, 
appeal to the electorate in terms of their commitment to serve their interests. This brings to the 
fore the saliency of their legislative actions to ensure that it is in tandem with those interest. 
The quality and degree of those actions ought to be scrutinised to see how it aligns to the 
preferences of citizens and bring benefits to them.  
 
The expression of policy preference by the constituents is reduced to mere endorsements with 
the constituents playing no active role in either the selection or the implementation of public 
policies. This has been argued to be due to their inability to articulate their demands and has 
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resulted in their failure to hold representatives accountable.383 However, where a connection 
exists, it gives citizens a better sense of the processes of representation and legislators’ 
responsiveness can be compared with constituents’ preferences. Political theorists have alluded 
to the fact that, representation was thought to be ‘voicing’ the electorate’s general will.384 
Manin expressed it in a more nuanced but basically similar idea when he emphasized that the 
quality of democratic representation hinges on the desire for representatives to be re-elected, 
giving them an incentive to represent the interests of the voters.385  Urbinati recently made a 
strong case that representation should be understood as continuous, not dualistic and 
sovereignty as including judgment, not only arbitrary will. She stressed the view that in 
representation, persons have ‘presence through voice’, exercising political judgment in the 
public sphere.386 These views expressed connotes that, representation aims to mediate public 
judgment and reasoning as it arises among persons engaging in horizontal dialogue within the 
electorate and vertical dialogue between the electorate and its representatives.387 Therefore, the 
means by which representation comes to exist is in the performance of representatives acting 
on behalf of constituents. Agreements are reached when expressed preferences of constituents 
changes the moral situation so that those preferences becomes an obligation to the 
representatives. 
 
The individual becoming a representative, expressly or tacitly, assumes an obligation to abide 
by majority agreements.388 In that wise, representation expresses a potentiality for the citizens 
to act; this they are able to do through their preferences expressed to their representatives whom 
they have empowered to act on their behalf and whom they expect to take such preferences 
into consideration in acting on their behalf.389 Thus, representatives acting as some kind of 
experts who have no reason to listen to their lay audience have been criticised as an anti-
democratic sentiment.390 There is no doubt that they might have the ability to reason 
independently, but as Kant argues, they are equally fallible and cannot do without or substitute 
for a reasoning public.391 The reasoning about norms presupposes the ability to judge what a 
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community could deem acceptable, requiring an understanding of the will of all persons 
concerned. It follows that proposed policies must not just be general but also justifiable to those 
subject to them and this requires, in Kant’s view, communication between citizens and 
rulers.392  
 
Thus, methods of aggregating constituents’ preferences in decision making must be accepted. 
Such methods must reflect in most instances the ideal preferences of the constituents arrived at 
by an agreed social decision function that makes it fair. A social decision rule that could 
translate determinate individual choices into indeterminate group preferences is what is needed 
for this to happen. This takes into consideration the interests of the generality of constituents 
in the district rather than a subset of it. Constituents’ preferences in broad terms which still 
recognises that individual member’s ideal preferences have some weight in all conceivable 
circumstances in the overall decision-making process is what is considered. Therefore, in 
saying that a person represents a constituency district, it implicitly means that every member 
of that constituency is being represented and their ideal preferences counts.  
 
According to Rogowski, societies where members agree on social decision function to arrive 
at the general preference, which also has the attributes of equality of information is best 
represented by itself or with strictly instructed delegates as representatives. These delegates 
decide in exactly the way prescribed by the social decision function.393 By this submission, it 
can be said that theorists have alluded to the fact that using the delegate model, constituents 
can control representatives. This is reinforced by the model of Miller-Stoke which assumes an 
influence of constituencies on deputies. They argue that constituents are said to control the 
actions of representatives by choosing candidates who so share their views that, in following 
their own convictions they act in the constituents will, or by representatives following what 
they perceive to be the district attitude in order to win a re-election, they are being controlled 
in some way by the constituents.394 This idea was succinctly developed in their famous triangle 
which provides a model that shows the connection between district attitude and the 
representative role call behaviour where the constituents tend to control in some way the 
actions of their representatives.    
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Fig 4.17   Miller and Stokes connection between a constituency’s attitude and representatives roll call 
behaviour  
 
The triangle shows that the representative’s vote is according to what he thinks the district 
wants because he believes that his opinion is the same as that of the district. This is shown by 
the arrows connecting the two intervening factors which are the representative’s attitude and 
the constituency attitude. They however report that the results of their analysis are different for 
different policy domains. In the domain of foreign policy there is hardly a correlation between 
the roll call behaviour of the deputies and their constituency opinion. This is different with 
regards to social welfare and civil rights where they found substantial correlation. It needs to 
be noted that while, the triangle shows some kind of connection between the constituency views 
and the representative’s votes in the House, it fails to show whether the votes were influenced 
by the constituents’ preferences or how much control the constituents may or may not have 
over the actions of the representatives. This made them come to the conclusion that it would 
be wrong to choose just one model of representation. It also goes to show that relying on roll 
call votes alone which has been the practice to measure representation395 may not be sufficient 
as it misses a wide range of activities that are done by the representatives outside the 
parliament. If one is to consider peculiar matters that affect citizens directly, it may indicate a 
relative rather than an absolute reliance on this. It has also been found that, knowing the policy 
orientation of a district gives no clue to what the member’s actions would be.396 Hence a 
distinction must be made with regards to such matters. Representatives can follow their 
perception of what they think the constituents want, but in such cases, the representative will 
be in luck if they are able to match constituent’s preference in such instances. For more accurate 
matches constituents ought to make their positions known for the representative to implement 
and put into action. 
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Thus, in assessing representational relationship, the neglected interconnection between the 
actions of the representatives and how they can achieve representation can be corrected by 
focusing on the relationship between them and their constituents considering the requirement 
of deliberation between both parties and not merely acting on what is perceived. Good 
representation as Dovi argued, can be achieved when constituents are able to make their input 
and not the representatives acting on their perception of what they think the constituents want.  
 
Looking at this from the perspective of the CDF, this policy is designed to respond to 
constituent’s needs irrespective of political party affiliation. Its success depends heavily on 
their relationship with the legislators. Project selection and implementation are meant to be 
based on the needs of the people who are meant to be given the opportunity to communicate 
their diverse developmental needs to the Legislator for implementation. The way 
responsiveness can be achieved is through inclusion of public forum and the discussion with 
the people about their community development needs. This way their input in project selection 
and implementation is included. Situations as seen above where legislators select and 
implement projects to the exclusion of the constituents in effect goes contrary to the intent of 
the CDF. 
 
Also, if we consider the importance of citizen participation in any democratic process, then 
theoretically, the CDF could be seen as a tangible development outcome which enhances the 
implementation of projects by enabling the community to identify those projects that are of 
priority to them.  But the concern especially from the perspective of the constituents is that, 
this has not been the case. The CDF policy has continuously raised questions of efficacy of 
government service delivery and the extent to which such service delivery can be made 
accountable. Legislators have been criticised for their non-involvement of constituents and the 
manner of selecting projects to implement in each community has also been a problem. 
Occasionally, in trying to implement the CDF policies, situations have been found where the 
members hold town hall meetings to get constituent’s views.397 Interestingly, many of these 
meetings do not take place in constituency districts but in the cities. As such, the result is often 
that they may not get the right persons who may be directly affected by their decisions to make 
their input about how these projects are implemented. 
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Although in very few communities there has been evidence of some consultation and 
involvement of citizens in the identification of development priorities, there percentage is 
negligible when compared to the overall results. A majority of the constituencies cite low 
involvement of constituents in the identification and selection of these projects as they are 
mainly dominated by the legislators and thereby falling short of the expectation of constituents. 
An empirical analysis of the use of the CDF is done with interviews from the representatives 
and the constituents to get their views on the implementation of the policy. The findings in the 
next section demonstrate the extent to which this policy tool has been used as an effective tool 
of representation.  
 
4.7 An Empirical Study of the CDF as Tool of Representation. 
 
To extend what we know of representation, the legislators’ activities while implementing the 
CDF is tested to see the extent to which the policy is used as a tool to represent constituents. 
The legislator actions coupled with a wide range of perceptions and attitudes of both the   
representatives and the constituents are gathered to get information about the effectiveness of 
this policy in meeting constituent’s interests and the overall constituency needs. Interviews 
were conducted with a sample of 10 legislators and 20 constituents that cuts across various 
constituency districts. 
 
A major problem in conducting these interviews was that the participants were suspicious of 
the political purpose for which the results might be used. Despite the assurances that the 
interviews were exclusively for the advancement of academic knowledge, the politicians 
especially were very sceptical. As a result of their scepticism, there was high rate of refusal 
among the legislators to participate in this project. Several legislators had to be approached by 
the author before the sample of 10 members was achieved. The constituents on their part were 
a bit more willing but those considered in this sample, are those that share the same 
characteristics e.g. people who voted in the last elections and had played active role in politics 
in their community. By so doing, some dominant electoral elements of the districts were chosen 
so their opinion can be compared with those of their representatives. 
 
Due to the small sample size, the findings that follow are merely indicative and can be said to 
be tentative. However, the significance is that the information in this research has been obtained 
directly from both legislators and constituents. Both views have never been compared to gauge 
the nature and extent of representation that members can achieve using the CDF. Though, the 
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research and analysis are restricted to this policy area alone, it can be useful in clarifying the 
concepts of power and influence that exists between politicians and those they represent and 
this can be applied to other policy areas. The research will also be able to show who gives 
direction in the relationship that exists between the representatives and their constituents and 
how this tends to affect representation. 
 
In getting the views of the constituents, one is mindful of the fact that, the broad conception of 
how a government should go in achieving social and economic welfare objectives usually guide 
them in their response to particular questions about the actions legislators might take. This is 
fair because representatives themselves also respond to many issues in terms of fairly broad 
evaluative dimensions.398 This general position seems to orientate their actions on social 
welfare issues like the CDF. Therefore, it follows that such general evaluative dimensions 
should be used in comparing the views and perception of both parties.  
 
The necessity of specifying the activities of the representative as what will account for 
representation, assess their acts based on how projects are selected and implemented coupled 
with the attitudes of both parties revealed during the confidential interviews. By comparing the 
views of the representative and the constituents on the same issue, we are able to assess whether 
there was agreement as to the projects to be sited in the district by both parties. A situation 
where the constituents do not like the project in their community and do not think that it might 
be beneficial to them would be an indication that they may not have been consulted. This raises 
a question of how representation may be achieved. Also, it enables us to see the kind of 
relationship that exists between the representatives and the constituents. A situation where 
constituents were not asked to contribute to the decisions made with regards to the particular 
projects for their community will give two varying sets of measurement. It would mean that 
they would not be arriving at a congruence. It would also be an indication that there is no 
relationship and again raise a question as to how representation can be achieved. On the whole, 
where there is no agreement, we are able to see other variables that may have acted as a 
disincentive for representation to be achieved. This gives a basic model of the policy process 
and how representatives can be responsive to constituents in a particular policy area and the 
empirical reasons given are meant to justify the measure of representation.   
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4.7.1 Summary of Responses and Findings 
 
The starting point of a casual analysis of the representatives’ activity in their various 
constituencies and how it reflects constituency interests is the perception of the representatives 
themselves. Their activities outside the parliament which relates to their opinion about their 
main focus of representation, connecting with their constituents through personal means, 
listening to what they have to say and informing them about political matters all have an impact 
on how they can represent constituent’s interests. Although, some representatives have alluded 
to the fact that relating with constituents through small town hall meetings is simply too 
difficult. Other personal means of relating with constituents have been considered to be a folksy 
way as against the more sophisticated way of using mass communication or impersonal means 
such as letters and mails through the internet etc.399 In a developing nation like Nigeria where 
most of the constituents especially those in the rural communities cannot be reached  through 
these more sophisticated means, one cannot rule out the fact that through direct interaction the 
careful decisions that are made by the representatives are more likely to reach the constituents 
than the impersonal driven styles that may be convenient in other policy areas that do not 
directly affect constituents. It is sufficient to translate how they go about this to be 
representative activity, as it provides a credible indicator of how they represent. In other words, 
directly interacting with constituents is an important way that representatives can effectively 
represent their constituents’ interests.  
 
The analysis here gives an insight to the type of representation legislators provide and reveals 
a more complicated reality which is, legislators tend to conform to formal expectations of the 
constituents and behave in a stereotypical way when dealing with constituents. Combined with 
the evidence from the interview, it was found that the expectation of the constituents and the 
perception of the representatives themselves determine the way representation occurs. The 
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Q In your opinion what do you think should be the focus of representation:(a) the nation (b) 
An Organised Interest Group (c) Political Party (d) Specified Electoral Constituency 
 




Legislators Opinion Constituents Opinion 
The Nation  2 20% 1 5% 
Organised Interest 
Group 
0 0 0 0 
Political Party 1 10% 7 35% 
Specified Electoral 
Constituency 
7 70% 12 60% 
Total 10 100% 20 100% 
 
From the point of view of the representatives, majority of the respondents 7 out of the 10 
identified the constituency as their focus of representation. Only 2 identified the nation as their 
focus of representation and one thought that he represents the interest of the political party 
under whose banner he represents. None of the respondent thought that they were there to 
represent an interest group. This reveals the strong affiliation members tend to have towards 
their constituency. Being mainly drawn from single member constituency, it is not surprising 
that the members would identify with those who gave them the mandate. This perhaps also 
indicates a strategy whereby members in trying to secure future prospects for election associate 
themselves with those who would give them the mandate. This conclusion is reached because 
this strong affiliation does not translate to a strong physical relationship between both parties 
as the actual relationship between them is still seen to be distant. It also goes to emphasise the 
weakness of political parties because although the parties play a huge role in determining who 
becomes a legislator, once in office, their party seems to have less influence on what they do. 
 
When compared with the views of the constituents on the same question, variations were seen 
in terms of more constituents especially those who are active party members expressing the 
views that representation should focus on the party. However, majority 16 out of the 20 
constituents still think that the focus of representation should be the specified constituency that 
gave the member mandate. An obvious observation from the responses is the facts that, in 
Nigeria, organised interest group play little or no role in linking citizens and their 







4.7.1.1      Linkage with Constituents  
 
As stressed earlier, case work like the CDF provides an important channel of communication 
between the representatives and the represented and this impacts on how representatives are 
able to represent the interests of constituents. The processes and mechanism by which this 
communication is established and maintained and the perception of their linkage roles 
determines to a large extent how they perform when acting on behalf of constituents.   
 
To examine the point of contact and the transmission of information between the legislators 
and their constituents, they were asked how they maintained contact with their constituents. 
Table 3 outlines the response of both the representatives and the constituents. One thing that 
was obvious was the fact that, most of the members had no constituency office, two thirds of 
the members interviewed fell in this category (no = 7 out of 10). Few ran constituency offices 
and maintained staff that would man these offices to facilitate contact on their behalf with their 
constituents (no = 2) and this was clearly done on a regular basis of at least once in a week 
while some claimed that they met with constituents at least fortnightly. NG 4, one of the two 
members with a constituency office, gave the information that even on regular days when the 
House had plenary, he retired to his constituency office after the plenary session and closed for 
the day at his constituency office. What is clear is that, most of the meetings that members have 
with constituents are rather informal with no prior appointments and these meetings usually 
happen where ever it was possible. This ranges from the parliamentary office itself to their 
constituency office if they have one or even the member’s homes. Other means of contact are 
made possible during town hall meetings at the instance of the member, but these were rarely 
the case.  When asked how information is passed across both parties, direct meetings were seen 
to be the most useful method and this could be anywhere. A third of the constituents (no 7) said 
they had visited their MP in their offices in the parliament on receiving information of an 
informal meeting. None of the participants said they had seen or received a letter or leaflet from 
their representative. A quarter said that they have seen their representatives on the television.  
 
Q. How is contact maintained between the representatives and the constituents? 
 
Table 4.4      How members and constituents maintain contact.  
 
Place of Contact Legislator’s View Constituents’ View 
Constituency Office 2 1 
Office in Parliament 6 7 
Members Home  5 3 
Town Hall Meeting  4 15 
Other Places 0 2 
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There seems to be an overlap from the responses of the constituents here, It was found that, the 
same persons seemed to be active in meeting with the representatives in different places and 
this shows the variation in the numbers. However, from the small sample of 20 constituents it 
can be said that there exists some kind of contact between both parties. The interviews also 
reveal that most of these contacts were at the instance of the constituents and not the 
representatives. When asked about the frequency of issues that were brought before the 
members, it was found that, significantly, issues relating to personal welfare featured 
prominently with support for employment and financial assistance being recorded as the most 
frequent. This is in line with the findings that most of the issues brought to the attention of MPs 
are actually outside their immediate policy domain and also goes to show that most constituents 
appeared not to have high expectations of their representatives. They merely see them as local 
promoters and powerful and influential people in the society who they can use to get things 
done in government bureaucratic circles.400 
 
 
In assessing the significant disconnection and the widely held negative perception of the 
members, the constituents blamed it mainly on the lack of visibility of the members. Many of 
the respondents use the words remoteness or distance to explain why they are disconnected 
from their members. On the whole only 3 out of the 20 participants felt they were well 
connected with their members. Some of the views of the constituents are presented as follows: 
 
“They keep their distance, they only come to us when they want our votes once they get 
it they forget us and only come back after four years” 
 
“where did we see them? After the election I have not set my eyes on my representative 
in this village again, they do not care about us, the only thing they care about is the 
office.” 
The aggregate response of constituents in this regard is shown below.  
 
Q. How connected are you to your representative?  
 
Table 4.5    Showing constituents connection with their representatives 
 
Well connected 3 
Averagely connected 2 
Low Connection 13 
Don’t Know 2 
 
                                                          
400 David Judge and Gabriella Ilonszki, Constituency Linkage in the Hungarian Parliament, Legislative Studies Quaterly Vol 
20 No 2 (May 1995) pp 161-176 at 172 
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What this confirms is that having contact with representatives with regards to public issue have 
a way of making the constituents feel they are somewhat connected to their representatives and 
the representatives are representing their interests. The correlation between this form of contact 
and connectedness also goes to show that confidence in the representative activity of the 
members tends to increase when people are consulted and their views heard before important 
decisions that affect them are made.  
 
Constituents want to be represented by a person that they can trust, a person who they see often 
and who is always open to their concerns and whose assurances they can trust.401This trust 
usually entails face to face contacts with constituents as this increases the chances of the 
member being liked or even recalled. The members sometimes seem to be engaged in a variety 
of meetings and social gathering that may be organised at the local level to increase their 
visibility. They take part in activities like inaugurating buildings, giving prizes at schools, 
cultural festivals etc. The fact remains that, when it comes to those issues that are of benefit to 
the constituents as a whole they may not be as open to them and invite them to make their input. 
This lack of connection between the representatives and the constituents has been cited as one 
of the causes of the decline in confidence in the political system.402 This situation, coupled with 
the development of more individualistic, consumerist cultures which has eroded collective 
political identities,403 all tend to make the people feel that they are not properly represented by 
the legislators.  
 
4.7.2 Views on the use of CDF 
 
The central hope of the CDF is that projects would be targeted to meet the needs of particular 
constituency districts. This requires among other things, the legitimate connection between the 
members of parliament and their constituents, paying more attention to implementation and 
holding government officials responsible for results. This also means that, steps would be taken 
to eliminate opportunities of corruption and that attention would be focused on making the 
CDF a part of the effective development effort of government. 
 
In trying to see the extent to which this policy tool can fulfil its mandate, there are certain 
principles and guidelines which are consistent with international standards that the policy and 
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its operation must adhere to. These principles are meant to highlight the importance of 
transparent project selection and implementation in a manner that enables the citizens to work 
for the development of their community. It enables them to demand accountability through 
their regular oversights in order to get the type of development project that is most suitable in 
meeting their needs and promoting their community development. This means that the success 
of this policy is contingent upon an inclusive process of consultation which fosters cooperation 
among the MPs and their constituents. In other words, responsiveness of the members towards 
the constituent’s preferences is salient in the achievement of this objective.  Responsiveness 
can be achieved through public forum discussions about community development and 
soliciting input from all legitimate stakeholders by regularly including them in project selection 
and implementation. 
 
Secondly, transparency is the fundamental principle of a democratic government. This refers 
to the administration of government that is open and publicly observable in a manner that it 
creates opportunity for citizens to participate. Apart from the fact that the CDF implementers 
are meant to consult constituents to ascertain their local development problems and the possible 
solutions to those problems, the flow of funds for the implementation of this projects must also 
be transparent and traceable. Information about the use of the CDF funds on projects must be 
made publicly available and documented according to financial principles. Also, the 
administration of the CDF must be done in an effective and transparent manner. 
Implementation strategies must be streamlined to proactively comply with the intent of the 
policy. Meaning, the allocations of projects must be done in a fair and equitable manner. The 
funds should be released on time and projects should be completed on time. This is coupled 
with the need for the structure of the administration to be clearly defined in such a way that 
each of the administrative bodies function with responsibility and commitment. 
 
Finally, to improve the quality of projects and prevent corruption and the abuse of funds there 
should be some form of accountability and oversight. Procedures and legal regulations must be 
put in place to hold the implementers of the policy accountable. Monitoring by constituents to 
ensure that projects progress towards their goals, while also evaluating the impact of these 
projects on the constituency districts are all necessary elements for the success of the 
programme. 
Having this as the background and turning to the explanatory factors, questions were posed to 
the members and the constituents on the operation of the CDF and they gave their views about 
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this policy. Both parties were asked if they had knowledge and information about the CDF and 
what it aims to achieve. All the legislators were able to give an overview of the CDF coupled 
with what it stands to achieve. On the part of the constituents, 14 out of the 20 (70%) 
respondents have heard of the CDF before, but more than half of those who responded in the 
affirmative 9 (45%) were not aware of its policy objectives. Most of the constituents were 
generally of the opinion that as legislators it is their duty to ensure that the constituency gets 
their share of the “national cake.”404 They were not aware of the fact that special funds are 
allocated to each constituency for development projects. Others thought that the projects that 
they see the members caring out in their constituencies were due to their own benevolence for 
the community and as such coming from their personal funds. In the opinion of such people, 
“once they become members they become so empowered financially that they are in a position 
to do a lot for their constituents”.  
 
Establishment of knowledge of the CDF among the constituents is one way of finding out 
whether the constituents made an input in the choice of projects. Where the attitude of the 
constituents is negative, it goes to show that the legislator has acted alone without consulting 
with the constituents. The negative attitude may also imply that the project is of little or no 
benefit to them. This invariably means that their expectations are not met, which suggests 
ineffectiveness and the lack of representation in this regard.    
 
Table 2 indicates how the informants responded to the question about knowledge of CDF 
policy.  
 
Q. Do you have knowledge about the CDF and what it is meant for? 
 












Heard of it but don’t know much - 14 
Don’t Know/ No opinion - 6 
 
The interview results reveal that knowledge was a significant factor to how the CDF is 
implemented. The constituents lack knowledge as to what the CDF is meant for and what it 
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ought to be doing. The members who are in a position to educate and inform their constituents 
of this policy initiative and its benefits fail to pass on this information thereby making majority 
of the constituents to be ignorant of the fact. Legislators generally are found to engage very 
little time in educating their constituents about their representative activities except during 
election.  The findings therefore suggest that although the basis of a representational 
relationship does exist, there seems to be an alteration in the way it works. Greater attention 
needs to be paid to communicative dimension between the representatives and their 
constituents for them to be on the same page on policy issues. Representation needs to be 
thought of as empowering people directly rather than investing power in politicians who 
represent the people.405 
 
When asked about the participation of constituents in the decision-making process of the CDF, 
the two sides tend to share an understanding of the importance of citizen participation. In reality 
however, the system ignores the fact that the best way of ensuring and preserving the 
representative framework in the implementation of this policy is through allowing the 
constituents input in the decision-making process. This conclusion is reached because it was 
found that in most of the cases the constituents were not consulted before projects were sited 
in their constituency. Even those members that had regular meetings with their constituents did 
not inform them or get their views before these projects were allocated. The table below 
provides the response from constituents.  
 
Q Have you ever participated in a meeting where the CDF projects were discussed? 
 
Table 4.7   Constituents participation in Project decision 
 
Always  0 0% 
Sometimes 0 0% 
Never 20 100% 
 
On the level of their satisfaction about how they are being represented their attitudes appeared 
to be more of dissatisfaction. The question below was put to the respondents. 
 
                                                          




Q Government has provided funds for development projects in the constituencies, overall are 
you satisfied or dissatisfied with the job your legislator is doing in your constituency? 
 
Table 4.8   Evaluation of Legislator’s work in their constituency.  
 
           Constituents View 
















It is notable that most of the constituents thought that the legislators were not doing a good job. 
They felt that if the CDF was meant to be a response from government, the legislators have 
failed in the delivery and the implementation. They fail to see how these projects have come to 
change their lives. In part, it can be argued that, this is as a result of the disillusionment resulting 
from the knowledge that the funds were for their own benefit and not just out of the good will 
of the representatives. It can also be attributed to the low level of trust that the constituents 
have in their representatives and the general opinion of corruption that is always attributed to 
politicians.  
 
A further examination of the point of contact and the transmission of information between the 
representatives and the constituents shows that, although there are outlets for the constituents 
to make their views heard, these views were not articulated in a way that shaped the decision-
making process with regards to the projects to be implemented in their various constituencies. 
This makes it easier for factions to exploit the procedures on behalf of sectional interests, which 
may not be of benefit to the generality of the constituents. This may also have been possible 
because the prevailing political system is such that it is difficult to hold representatives 
accountable for their actions. 
 
In general, the respondents tend to distrust the process of representation itself as they feel that 
their interests are not taken into consideration and in their opinion, the CDF policy as it is 
implemented has failed to produce better outcomes. What this suggests is that greater attention 
needs to be placed on the interaction and communication dimension of representation. Citizens 
are demanding a less distant relationship with their representatives as such; new means of two-
way communication needs to be established. In terms of performance of the CDF, a lot is still 
left to be seen. There are very few records in Nigeria and none has shown that the policy 
initiative is meeting its targets. So far, the identified projects have not been assessed in terms 
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of their impact on the overall interests of the community.  In terms of poverty reduction, records 
show that it supported few groups mainly youths and women with equipment to start up small 
businesses. However, this help does not cut across and only a small group benefited from it, so 
its aim of promoting equitable development and alleviating poverty at the constituency level 
cannot be said to have been achieved. For instance, the CDF bursary meant for students is said 
to be frequently abused by giving to students who are not deserving of it. These bursaries tend 
to be given to relatives of the legislators and there is lack of public awareness in the community 
for them to take part. Critics continue to question the actual intention of the CDF policy arguing 
that some of these hand-outs are a source of social discord as it encourages dependency and 
undermines the importance of self-help or unpaid community service as a long term for 
community development. These shortcomings make the constituents come to the conclusion 
that the legislators do not use the CDF to represent them as they do not see the benefits of the 
programme. 
 
4.8   Analysis 
 
Since independence, a major concern in Nigeria has been the inability of the central and local 
government to provide quality services capable of driving equitable developments in the local 
communities. The strategy of using the CDF to meet this need is without question a laudable 
move on the part of the government. This was intended to provide a visible mechanism of 
delivering social projects towards poverty alleviation and infrastructural development at the 
local level.  However, it has raised concerns as to whether legislators can act as development 
financiers. As a Ugandan representative puts it: 
 
that money should be sent to districts and be managed at local government level. Why 
should government give MPs money? It is obvious that the money will always be 
misused. MPs should be overseers of the various projects that are run and managed by 
the local government. Development is a national issue that should be planned and 
pursued with clear direction not this business of dishing out money to individuals in the 
name of the CDF. Even if you gave Shs 10 billion to each MP, no development will take 
up in their respective constituencies.406 
 
Critics have argued that the key function of the legislators is to make laws, scrutinise 
government policies and administration, contend with budgetary issues, debate major issues 
and ensure that the executives remain accountable, but their implementation of the CDF 
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undermines these functions.407 They are of the opinion that, the CDF should be implemented 
in a way that does not involve legislators playing a central role but allows government agencies 
and the Local government authority to implement it. Legislators as representatives can then, in 
the ordinary course of their oversight function scrutinise it to ensure that it meets the objectives 
of its policy.  
 
Other factors may also be working against the CDF. This includes the reality of conducting 
constituency work in a developing country like Nigeria which poses its own challenges. Given 
the ‘patron-client’ nature of politics that is prevalent in the country that encourages 
expectations of direct form of help from the representatives, constituency work is 
predominantly being overwhelmed with individual calls for assistance. The legislators are 
regarded as providers of financial assistance such as paying of house rent, providing school 
fees or assisting someone with funeral expenses. These activities leave the representative little 
time and resources to engage with constituency work and address the general needs of the 
community. Since these funds are sourced from budgetary allocations, it is also considered to 
be a misuse of funds when they are put to solve individual problems rather than meeting the 
needs of the people.  
 
Lack of public access to information has also been identified as a major problem of the CDF.408 
The implementation of this policy appears to be shrouded in secrecy and this has resulted in a 
cry from Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) challenging the policy and requesting for an 
order to make public the allocations that are made to the legislators under the CDF.409 
Furthermore, there appears to be no clear principles for the allocation of these funds nor is there 
any acceptable template for the administration of the CDF. A clear direction as to how these 
funds might be used, decisions as to the kind of projects which these funds are to be invested 
on, the manner in which tenders are awarded, the type of oversight and the transparency 
required in the policy process, are all issue that are plaguing the implementation of this policy. 
Except for Lagos State, there is no legal framework either at the national or state level that 
seems to back the implementation of these projects.410 The disbursements made so far have not 
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been measured to assess whether it is indeed effective in the allocation of infrastructural 
projects to meet the needs of constituencies.  
 
Overall, there has been no proof that the CDF as a policy has been able to provide an equitable 
distribution of projects that reflect the priorities of local communities. Between 2004-2013, an 
estimated Nine Hundred Billion Naira (N900, 000,000) has been disbursed for CDF projects, 
making Nigeria one of the costliest in terms of allocations to constituency project 
funds.411Despite this fact, the CDF has failed to play a fundamentally distributive role that may 
be seen as more adequate than the disbursement or the implementation of development projects 
under the executive. 
 
Criticisms against the programme range from corruption, selection of contractors based on 
nepotism, the misappropriation of these funds for the funding of non-priority projects, 
substandard or abandoned projects that tend to benefit the elites in the cities rather than the 
rural areas. These are all common features with the CDF which stems from the fact that there 
is lack of reporting, weak contract management and poor oversight. The practice where the 
legislators who are interested in the execution of particular constituency project are the same 
people that are called upon to perform supervisory role with respect to such project is bound to 
cause a conflict of interest.412 The inability of the implementers to have a grasp of the aggregate 
cost of these projects and its impact on the national budget, coupled with the exclusion of the 
constituents whose interest should be taken into consideration are things that need to be 
addressed if the CDF policy is to achieve its policy objectives. 
 
Most of the problems associated with the CDF are as a result of weak systems of redress due 
to weak institutions and the overall lack of political will. Despite all these manifest abuses in 
the system, there is yet to be a prosecution for corruption that may serve to deter other 
subsequent offenders. Without a proper legislative framework, avenues for redress and strong 
systems for accountability, decentralisation schemes like the CDF are more likely to bring 
about corruption to the locality than to achieve the gains of development.413 
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The question of what specific projects to be sited in a community and who the deserving 
recipients are and the extent to which these projects must go will all depend on the needs of 
individual community. But the equitable process for deciding what project to allocate funds to, 
is a challenge that needs to be addressed. Those factors that tend to motivate legislators to 
prioritise certain areas of their constituencies and not others or to site certain projects that are 
more relevant to one gender, males as against the females, are all important issues that need to 
be understood if the CDF is to be used as a veritable tool to tackle the infrastructural deficit in 
the local communities. This understanding is needed to avoid bad practices and propose 
recommendations that would help in the implementation of the policy and bring it in line with 
the preference of the constituents. 
 
4.8.1 Sustainability of the Policy 
 
There is no doubt that the CDF represents an imperfect piece of legislative activity that can be 
prone to corruption and abuse, yet it provides one of the most critical tools available for 
government to use to cure some of the problems facing Nigeria. Without the CDF, legislators 
may be unable to do anything that can directly aid their constituents. The programme serves as 
a quick fix to the development imbalance and cures the deprivation of most of the rural 
communities by providing them political succour with the particularised benefit that it brings 
to them. It forms a critical feature of the democratic system in Nigeria to enable legislators to 
better represent their constituents.  
 
However, the efficiency and effectiveness of the policy lies in its implementation. A case for 
its continuous use must take into consideration the articulation of local demands. The challenge 
it faces in this regard is not to replace the existing service delivery from local or central 
government, rather it is to define a relationship with the local authorities and other government 
agencies in order to improve service delivery in the local communities.414 It is important that 
an effective monitoring process be included in the policy implementation to ensure 
accountability. It is also necessary to devise norms, rules, procedure and template that would 
be adapted to the different projects that are being provided to enhance their effectiveness. This 
accountability regime also concerns how the procurement of goods and services will be 
monitored and the body that will be responsible for such monitoring. There needs to be some 
level of separation of powers between those that are meant to provide these goods and services 
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and those that would monitor its implementation. The current system where the legislators 
oversee both monitoring and implementation leaves no room for adequate transparency in the 
programme. This lack of accountability has led to its criticism and made it popular with 
politicians who are interested in advancing their own interest rather than the interest of their 
constituents. The inclusion of a monitoring regime into the policy making process is what will 
in the long run account for a more transparent implementation of the policy and enable it to 
achieve its objectives and strengthen the responsiveness of government in meeting the real 
needs of the people.  
 
In addition to having these effective monitoring in place, there is need to enforce the protective 
provisions put in place in the Procurement Act Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2007. This is 
an Act that regulates the procurement of goods and services in Nigeria to promote 
accountability, transparency and openness in transactions415 and any departure from the Act is 
criminalised.416 The CDF can also take a cue from other jurisdictions to identify some good 
practices that can be transplanted to the jurisdiction to make its policy workable. Such practices 
as appointing committee members is a strategy that is being employed in other jurisdiction to 
ensure accountability.417Although there is little academic research in this field, coupled with 
the fact that the CDF is a relatively new phenomenon, with the earliest started about 1985 in 
Pakistan.418 The need to identify principles of accountability that would contribute to a 
constructive framework for the procurement of goods and services in the implementation of 
CDF cannot be overstated. If implementers know that there are systems of accountability in 
place, this would go a long way in putting a check on their activities and to preserve the 




This chapter has discussed the Constituency Development Fund as a tool that the 
representatives may use to represent constituents’ interests. Though unmentioned in the 
constitution or any national law in Nigeria, the implementation of this policy has become an 
important part of the job of legislators in Nigeria. As an engine for representation, its 
importance derives from the f act that it serves as a policy tool that is aimed at decentralisation 
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of government efforts towards development. This politically driven initiative if properly 
implemented has been shown to be an important form of constituency-based politics in Africa 
to deliver the gains of democracy to the people.419 It has also been identified as a tool to enhance 
the functionality of the legislature as a representative institution.420 
 
Unfortunately, the activities of the members and the way the policy is being implemented has 
raised a lot of doubts and criticism among constituents. The legislators have failed to include 
the input from constituents in the decision-making process. They have argued that, the 
expectations of constituents are difficult to meet. On the part of the citizens, it has become clear 
that they are highly interested in the goods that their representatives are able to deliver to them 
as that is what is visible to them, for which they can hold representatives accountable.421 This 
however, seems illusionary as the lack of accountability and transparency is mainly due to the 
lack of proper monitoring of the implementation of the policy process. Corruption and the lack 
of accountability in the system has been a major hindrance which has led to the inability of the 
policy to achieve its objectives. This has also led to the high cost of implementing this 
programme without a commensurate amount of development projects seen on ground to justify 
the expenses. Politicians seem to have leveraged on the system and instead of using this policy 
as a tool of representation they use it as a means to enrich themselves.  
 
Consequently, the idea of the case study is to show how the actions of the legislators influence 
the representation of their constituents. A salient point that has been made in the use of this 
case study is that, not taking into consideration the preferences of the constituents leads to the 
wrong conclusions and to the legislators representing in an improper manner that tends not to 
be in the interest of those they represent. Another valid point that was made in this chapter was 
that, for growth and development to be maintained the action of the legislators must be held up 
against certain standards. This is with the view to assess their performance and appreciate their 
strength and weaknesses in order to develop appropriate mechanism for their improvement. 
Since representing is the core function for which the legislators are assessed, then the standards 
they must meet cover the core areas which include participation of their constituents, 
accountability to them and taking their interests into consideration. If these core principles are 
not met it is unlikely that representatives can adequately represent the interests of those who 
elected them.   
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REPRESENTATION AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
 
5.1   Introduction  
 
Citizen participation has been identified by political theorists as the corner stone of any 
democratic society.422 There has been a growing literature on the relationship between citizen 
participation and political representation.423 Both concepts are closely interrelated as they 
reinforce the concept of democracy which upholds citizen engagement in a political system. 
As a result of this, modern representative democracy has always been shot through with 
participatory elements.424 This participation, it has been shown, cannot be restricted to 
conventional forms, such as voting or running for election alone. It also covers other less 
conventional types of political activities, such as protests, demonstrations, sit-ins, hunger 
strikes, boycotts etc.425Although, there has been no consensus about the goals and objective of 
citizen participation, due to the disagreements amongst theorists on how citizens should 
participate. Theorists tend to agree on the fact that participation of citizens in the decision-
making process is crucial for the well-functioning of any representative democracy.426 
 
Analytically, this chapter tries to advance understanding into the relationship between 
representation and citizen participation. It examines the link between these two phenomena, 
analysing the function of citizen participation and how it enhances the process of 
representation. It assesses the extent to which representatives employ methods that allow 
citizens to participate in the decision-making processes that affects them, considering the 
complex relationship that exists between both parties. It argues that, through citizen 
participation, the organising structures of representation are able to articulate the interests of 
citizens. Where these structures are such that citizens are only passive participants who are 
handed down decisions already made by the representatives, then there is no real representing.  
Citizen participation is seen as tantamount to an effective representative process and it is 
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recommended that the representatives in their implementation of policies like the CDF, should 
accommodate the expression of the constituents’ preferences as this will enable better targeting 
of projects to the needs of the community.  
 
5.2 Definition of Citizen Participation.  
 
Before going into the analysis, a definition of citizen participation is necessary. Rosenstone 
and Hansen offer a definition of participation in the political sense as ‘an action directed 
explicitly toward influencing the distribution of social goods and values.’427 By this they mean, 
participation will require a considerable degree of contact and communication between 
government officials or representatives with the citizens to ensure that decisions are geared 
towards problem solving in the communities. Arnstein also emphasises on the power of 
decision making as central to the concept of direct citizen participation.428 This requires power 
sharing among the citizens and their representatives. It is not a form of control that enables 
those in authority to get citizens to do what they want them to do, rather, it is a form of shared 
power with the citizens as opposed to power over citizens.429 Invariably, citizen participation 
in decision making is understood as the active dimension of citizenship in every given 
community. It refers to the various ways in which individuals take part in the management of 
the collective affairs of a given political community.  
 
Given the importance of citizen participation in the decision-making process of a community, 
attention needs to be paid to how representatives engage citizens in this regard. There is no 
gainsaying that effective representation can be achieved when opportunities are created for 
citizens to participate in the decision making that affect them directly. In line with this thinking, 
when representatives engage with their constituents in a way that excites their contribution in 
decision making, then they can respond satisfactorily to their collective preferences and 
represent them better. Rosenston and Hansen concurring with this state that ‘People participate 
in politics not so much for who they are but because of the political choices and incentives that 
are offered them.’430 
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Thus, citizen participation - in the decisions that affect their lives - is an imperative of 
contemporary society. The beginning of the 20th century saw the expansion of demand for 
citizen participation in basic welfare and quality of life.431 This is a shift from citizens’ total 
reliance on public officials and administrators solely taking decisions and implementing 
policies on their behalf. However, this is not the case in all jurisdiction. In developing countries 
especially, it is observed that despite the wave of democratisation, the ability of the existing 
structure of representation to provide citizen influence over decisions that affect them, is on 
the decline. The World Bank, for example, has argued that, in most societies, democratic or 
not, citizens seek representation of their interests beyond the ballot as taxpayers and as users 
of public services and against the backdrop of this competing social demands, rising 
expectations and variable government performance, the expressions of voice and participation 
seem to be on the rise’.432 These agitations are as a result of citizens becoming more suspicious 
of government and demanding direct control in the decisions that affects their lives. As Verba 
and Nie argue, if democracy is interpreted as the rule of the people, then the question of who 
participates in political decisions becomes the question of the nature of democracy in that 
society.433  
 
The connotation here is that in a representative system how decisions on behalf of constituents 
should be made is a central issue. This issue has been widely debated by political theorists. 
Some believe that representatives should act on behalf of constituents without the constituents 
influencing or controlling them;434 others are of the view that greater citizen involvement is 
what is needed to curb the abuse of representative systems.435 The latter view suggests that the 
solution to the crisis of citizens’ representation in modern democracies is citizen participation. 
Representatives are expected to make politics more inclusive by allowing citizens to participate 
and take part in decisions which concern them. It is also expected that representatives would 
be free from prejudices and bring about an ideal rational deliberation between them and the 
citizens they represent. Based on these expectations, the hope is that democracy could move 
on towards the deliberative ideal, allowing decision-making to be better informed, more 
transparent and more effective.  
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On a casual analysis, there seem to be avenues that are open for citizens to participate, but to a 
large extent, the system and the way society is ordered, discourages or prevents substantive 
citizen involvement.436 This has led caused some persons in the society to be marginalised. 
According to Philip, when a society is ordered in a hierarchical fashion as most are, those who 
have been marginalised will seek to enhance their representation.437 This they can do by 
demanding for better participation which includes information and deliberation that would 
enable them take part in the decision making that affects them. Thus, political participation 
affords citizens in a democracy an opportunity to communicate information to government 
officials about their concerns and preferences and to put pressure on them to respond.438 
 
The above argument underscores why citizen participation is an important characteristic of any 
democratic society. Citizen participation in the political process is one of the main principle 
democracies are built on as it is the basic feature required for the proper functioning of any 
civil society. Citizens have the right to express their views and attitudes towards almost 
everything happening in the public sphere or concerning their own interests. They need to do 
this in a way that government officials know this and respond. The commonest way this can be 
done is through voluntary political participation of the citizens. They can influence government 
action by their activities either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public 
policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make these policies.439 This will 
cumulate into the creation of political communities that can transform dependent private 
individuals into free citizens and partial or private interests into public good.440 They also tend 
to have the knowledge and ability to participate more fully in the political, technical and 
administrative decisions that affect them.  They are able to demonstrate this capacity when 
given the chance and this makes them feel like democratic citizens and to also feel more 
represented.  
 
Thus, the link between participation and representation becomes clear. Contemporary political 
theory challenges the actions of the representatives and assess them by how they can engage 
democratic citizens to participate in the course of representing them. Hall warns that the idea 
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of participation demands greater attention if we are to fully understand the phenomenon of 
representation.441 This is because it helps to return focus on how a member’s choice about 
activities shapes the representative relationship. In the course of their work, representatives 
make decisions and take actions that would require them to invite citizens to participate. They 
could either include citizens or discourage them. Their choice of activities becomes a focal 
point over public involvement and how the representative process can either be enhanced or 
hindered. The extent to which they can represent depends on how they can accommodate 
citizens actively in the decisions that they make on their behalf.  
 
Therefore, the concept of citizen participation is no longer hypothetical, rather, it is real and 
depends mainly on the activities of the representatives.  Research is also beginning to recognise 
a new kind of decision making which is not hierarchical but rather horizontal and involves 
citizens.442 This has been proved to provide better representative outcome than in situations 
where representatives alone take on the responsibility of deciding what should be. The 
representatives in the course of representing constituents are involved in governance and as an 
activity, governance seeks to share power in decision making, encourage citizen autonomy and 
independence and provide a process of developing the common good through civil 
engagement.443 This structure tend to provide the best morale for citizens because there is less 
red tape when dealing with issues in the constituency.   
 
Likewise, Legislators in the process of representing constituents, engage in activities that range 
from the formal legislative (i.e. passing legislation) to the informal quasi-legislative (i.e. 
services provided to constituents outside Parliament) This aspect involves deliberative 
democracy and collaborative policy making,444 which has to be done in conjunction with the 
citizens. Certain barriers seem to hinder the participation of citizen in this deliberation and 
collaboration. These are identified as the nature of life in contemporary society, administrative 
processes and the current practice and techniques of participation.445 One of the ways through 
which these barriers can be overcome is by a learning process that is built on empowering and 
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educating both the constituents and the representatives. These processes of deliberation can 
lead to the effective representation of people’s interests. Most importantly, it can enable 
administrative structures and processes that would change the way legislators and their 
constituents meet and interact. This will go a long way in identifying the goals and objectives 
of government policy interventions and make them more targeted to the needs of the citizens.  
The effectiveness of this deliberation is assessed by how it can engage active and informed 
participation of constituents in the decision-making process in particular and in the political 
process as a whole. If proper deliberative conditions are in place, citizens might even be able 
to change their minds to agree with the representatives if confronted with a better argument.446 
Thus, better conditions of democratic representation unfold where there is a relationship 
between the representatives and citizens on an ongoing basis during the term of office and not 
merely at the time of voting or re-election. This will have the effect of altering the judgement 
of the representatives and bring about an acceptance of the citizens as the proper source of their 
authority to be such representatives. 
 
It should be noted that deliberation here is not seen merely as the aggregation of interests, it 
requires thoughtful examination of issues, listening to the perspective of others and coming to 
a public judgement on what represents the common good.447 This is differentiated from public 
opinion which is uninformed, superficial and transient. This may not be able to form the basis 
of public policy. According to Nancy, public judgement come from people working together 
face to face in a shared search for effective solution to their community problems. This requires 
information about issues, knowledge of the basic elements of the problems as well as an 
understanding of the relationship among the elements and the consequences and trade-offs 
associated with different policies.448 Thus, it can be said that citizens are an integral part of any 
government and their active involvement is considered essential in the substantive decision that 
faces the society. These decisions are those that are crucial for the life of any community as 
such it needs to be defined by the citizens themselves and not anyone else on their behalf. In 
the next section the functions of citizen participation and its effect on representation will be 
discussed.  
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5.3   Function of Participation and how it helps Representation 
 
Dennis Thomson identified the main functions of political participation and its effects on 
political representation and listed them as follows: protects citizens against sinister interests; 
helps to avoid excluded interests; provides political knowledge to citizens; improves the 
legitimacy of democratic institutions and leads citizens to self-realisation449 
 
Thomson discussion on the function of participation is important for this research because it 
brings to light how the realisation of these functions depends on the activities of the 
representatives. If we consider the important role that representatives play in the gathering and 
distribution of information necessary for improving the knowledge of constituents, it follows 
that, in fulfilling this function, a lot depends on how the representatives agree to meet with 
constituents and consider the preferences that they express. So, if avenues are not created where 
the representatives are to meet with constituents, the result is that, they prevent those interests 
from being heard and expressed. Thus, the actions of the representatives either create incentives 
or disincentives for the participation of citizens.  
 
According to Jack Nagel ‘Acts of participation are stimulated by the elites’.450 This view is 
supported by the views of Rosenstone and Hanson who argue that, people participate in politics 
not just because of who they are but because of the political choices and incentives that are 
offered to them.451 This invariably means the responsibility is on the political representatives 
to create the enabling environment for the citizens to participate, especially in the decision-
making process. This they can do by framing the issues to be deliberated in a way that the 
constituents can understand and by discouraging strategies that would prevent participation 
like ‘exclusive invitation’. This tends to cut out a large segment of the population that would 
ordinarily be impacted by the decision. It also gives constituents little inducement to want to 
respond to policy issues and participate in the decision-making process in politics.452 An 
analysis of these functions is necessary in order to give a proper perspective of how it interacts 
with representation. 
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Firstly, it protects citizens against sinister interests. When citizens are allowed to participate, 
they remain their own masters and ensure that no one will impose an interest contrary to their 
will. They gain freedom which comes from participation in decision making as they have a 
degree of control over their lives and environment.453Their involvement is also said to foster 
more responsible policy and administrative systems that are more in concert with what the 
citizens desire. Thus, citizen participation will produce more public preference decision making 
on the part of the representatives and a better appreciation of the larger community. 
 
Secondly, it avoids excluded interests and this is based on the thought that extensive 
participation is necessary so that all interests are considered and expressed by those who know 
them best. There are disadvantaged citizens who have been systematically excluded from the 
representative democracy. Participation gives room to such persons to make their voices 
heard.454 The function of avoiding excluded interests shows how participation depends on not 
only the citizens expressing their views, but also on the representatives agreeing to meet with 
the citizens and seriously considering the preferences that they express.  
 
Thirdly, it provides political knowledge. The political development of citizens depends to a 
large extent on how they are able to participate. The more people are allowed to participate, 
the more they are able to develop the attitude and skills of citizenship and this has the positive 
effect of pulling others into the system. This means that citizen participation makes the political 
system to be more democratic. It also has the advantage of reinforcing the government at the 
local level. When citizens are allowed to participate in representative process, they are able to 
make good collective decisions and come to public judgements which stems from taking into 
account the interests of others and hearing competitive arguments before collective decisions 
are made. This also enables them to be self-protective and raises in them a sense of belonging 
in their local community.455 In other words, through participation, democratic citizens gain 
competence and improve the understanding of their own needs, desires and interests. This 
invariably would improve political outcomes by helping both the citizens and the 
representatives to base their decisions on better information.   
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It is argued that, relying on other people to advance one’s interest comes with risks, hence the 
need for constituents to participate themselves. In this way, they can hold their representatives 
accountable. Through their participation, citizens can make continuous judgement on how they 
are being represented. As David Plotke argues, citizens gain political representation when their 
authorized representatives try to achieve their political aims, subject to dialogue about those 
aims and to the use of mutually acceptable procedures for gaining them.456 In a political sense, 
this makes the citizens to be present throughout the representative process and this conception 
is what underlines the agency of both participants in the representation relationship. Here, the 
representation-relationship does not exclude the agency of the principals who act through the 
representative, rather, it looks at the exercise of political freedom as an on-going 
communicative process. This tends to challenge the view that citizens are sovereign only in a 
potential way, because they only exercise their right of choice during elections by “deposing” 
the representatives.457 
 
Fourthly, it improves the legitimacy of democratic institutions. By their active participation, 
citizens give their consent to political institutions and thereby to the decision-making authority 
of these institutions.458 Where citizens refuse to participate, it is an evidence of their 
disapproval of the system. As Young argues, the legitimacy of a democratic political system 
depends partly on the extent to which all citizens who will be affected by the decisions made 
by the political system have had an opportunity to have their voices heard in the decision-
making process, because this has the effect of producing stability within the system.459 
 
Finally, citizen participation can lead to self-realisation. Democratic citizens are meant to shape 
themselves and the decisions that are made about them through their active participation. For 
them to be autonomous, they must be allowed to participate in decision making especially in 
matters that affect them. This depends on the choices that are offered to them as it fosters the 
right relationship between the representatives and the represented. To sustain the virtuous circle 
of representation, a participatory government requires a participatory society to be able to 
sustain it. This also means that participation gives the power to the citizen to be able to 
challenge their representatives and this can be an avenue through which changes can be made.  
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The highlight of these functions goes to show the importance of citizen participation in a 
democratic society that intends to achieve proper representation of its citizens. Despite its 
importance, there are some criticisms to citizen participation as many regard it with distrust.460 
This is because they doubt the ability of the citizen to make positive contributions to 
governance and decision making in general. According to Schumpeter who is a strong 
proponent of this view, ‘the masses are incapable of action other than a stampede’.461 Others 
like Stivers also reason that, the involvement of citizens in governance and decision making is 
unworkable however desirable it may be.462 
 
Some of the reasons for their criticism of participation rests on the assumption that, citizens by 
nature are naturally flawed as they tend to be over zealous or indifferent. Critics argue that the 
average man is not a rational and thoughtful democrat, rather he is a prejudiced individual who 
neither understands nor is particularly committed to democratic principles.463 This being the 
case, what is required is a form of guidance in decision making by some informed and 
politically active minority.464 This is because, it is felt that citizen participation is inefficient as 
it will in some way make the decision making process slow if all the persons involved will 
have to be called upon to make their inputs before particular decisions can be taken. They 
further argue that, the complexities of modern society demand that the elected officials and 
administrators who have the capacities are saddled with the ultimate responsibility to formulate 
and execute public policy as that is what they are hired to do. If decisions are made by just the 
citizens who have no knowledge, the decision made will be uninformed ones.465 Other 
criticisms that are levelled against citizen participation is that, it cannot prevent powerful 
cliques from dominating the decision-making process nor can it eliminate the difference in 
power that it is meant to eliminate.466 
 
These critiques of citizen participation help to bring to light some of the problems that need to 
be addressed if participation will be able to enhance the representation of constituents. There 
is no questioning the fact that modern representative democracy demands the recognition and 
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equality of citizens in relation to their needs, characteristics and identities.467Political theorists 
have argued that good representation requires that the represented be made 
present.468According to Bantham, “there is no one who knows what is in your interest better 
than yourself”.469 The same can be said for constituents that no one can know the interest of 
constituents better than the constituents themselves. It follows then that, each constituency is 
the guardian of what constitutes their interests. Representatives cannot act in the best interest 
of constituents if left to themselves without relating with the constituents. There is therefore 
the need for the constituents to come to reason with them and make collective choices. The 
essence of this collective choice is in finding a method that allows participants to compare 
gains and losses that stem from a particular policy intervention. For this reason, citizen 
participation has been thought to include a vast number of official contacts and 
communications with government officials as well as a large volume of informal, problem-
solving activity among friends and neighbours in local communities. This gives the citizens the 
opportunity to be the final judge of what constitutes their interests. It also allows the 
representatives to use the information they gather from the people to further their interest. 
 
Consequently, the absence of participation is one of the key ways that can be used to show that 
a representative system fails to be responsive to constituents. This is because there are 
fundamental differences in the social position that affects how legislators perceive constituents 
and vice versa. Where these contacts are absent, it allows the prejudices of both parties to come 
into play and the legislators may be acting on what they perceive to be the interests of the 
constituents which may very well be wrong. Also, when political opportunities are limited and 
avenues of political participation are strictly restricted and controlled, citizens become passive 
which can lead to negative form of participation like protest and boycott that may not be 
beneficial to society. This passivity can mean a transitional waiting for better opportunities for 
participation.470 This also has been explained to be the reason for the decline of citizen 
involvement and the retreat of many citizens into their private spaces in many democracies.471 
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Thus, political participation largely and primarily depends on the structure of political 
opportunities present at any given time and in any given society, which is the result of 
inclusion-exclusion mechanisms developed by the states.472 By not establishing arenas and 
institutions for consultative politics, states may close avenues of political participation for its 
citizens and thus provide them with fewer opportunities to participate in the management of 
their collective affairs.473 But when issues are framed to be deliberated between the 
representatives and the constituents, it offers an incentive to participate. Such strategy will 
invariably safeguard the mechanism of accountability and preserve the access of all citizens to 
governmental bodies.474 
 
5.4    Methods Employed to Include Citizen Participation  
 
This section examines some of the innovative mechanisms that can be put in place to enhance 
citizen participation and to enable citizens to present their views and preferences directly and 
interactively to their representatives. Voting seems to be the popular method with most writers. 
Although, it is an important mode of citizen involvement in political life, it is but one of many 
political acts that citizens can get involved in. Citizens apart from voting can work formally or 
informally with the representatives to solve some community problems. They can engage in a 
variety of activities, including working in and contributing to electoral campaigns and 
organizations, contacting government officials, attending protest marches or demonstrations, 
serving without pay on local elected and appointed boards, being active politically through the 
intermediation of voluntary associations.475They may also contribute money to political causes 
in response to mail solicitations.476 The list is not hierarchical, though it is quite obvious that 
voting is the easiest way to participate in politics. For the purpose of this study, it is important 
to see that through the use of deliberation, representatives can routinely engage constituents in 
the decisions they make on their behalf. The extension of invitation to the citizens to participate 
can create a positive impact on representation, but it needs to be noted that this is not just 
declarative, it has to be implemented in practice.   
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Verba divides citizen political acts into three categories based on certain factors which he 
classified as: the requirements for activity; the level of capacity for conveying information; and 
the variation of pressure on policymakers made by activity.477 This classification reflects one 
important feature of the political life in any given state and that is the freedom of choice. It also 
goes to show how effective the political system of a society can be when there are possibilities 
for everyone to find their niche in the participation process. Thus, for good representation to 
suffice, avenues must be made available for the citizens to express themselves and this right 
must be safeguarded. This brings us to the next section where an evaluation of citizen 
participation is assessed to see the extent to which it enhances the representative process.  
 
5.5     Assessing Citizen Participation  
 
In assessing citizen participation, one needs to evaluate the outcomes and processes and its 
implication on the representative process.  For this to be done, there is need to be clear on what 
model informs the analysis that is made. Also, it needs to be noted that variations in the 
participation patterns would depend on certain inherent factors in the society such as the 
stability in the social system, acceptable pattern of power, presence of organised political and 
social movements that agitate for community rights etc.478 
 
Erasmus Kloman in his research on “Citizen Participation in Philadelphia Model Cities, 
demonstrates the difficulties of conducting evaluation in highly charged political environment 
and the challenges of reconciling multiple perspectives.479 Judith Rosener advocates an 
approach which she believes avoids some of the major difficulties in evaluating participation 
and she proposes a measurement of its ‘effectiveness’. Using this model, evaluation can be 
moved from a scenario where there is no agreement on participation, criteria or cause/effect 
relationship between a programme activity and the achievement of goals and objective to a 
scenario where there is agreement on participation which has a goal or objective and criteria 
by which success or failure of the activity can be measured.480 
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This means there should be an understanding that, citizen participation is not just an end in 
itself but a means to an end. The ultimate goal of involving the citizens, which is for them to 
input their preferences in order to get to the goals or objectives of the particular government 
policy or intervention programme, must be achieved. This is the specific function which the 
citizens are meant to perform in that participation activity. For them to be able to do that, the 
objective has to be clear to them. This way, the cause and effect relationship between their 
participation and the desired goals can be measured in terms of the achievement of those goals. 
It is however emphasised that there should be an agreement on goals and objectives, and an 
indication of whose goals and objectives they are. Also, there must be a fair knowledge of a 
cause and effect relationship between the specific participation programme and the 
achievement of the agreed upon goals. 
 
The significance of this model is its impact on the policy process as it illustrates an attempt to 
evaluate decisions that are made based on the processes and outcome that follows. The stated 
goals and objective are defined by the accomplishment and the specific change and conditions 
which the programme intends to produce. The activity could be the town hall meetings or other 
forms of engagement between the representatives and the citizens. In order to determine 
whether or not these activities contributed to the achievement of the objective, the criteria is 
that, there has to be evidence that there was interaction between the representatives and the 
citizens and evidence that the citizens input are being used in the policy or the decisions made. 
This is what shows that they were involved in defining the problem and setting out the priorities 
on how to find a solution to it. 
 
Indeed, there may not be a widely acceptable scheme for conceptualising and measuring the 
effectiveness of citizen participation, because an understanding of the environment in which 
the activity and the assessment will take place is also important. However, what is being 
stressed here is that, if representatives are to do their jobs well, they would need to involve 
citizens in a way that is judged to be effective and this has to do with the process and the activity 
that they perform and not just that they are present. Seeing that the right processes are followed 
is enough to boost the confidence of citizens in any representative process and make them feel 
more represented and as suggested by Elena C Van Meter, ‘Effective citizen participation can 
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be the bottom line of government’,481 such that government can use this as a basis to change or 
justify their policy and processes of implementation.  
 
Thus, citizen participation in this sense means the sharing of decision power and not just an 
expression of opinion after decisions have been made by the representatives. By including 
citizens, representatives and the citizens would be able to know what works and what does not 
work through the information and the deliberation. This would minimise the frustration felt by 
the representatives in meeting the expectations of citizens as well as minimise the distrust felt 
by the citizens about their representatives. It would also mean that, expectation about a 
particular government intervention would be clear and the representatives would have to be 
honest about their intention while the citizens would also be reasonable in their demands. This 
invariably will go a long way in making the citizens claim ownership of whatever decisions 
are made and ultimately feel more represented.   
 
If this model is applied to government policies like the CDF in Nigeria, the processes that are 
employed by the representatives in getting the constituents to make an input in the decision 
making and how projects are allocated can be evaluated. This will ultimately be a measure of 
how the policy initiative has been able to meet its objective which invariably is in line with 
effective representation of citizens’ interest.   
 
To further support the use of this model, there is the persuasive argument that smaller systems 
hold out the potential for effective citizen participation than larger ones.482 Due to the scale of 
size, the constituency would seem to be one area where citizen participation would seem to be 
more evident.483 This means in implementing the CDF policy, the small size of the constituency 
should ordinarily be seen as an incentive, as it is small enough for the representative to mobilise 
the citizens and encourage them to participate. In practice, this is hardly the case as there seems 
to be a tension between the representatives and the constituents. This may be because, 
constituents are perceived by the representatives as not having the skill and time to devote to 
making cogent decisions. Nonetheless, representatives feel that it is within their purview to 
make decisions on their behalf. The problem this raises is that the representatives sometimes 
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may not be attuned to the issues of the community and acting alone might not enable them to 
meet the constituency needs. As a result, there seems to be a constant call for decentralisation 
in the decision making and direct citizen involvement. This direct citizen involvement in a 
democratic society is now viewed by many as a vehicle for social change and transformation.484 
The extent to which it is being espoused and practised or the extent to which it is opposed and 
questioned appears to be the level of citizen satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a particular 
government service.485   
 
5.6    Citizen Participation in the CDF and its Impact on Representation 
 
It is already established that, the mandate of the CDF in Nigeria is to provide even development 
in all the constituency districts and it seeks to enhance provisions for constituency projects 
which are implemented by members of the legislative arm.486 It is also an established fact that 
the implementation of this process requires the participation of the constituents. The purpose 
of this, is to ensure that the interests of the constituents are represented in the allocation of these 
constituency projects. However, if one considers the fact that the CDF legislation at the federal 
level is yet to be enacted by the National Assembly and that apart from the government 
directive, there is no law in force backing the policy, then one may come to the conclusion that 
citizen participation is not yet defined. This conclusion is reached because there seems to be 
no express agreement on goals, which ultimately affects the criteria that may be used in judging 
the value of any activities performed by both the legislators and the constituents in the 
implementation of the CDF policy.   
 
Although this is the case, another argument that could suffice could be that, there are other 
government documents that may have the force of law where the policy directive may be 
inferred. For instance, the funds from the CDF are from the appropriation of the Federal 
government and this in itself is a law. Other government directives and Hansards of the 
National Assembly are also important in determining the objectives of the programme. These 
documents presume that, the central principle behind the CDF is the interest of citizens as their 
involvement is crucial to the choice of projects that are sited in any particular community. In 
the absence of predetermined goals and objective, one can rely on these documents to develop 
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a set of criteria or standards with which to measure the specific programme’s activity against 
the overall principle that it stands to achieve. Thus, the CDF as a policy can generally be said 
to encourage citizens to get involved in the decision making regarding their welfare.487 
 
The participatory approach of the CDF policy is meant to shift the development paradigm from 
the top down approach where development agencies are used to acting as all-knowing and 
taking communities as passive objects of development, to the bottom up approach. This 
paradigm shift means equal participation of citizens and empowering development 
beneficiaries in terms of resources and needs, identification, planning on the use of resources 
and the actual implementation of development initiatives.488 Unfortunately, whatever 
safeguard that has been put in place with regards to citizen participation in the CDF programme, 
may not be yielding much results. This is due to the inherent weakness in the processes which 
still affects adversely the participation of constituents in the implementation of the policy.489 
This wave of non-participation, it has been argued, has provided evidence of a crisis in popular 
representation in many low and middle income countries, as state responsiveness to social 
claims and the ability of the existing structures to provide representation for their constituents 
and allow them have an influence over policy is on the decline.490  
 
This seems to be the situation in Nigeria, as citizens tend to be more curious about what 
representatives do in the course of performing their functions. On a cursory look representation 
might seem to be taking place but, attention needs to be paid to not just the fact that constituents 
are present, but on the processes adopted to include their preferences in the decision making 
process while implementing the policy. Dovi has warned that, representatives should not just 
be judged as representing constituents’ interests merely because they increase opportunities for 
constituent’s participation, rather they should be judged by whether they encourage forms of 
participation that further the well-functioning of the institution and foster citizens capacities 
and opportunities for such participation.491 This means that where citizens are allowed to take 
part in meetings, but the positions to be taken are already decided without their input, such a 
                                                          
487 Mbitha Mwenzwa, From Center to Margin: An Appraisal of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) as a 
Decentralization Strategy in Kenya. P. 3 www.eldis.org. 
488 Roberts Chamber, Who’s Reality Counts: Putting the Last First, Intermediate Technology Publication, IDS Discussion 
Paper 347(1994).     
489 Chitere O P & Ireri O N, District Focus for Rural Development in Kenya: It’s Limitation as a Decentralization and 
Participatory Planning Strategy and Prospects for the Future. Nairobi Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (2004). 
490 John Harris Political Participation, Representation and the Urban Poor: Findings from Research in Delhi, p 2 
www.2.ids.ac.uk . 
491 Dovi (n 3) 130. 
186 
 
practice does not foster proper participation and this impacts on how one conceptualises the 
representative system. Thus, a system which is concerned with the capacity of citizens to 
engage in public activities and decision making without necessarily controlling the decision-
making process can effectively articulate the interests of its citizens. This is what Philips terms 
as ‘politics of presence’.492 
 
The presence of constituents in the implementation of the CDF can only be meaningful if their 
preferences are taken into consideration in the allocation of infrastructural projects. This is 
when the projects can match the needs of the constituents as they become a part in identifying 
the solution to the problem of infrastructural deficiency in their local communities. When the 
preferences of the constituents are manipulated, there is no way this can improve the 
functioning of the representative system and make government intervention policies effective. 
The constituents’ participation is meant to contribute to the objective of the policy and make it 
necessary for the representatives to use the policy to represent constituents.  
 
The approach taken in the implementation of the CDF in Nigeria tends to point to the fact that 
constituents are often vulnerable to manipulations by their representatives who withhold 
information from them. Most of the systems operation seems to be shrouded in secrecy as such 
constituents are not aware of the essence of the policy. They may sometimes seem to be taking 
part in meetings, but they really do not make an input to the project selection or the siting of 
such projects in their constituencies. They merely attend those meetings as nominal participants 
and play no part in the decisions that are made. Constituents generally seem alienated and 
sometimes go to the extent of resisting these development initiatives. Indeed, Chitere has cited 
cases where communities that have been left out have resisted initiated projects in their 
communities.493 
 
This goes to show that not all methods of citizen participation can support the capacities of 
constituents. Citizens that are enlisted to participate should be able to have trust in the process. 
Their representatives and the methods that are employed in the decision-making process should 
be such that would allow them to voice their preferences. This is what contributes to the proper 
functioning of the CDF policy and ultimately the representation of constituents’ interests in 
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that regard. A lack of participation by constituents is a way of denying the CDF programme 
any chance of success and giving the representatives the chance to use the policy initiative to 
their advantage and at the expense of constituents.  
 
 In the light of the above, it is seen that in carrying out their function, the legislators engage in 
activities that would require them using deliberation and public conversation with their 
constituents and this can be regarded as a collaborative policy making which is important to 
the operation of any policy initiative. They are meant to educate their constituents through 
deliberation and offer prescriptions regarding political issues. This way, they are also able to 
shape how the constituents understand an issue and take decisions that would further their 
interests. By doing this, they also inspire constituents by example to participate and bring them 
into the policy making process through public hearings, town hall meetings, teach-ins and other 
meetings that allow testimonials. This way they are able to justify their decisions by invoking 
the experiences of their constituents494 and the constituents in turn are able to give the political 
cover that they need to exhibit democratic representation.  
 
A good representative system must, therefore, seek to safeguard the capacity of constituents to 
determine when and how they need to participate. It should allow the constituents to make their 
own choices regarding the good that they want. Such necessary conditions include educating 
them and giving them the required information to enable them to participate.495 It also includes 
preserving the capacity of the constituents to make decisions that would be in their interests.  
In the course of representing, the processes representatives employ to provide mechanisms for 
the effective recognition and representation of the distinct voices and perspectives of their 
constituents groups is what seems to be important.496 The requirement is for the citizen to be 
seen to rule and be ruled and not just stay entirely passive in the decision making process 
especially on matters that affect them.497 They should be able to monitor the process and be 
willing to engage actively when the need arises. This is how they are able to fulfil the 
requirement of democratic citizenship and representatives have an important role to play for 
this to be achieved.  
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Democratic citizenship here is understood as a latent condition that is triggered by the 
representatives when they invite the constituents to participate. Representation should not be 
restricted to only just the political moments when citizens vote. It should also be identified with 
those moments when they engage with representatives in town hall meetings and take part in 
the decision-making process. The information that is passed on to them by the representatives 
is what enables them to think for themselves and take a position that would be in their own 
interests. When citizens are allowed to participate in this way, it creates a space where they can 
reason together and come to public judgement with their peers in face to face meeting about 
issues of public concern.498 Apart from the fact that people are able to learn from one another 
about issues of public interest, people become receptive when they engage in meaningful 
deliberation with one another.499 It also brings together a cross sample of the electorate who 
deliberate on the issues that affect the community aided by the representatives who provide 
them the facts in a language they can understand. This ultimately leads to better policy 
recommendations that are more thoughtful and substantive.  
 
Supporting this view, Box advocates a rethink in the structure of representation by redefining 
the role of citizens, elected officials and the administrators, so that responsibility can be shifted 
from the professionals and the elected officials to the citizens through mechanisms of 
engagement.500 For the CDF, the facilitation and mobilisation of citizens, the consequences of 
the activities and the responsibility for implementation are all factors that need to be born in 
mind if the policy is to achieve its goal of meeting the needs of constituents and serve as a tool 
of representation. Emphasis on the process of citizen participation becomes more critical 
because the issues to be dealt with has to do with growth, allocation and development that are 
required to meet the needs of constituents.  
 
5.7  Analysis 
 
The idea that people ought to be directly involved in the decision that affects their lives is 
something that has captured the attention of theorists. Despite the warnings about its dangers, 
limitations and impracticability, its appeal continues to drive political theories. As such, its 
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capacity to enhance democratic representation cannot be overstated. The struggle is to ensure 
that such participation is inclusive of all citizens that are willing to participate and not just a 
subset of it. The ability of representatives to plan and deliberate with their constituents will in 
no doubt enhance the decisions that are finally made in their various constituencies. Therefore, 
a continual search for practices that would enable this engagement is recommended. The 
practices adapted should be such that would enhance the proper representation of constituent’s 
interests and make intervention policies like the CDF to be relevant in meeting the needs of 
constituents and fulfilling the purpose for which it was established in the first instance.  
 
It is apparent that the gap between the ideal and what is practised has resulted in a situation 
where the constituents believe that the decisions made are not necessarily in their interests. 
This appears to energise the constituents and make them criticise government and its policies 
and call for more participation of citizens. A deliberative process that would require the face 
to face involvement of constituents in decision making especially in matters that affects them 
is what is needed and this is obviously still lacking in Nigeria. This situation is mainly due to 
the lack of interaction between both parties hence a lack of monitoring and accountability and 
suspicion among the citizens.  As Lukensmeyer & Brigham put it “the values are there, the 
strategies are there, the people are there, it is simply up to the representative to make it 
happen.501 
 
It is worth noting that, in determining the relevance of citizen participation in a representative 
democracy, one finds that the roles of both the representatives and the constituents are 
intertwined. Both parties need each other and there has to be some compatibility between these 
roles. This is what is ideal for interaction and to mutually reinforce support for the inclusion of 
constituents in the decision-making process. A change in the perception from both parties can 
also help to reinforce this relationship. If the representatives were to be more responsive and 
transparent and the constituents, less suspicious of their intentions, then there could be better 
representative processes where all the parties act with mutual understanding and consideration 
of the other’s interests.  
 
However, changes do take time to happen and behaviours are deeply ingrained so the role 
expectations of the representatives and the constituents may not change overnight. The 
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deliberate lack of information on the part of the constituents is mainly blamed on the 
representatives who place restrictions on the means through which citizens get informed and 
enlightened. Constituents may be seen attending Town Hall meeting with their representatives 
but a lot of them have little or no understanding about the CDF for instance and they really 
have no say in the selection and implementation of projects. This is contrary to the views 
espoused by Robert Dahl who argues that, for people to be able to know what they want and 
what is best for them they must be enlightened and this can be via the information they get.502  
 
Therefore, the idea of how the representatives are supportive of citizen’s active participation is 
vital to how they can effectively represent their interests. The model where the citizens are 
mere subjects that are meant to succumb to the ruler’s voice seems to be replaced by a model 
that calls for an expanded role for citizens. This is not just centred on citizens who will vote 
for a candidate to represent them in parliament every four years, but it requires the continuous 
and active participation of these constituents in the decision making that involves them. 
Different models of how to deal with the public and public funds are beginning to emerge. 
People are demanding for a more accountable government that is open, transparent and 
inclusive of its citizens and citizen participation needs to be understood within the context of 
this change because it sets the terms and conditions of how representation can be defined, 
expressed and judged.  
 
Therefore, legislators who represent the interests of the people have the responsibility to 
energise and coordinate all the parts of the system, ensuring equal and equitable outcomes and 
the constituents will in turn make their input and support the programme and activities so they 
can be properly designed, implemented and evaluated.503 In this way, citizens would be able to 
promote their interests in a group rather than as individuals. This would also create avenues 
where constituents foster a more collective advocacy group that would represent their wider 
interests and be a watch dog for the greater good of all in the community. Such dispersed groups 
in the community enable active and legitimate opportunity for the citizens to be heard at the 
critical stages of the decision-making process. Also, the diversity of interests can be represented 
and a reasonable responsiveness to constituent’s interests can be developed. As the citizens are 
expected to be knowledgeable about their interests, the representative’s role is to give access 
to them so that they can be voiced out for the representatives to implement. It goes without 
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saying that the role of the representatives in this regard is to be implementers of the citizen’s 
preferences through their laws, mandate and policies. 
 
The decision-making process has been described as a learning process where the citizens are 
co learners and solutions to public problems have to be discovered through a process of social 
learning.504 This social learning occurs through collaboration between the representatives and 
the citizens who are required to make value judgements and trade-offs among competing social 
needs and solutions on how to meet these needs. The representatives as stewards serve as 
facilitators of this learning process. By their activities, they are able to create supportive 
political cultures that can be sustained through their encouragement of citizen involvement and 
accommodating collaborative problem solving and decision-making group. If nurtured through 
dialogue, this can ultimately have the effect of developing citizen’s identities and harness the 
energy and talent of members of the community.     
 
Ultimately, the empowerment of citizens lies at the heart of citizen’s participation.  There exist 
no objective criteria that can be used as a yardstick to measure its effect on the representation 
of constituents, but by assessing its relevance to how the representatives can effectively 
articulate constituents’ interest, its relative importance can be deduced. The actions and the 
processes used by the representatives when they act on behalf of constituents confer legitimacy 
and ownership of the decisions that are made and this affects the extent to which the 
constituents can feel represented. This process of mobilisation and capacity building is what 
will ultimately give voice to constituents and enable them to express their preferences to their 
representatives and enhance the representative process so that decisions that are made are better 
targeted to the needs of constituents.    
 
5.8   Conclusion  
 
The broad picture that emerges from this chapter shows the importance of citizen participation 
in the representative process. It has discussed how citizen participation is a factor that helps in 
the effective representation of citizens. Ideally, for representatives to be able to represent 
constituents’ interest they have to enlist their participation so that they can make their interests 
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and preferences known. This is necessary because the articulation of interests itself is a 
purposeful and requisite value in any democratic society.505 
 
Mere participation of constituents is often not enough in itself. What is needed is that citizens 
that participate are able to contribute to the decisions that affect them. Therefore, the 
representatives are meant to adopt processes that allow for deliberation and give the necessary 
information that will enable the citizens to understand political issues and make their decisions 
based on such understanding and their needs or else such representation is hollow. The measure 
of effectiveness of this participation can be deduced from the processes used to mobilise 
constituents’ participation and the outcome on the policy process. From this, one can infer if 
the preferences of the constituents have been included and in this way, representatives can be 
said to be representing those interests.   
 
Unfortunately, the CDF policy in Nigeria has continuously been implemented with little or no 
contribution from the constituents. The decision as to what projects to be sited in respective 
communities are taken without the input of the constituents and this has been the reason why 
some of these projects seem to have failed to meet community needs. If constituents are allowed 
to participate through effective deliberation and consultation with themselves and their 
representatives, they would have the chance to make their preferences known by choosing from 
competing needs those that are most salient to the wellbeing of the generality of the people.  
Also, it has been seen that policy preferences, implementation and enforcement cannot 
adequately meet the needs of citizens if such needs are not known and the citizens are in the 
best position to make this known to the representatives rather than for them guessing what it 
is. Therefore, the representatives need to do more in allowing citizen participation as this can 
help them in their work of representation. Citizens have the right and must be allowed to 
participate in public policy and decision-making process as they know what is important for 
them and how they can best achieve their objectives. The duty then is on the representatives to 
devise effective ways of engagement with them, only when this is done can representation be 
able to meet constituent’s interests.  
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REPRESENTATION AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
6.1 Introduction  
The normative question in this research has been how quality representation can be achieved. 
Certain key factors have already been pointed out. It is however important that structural 
conditions and institutional design under which a practice of good representation has the best 
the best chance to flourish be in place. Usually, there are different characteristics or features 
that are inherent in every system that affect the realisation of representation. These institutional 
features according to Herrick, can affect legislator’s incentives for responsiveness, their ability 
and how they represent their constituents.506 Legislators as individuals act in an 
institutionalised representative system and it is against the background of that system, that their 
actions constitute representation.507 Thus, it is doubtful whether a rational effort to represent 
the interests of constituents can be feasible without the proper institutional framework in place.  
 
Invariably, this means that representation does not just pertain to the representatives and their 
constituents alone, but to the institutions that designates the processes through which the 
dynamic activities of the representatives are structured. It is within these institutional structures 
that the representation stands or fails. In essence, how responsive the representative is can be 
judged from the presence or absence of particular characteristics or mechanism that relate to 
the many interactions that the representative may have with constituents. This, coupled with 
the wide range of choice of responses within the general context of their obligation to their 
constituents, means that there are bound to be variations in representation with regards to 
different issue areas. Hence the nature of representation is constantly changing and is 
dynamically linked to the institutional influences to which it is exposed. It is for this reason 
that Douglas suggested that the term institution should be understood in the rather broad sense 
as ‘the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction’.508 This makes it 
imperative to examine the institutional design in order to see those features that enhance or 
serve as a hindrance to the representatives in the course of carrying out their representative 
functions. 
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As earlier stated, substantive representation which is at the heart of legislative responsibility 
requires contact with constituents. Constituents also want to have access to their 
representatives.509 This is how representative actions can be in line with constituents’ 
preference. Those features that guide the conduct of representatives and govern their 
operations, determine how they act and thus produce by-products.510 These products are either 
due to the incentives or the disincentives that the design of the institution may create in the 
representative in the course of representing constituents. So, when legislators are accused of 
not representing, it may well be because of the faults in the institutional design that beset their 
actions and their ability to function. Other ills in the society such as corruption and conflict of 
interest have been identified as factors that may also influence legislator’s activity and overall 
performance.511 This means that in the quest to understand how legislators represent, certain 
other questions have to be answered. This includes an understanding of the presence of 
corruption and the different levels of socio-economic development that exist in the system.  
 
This chapter examines the relationship between representation and institutional design. Those 
features that affect legislator’s incentive to represent are identified. For instance, features that 
make them vulnerable, ambitious or affect their role orientation may well affect their sensitivity 
to their constituency needs. While some features would have positive effects in increasing their 
incentive, others may have negative effect and decrease their incentive. The implications of 
these features coupled with other variables cannot be overemphasised. Put together, they 
determine what the legislator is able and not able to do. 
 
Generally, research on representation has failed to include attitudes about institutional designs 
and how it influences the capacity of the representative to represent. This approach has left 
unexamined the notion of how the system might support or hinder the ability to represent.  
Political economy literature has been able to analyse the behaviour of government and players 
acting within an institutional framework. However, their focus has mainly been on the 
incentives that are faced by government agencies in the policy making process. They fail to 
examine the influence that the institutional design may have on those processes. For instance, 
the role of the constitution in the determination of policies was evaluated by James 
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Buchanan.512 For a complete understanding of this, the role of institutional choices and how it 
affects the outcome of policy needs to be evaluated. This is necessary in order to understand 
how the policy implementation is able to achieve its objectives. Representing sometime achieve 
the ideal representation and sometimes they fail. The underlining   principles of a democratic 
system such as participation, accountability and governance must be upheld for proper 
representation to be in place. If the institutional design undermines the upholding of these 
principles, then the possibility of representatives representing constituents well is weakened. 
This stresses the importance of examining the institutional design. Other reasons for 
considering the institutional design in determining quality representation is that: it can bring 
about more routinized procedures that would enhance helping constituents and better 
representation.  The institutional design also affect the extent to which routine of decision 
making are predictable; that is, whether they follow established rules rather than the whims of 
personality.513 The institutional design has also been found to affect the role orientation of the 
legislators.514 To demonstrate this point this chapter examines five features in the institutional 
design that affect legislators’ ability to represent. 
 
6.2   Size of Constituency District  
 
The relationship between the representatives and their constituents can be made closer or more 
personal by the size of the constituency. Constituents from smaller districts are more likely to 
have personal contacts with their representative than constituents from larger districts. This can 
be evident from the features affecting dyadic relationships between representatives and their 
constituents.515 Dyadic representation is made possible due to the close relationship between 
the representatives and constituents. This close relationship makes it easier for the 
representatives to represent constituents’ interests since the legislators are more likely to know 
their constituents better and have a one to one relationship with them.516 Legislators are also 
able to relate better with constituents.  
 
                                                          
512 James Buchanan, The Collected Works of James N Buchanan, Vol. 4, Public Finance in Democratic Process, Fiscal 
Institution and Individual Choice (1967). 
513 Jewel Malcolm and Samuel Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, 4th ed. New York: Random House 
(1986) 41. 
514Wahlke J C, Policy Demands and System Support: The Role of the Represented (1978) 26. 
515 Herrick R. L, Representation and Institutional Design, Lexington Books (2001) 16. 
516 Malcolm E. Jewell, Representation in State Legislators (n 195) 120. 
197 
 
This view is supported by Hibbing and Alford who in their research found that constituents in 
small districts want more contact with their legislators.517 Moreover, as a result of this close 
legislator–constituency links in smaller districts, there is the likelihood that they have the 
potential to generate greater levels of request for the legislators and legislators in answer to 
these requests might become more active than their counterparts in larger districts. This 
suggests that close dyadic relationship will increase responsiveness, while, weak dyadic 
relationship might make the representatives focus on other issues than their constituency needs. 
The result of the later outcome may be because legislators are less well known in large districts 
where there are weaker dyadic relationship than in smaller districts.    
 
Generally, in thinking about the responsive and the accountability function of the 
representation, it is mainly viewed from the dyadic perspective as against the collective 
representation which has to do with the whole legislative assembly representing the people.518 
The structure of the single member district (SMD) which is essentially a small size 
constituency, is built on the idea that voters in a particular geographical area select 
representatives to represent their interests. If the representative fails to do this, they can be 
voted out of office. This in some ways enhances responsiveness as the fear of this repercussion, 
may force the representatives to be more sensitive and responsive to their constituency needs.   
 
Although, it has been argued that, electoral connection is not a prerequisite to accurate 
representation, the fact still remains that legislators may want to be responsive in order to keep 
their positions.519 For this reason, Herrick makes the submission that dyadic representation is 
critical in any representative democracy and high levels of dyadic representation should 
increase the odds that the representatives serves the citizens’ interests.520 Since the concentric 
circles of a single member district comprise of those living within a given electoral 
constituency, this should make it easier for the representative to achieve representation.  
 
Research has shown that irrespective of the type of constituency, representatives might differ 
in their orientation; while some might want to represent their immediate constituency, others 
might see their constituency as being the state or the nation at large.521 This variation in their 
                                                          
517 Hibbing J R and J R Alford, Constituency Population and Representation in the U.S. Senate, Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, 15, 581-98 (1990). 
518 Herrick R. L, Representation and Institutional Design, Lexington Books (2001) 4 
519 Weissberg R, Collective vs Dyadic Representation in Congress, American Political Science Review 72 535-47 (1978) 
520 Herrick (n 518) 4. 
521 Wahlke et al, 1962 Chapter 13, see also Smith 2003, Carroll 2002 pp 51, Mansbridge 1999 & 2003). 
198 
 
district/state orientation may also be as a result of their ambition. Three main types of ambition 
has been identified as likely to affect legislators approach to representation: static, which is the 
desire to keep the current position as long as possible, discrete, which is the desire to leave 
political office and finally progressive, the desire to hold higher political position.522 Close 
relationship has been found to make legislators have static ambition. They might not want to 
severe their relationship with constituents and therefore feel an obligation to focus on their 
wishes and this way represent their interests better.523 The reason they might want to be 
sensitive to constituents may be to insure future re-election. Those who might want to seek 
offices that transcend the constituency would have a wider focus. Such legislators are said to 
have a different approach to representation from those that have constituency focus.524 They 
tend to work on larger issues and focus less on service and substantive representation. Such 
representatives if found within the single member district may not necessarily conform to the 
expectation of their constituents or represent their interests. However, the small size of the 
constituency will mean that such shabby representation can easily be noticed by constituents 
who will want to hold such representatives accountable.  
 
Accordingly, responsiveness has not been limited to representatives with static ambition alone. 
Meastas argues that progressively ambitious legislators also cannot neglect the interests of their 
constituents irrespective of how secure they are in their current office as they desire to move 
to higher office and would require the votes of their constituents to do so.525 This desire for a 
higher position tends to put them in a competitive position with their opponents and their close 
relationship with their constituents may insulate them from electoral defeat. This too may have 
the effects of decreasing challengers to run against them. On the other hand, legislators with 
discrete ambition would have little incentive to want to keep in contact with constituents or 
even work for them. Such representatives often shirk their representational duties towards 
constituents.526Again, such representatives will easily be identified in a small size district and 
held accountable for their stewardship.  
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District size might also affect the opportunity of competition for the legislators. Where there 
are fewer constituents to represent and just one position, the vulnerability of the incumbent 
might increase as there may be more eligible candidates that would be qualified and interested 
in that position. This on the whole may account for more costly elections that would require 
the incumbent to be loyal to the powers that played a role to secure their position. The counter 
effect of this is that, the advancement of constituents’ interest may be compromised by such a 
representative. Legislators from multi member district (MMD) might be more secure for the 
same reason as there are more people and more positions and they may likewise have greater 
incentive to represent because of their progressive ambition. 
 
A number of reasons tend to support the fact that small constituencies increase representation 
and this is mainly as a result of the static ambition of the representatives. Although these factors 
coupled with those relating to ambition are genuinely identified as what can positively 
influence the legislator to be responsive to constituents. One would agree with the position of 
Fenno that, a mixture of three goals seems to influence legislators generally. These are re-
election, power and policy, with the dominant factor being re-election.527 For this reason, Fenno 
argued that the constituency a representative reacts to is the constituency he sees.528 So, it may 
be easier for legislators to be able to represent if they have small districts. This obviously will 
be as a result of the fact that there are fewer people to communicate with, to serve and to know. 
This is to say, the institutional design that creates smaller or SMDs may have some effects in 
that it would structure the experiences and perception of the legislators and their desire to want 
to represent constituents.  
 
6.3   Length of Term 
 
The ambition of legislators has been identified as one factor that tends to influence their ability 
to represent. One way that the institutional design may affect this ambition is by the inclusion 
of term limits which is the specified maximum number of years a person can stay in office. 
There has been a lot of argument on the effect of this particular feature and how it affects 
legislator’s ability to represent. Arguments are mainly based on the assumption that; term limits 
essentially allow more people to have the chance to serve in the legislature and increases 
diversity in the legislature. Secondly, it increases electoral competition, thereby reducing the 
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power of incumbency and it presumes that lobbyists would lose their influence.529 Having such 
a design in place, means civic minded individuals would be willing to serve a short term in the 
legislature and then go back to their careers. This apart, term limit has been said to have the 
advantage of creating more frequent accountability and allowing tighter control over political 
agents.530 This is as a result of the fact that new faces have to frequently face the electorate who 
determine whether they get into political office or not. Another reason why this feature is 
supported is that, incumbent legislators in term limited states spend less time on campaigning 
and fund raising for elections as a result of this, they can focus on representation.  
 
Research has found that both constituents and legislators agree that spending less time on 
campaign and fund raising is beneficial to representation.531 This seems to be a precise position 
in theory and has been supported by other political writers. Bails and Tieslau argue that, term 
limits should lower the rate of spending by making public sector decision makers more 
responsive to the desires of the citizenry.532 Herrick argues that legislators with shorter term 
should see a greater need to represent constituents more because they face them more 
frequently.533 Hence, there is strong argument that upholds the view that the length of term has 
implication for how well legislators are able to represent and how efficiently the legislature 
itself functions.  
 
Consequently, it may seem that, the incentive to perform may be stronger in shorter terms. 
Legislators may come into office and do their best at their job knowing that they have a short 
term to prove themselves. They do not spend their time strategizing on how to return to office, 
rather, they focus on the service they have come to offer. The prize of re-election tends not to 
spur them and campaign related activities are highly reduced. This giving them more time to 
focus on constituency needs. Essentially, this also creates an accountability effect by denying 
the legislator the opportunity of long-term static ambition which theorists view as making most 
legislators to sacrifice principle on the altar of political convenience.534 
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Nevertheless, it is not clear whether reducing campaign related activities would mean that 
legislators spend more time on those activities that the constituents would value. Conceptually, 
term limits have not been shown to prevent people from wanting political careers. Also, what 
needs to be considered is whether the value of rotating people in office outweighs the value of 
the knowledge and experience that incumbent lawmakers bring to their job. The effectiveness 
of this restriction on the performance of the individual legislator and the legislative arm as a 
whole has been assessed by various writers who have given dissenting views. In the United 
States, for example, empirical studies on the effect of term limits started appearing in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.535 This is as due to the fact that, they needed some time for the 
consequences of this particular institutional change to have its effects before research into it 
was possible.536 However, some of the dissenting views state that, term limited legislators were 
more likely to engage in deliberative style of representation and spend less time in other 
activities that are primarily designed to get them re-elected.537 Term limited legislators are 
fairly independent and unconcerned about elections and as such careless about their 
constituents’ views. Their representative style would mainly be to pay attention to broader 
interest, rather than the interest of their particular constituents.538 As a consequence, even 
though they are able to produce better legislative decisions, they may not have the necessary 
connection with their constituents. This it is concluded that, term limited legislators think of 
themselves as trustees than delegates. They are likely to follow their own conscience in making 
decisions than follow what the people in their district want.539 
 
Obviously, spending time helping constituents with problems, keeping in touch with 
constituents and engaging in district projects are seen by legislators as a means of securing 
electoral support which is invariably irrelevant under term limits. Therefore, it is expected that 
such activities would diminish as the legislators have nothing to work for that would benefit 
them. Political analysts view electoral connection such what would enable legislators act in the 
interests of constituents.540 They argue that legislators should be generally working for the 
constituency interest not implementing their own preferences or those of the state or even the 
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nation at large.541 With no limits on their length of service, legislators are allowed to develop 
policy expertise and this expertise and accountability allows the peoples branch to have both 
power and legitimacy in government.542 
 
Since election is what connects legislators to their constituents, having limited interest in 
elections as a result of term limits may make legislators ignore the constituents and their 
interests as they do not expect them to bring them back into office. Also, since legislators have 
short term, they may not be able to develop the knowledge and contacts needed for substantive 
representation or act on behalf of their constituents. The argument that term limits is expected 
to affect the vulnerability of incumbents is also highly disputed. There are numerous examples 
in history of legislators from Europe and the West who serve long term in office and had more 
time to engage and know their constituents and provide services for them.  Imposing term limits 
may make the position less attractive and this may decrease the effort that the incumbent put 
into the job and invariably affect their incentive to represent. Hence, it is seen that term limits 
affects the extent to which legislators respond to constituents and their relation generally with 
constituents is hindered.  
 
Looking at the effect of this restriction in the United States, it has been argued that term limits 
have been adopted in such a way that it has prevented some legislators from running for office. 
It has also relieved experienced legislators from office while giving new legislators a very short 
space of time within which to learn their jobs.543 In Nigeria however, term limit operates in a 
different way. Unlike the Executive arm which is constitutionally required to run for office for 
a term of four years and a second term of another four years, the legislative arm have no such 
restriction. The Legislators are constitutionally allowed to run for a consecutive term of four 
years but there is no cap as to the number of times they can run for the same legislative office. 
This is expected to make them to be more professional in their chosen carriers. Whether this 
expectation has been met is highly debatable.  Generally, most of the legislators in Nigeria 
remain amateur in their legislative duties. This may not necessarily be due to the length of their 
term in office, but likely be as a result of other factors that affect their ability to represent. 
Although, this research touches on a few of those factors, much space would not be spared to 
go into this in detail as that is a topic for another research. 
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One important factor that has been found to affect representation has to do with the length of 
the legislative session. The length of the legislative session has been shown to affect what the 
individual legislator can do more directly than the restriction on their term in office.544 It is 
argued that limits on the length and frequency of sessions affects the ability of the less senior 
members to become acquainted with their colleagues, the issues and the legislative procedure 
at large.545 Such skills as bargaining, being willing to compromise, appreciation of 
parliamentary procedure and most importantly, the capacity to listen to people, are learnt during 
the legislative sessions and longer sessions has the effect of equipping full time legislators with 
these skills to enable them represent effectively.  
 
Unlike other jurisdictions, the Nigerian legislature may seem not to be hindered by this 
problem. The average number of sessions in a single legislative year is about a hundred and 
eighty-one days. This means being a legislator in Nigeria is a full-time job. Nigerian legislators 
can therefore be referred to as ‘career politicians’ and the legislature itself can be said to be a 
‘professionalised legislature’. Moncrief in his research showed that the proportion of legislators 
who remained in Parliament for up to twelve years was clearly related to professionalization of 
the legislature.546 A number of legislators in Nigeria have stayed for more than twelve years as 
legislators in the same chambers of Parliament. Clearly, this incentive structure is put in place 
to encourage better representation, but whether that is what is actually happening is another 
question.  
 
It is worth noting that, with regards to their political ambition, term limited legislators and those 
that are not term limited have been found to have similar career plans.547 Term limit does not 
necessarily prevent them from wanting political career. Herrick and Thomas in their 
examination of legislators in fifteen states found that term limited legislators had higher levels 
of progressive ambition than others.548  Also, Powell is of the view that legislators in term 
limited states were more likely to seek a higher office because they do not stand the risk of 
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losing a career as they are limited in their term so the cost for such legislators is low as against 
those who may risk losing their careers while trying to bid for a higher office.549 
 
Alternatively, if attention is focused on how legislators are able to represent in the different 
consecutive terms in office, one would see that there is a trend. A general comparism done to 
identify the effects of term limits in the first and second term in office. The impression given 
here was that, legislators tend to be more responsive in their first term than in the second and 
may be, subsequent terms in office. This could be because, in their initial term, they feel a need 
to payback their constituents and when they become more grounded in their second tenure, 
they feel secure and less vulnerable and this acts as a disincentive to be responsive.  
 
Overall, term limits has been seen as one of the most significant institutional feature that affects 
modern legislatures. It has changed legislators’ own role orientation and behaviour and it has 
also been found to have far reaching consequences for the political system.550 The impact of 
term limit on legislators is greatly determined by the restrictiveness of the term limit itself. It 
is ideally advocated so that legislators can pay more attention to the broader needs of the society 
and less to the particularized needs of constituents.551 This indeed weakens the links between 
the legislators and their constituents as less effort is put on constituency issues. This invariably 
means that, even the citizens would have less time to become familiar with their representatives 
and as a result fail to interact with them. Moreover, if legislators are to master the act of 
legislative procedures both within and outside the legislative assembly, they would need more 
time on their job. It takes time to acquire certain skills needed to be an effective legislator. With 
term limits in place, legislators would be removed from office just when they have developed 
the working knowledge of how the legislature operates.552 The loss of this ‘institutional 
knowledge’ about what actions were taken before on a particular issue would no doubt impact 
on their efficiency and this would not give them the chance to be skilled at their jobs. Also, if 
they hold their office for only a short term, they might want to rely on short term solutions in 
solving problem which might have negative consequences in the future.553 
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Viewed in these terms, the impact of term limit on representation has not been positive all 
round. Reducing the time legislators are in office, may be seen as what can enhance 
accountability, but it would be counter-productive if it weakens legislators and diminishes their 
ability to represent their constituents. If constituents are allowed to make the ultimate decision, 
during election, they are capable of identifying those that represent their interests and keep 
them in office and vote out those who have failed to do so.   
 
6.4   Resource Availability 
 
One important feature that enhances the capacity of legislators to be effective and be able to 
represent constituents properly is the level of resources available to them. This has made states 
that can afford it to undergo numerous reforms that help enhance their legislator’s work. This 
has to do with a whole variety of things ranging from better pay, employing professional staff, 
streamlining their procedures, democratising their processes, enhancing their ethics and even 
reducing possible conflicts of interests.554 This enhances legislator’s capacity because they are 
given structures that help them to be stronger, competitive and more effective in discharging 
their function.555 This increased capacity to represent requires money, time and expertise. 
Legislators with such resources available to them have been found to be more likely to engage 
in services and act on behalf of constituents.556 The resources available to them make it possible 
for them to engage more in their legislative activities. Jewel agrees with this and states thus: 
 
How a legislator represents his district depends to a large extent on the resources at 
his disposal… However eager he may be to maintain communication with his district, 
the legislator with a large number of constituents cannot answer many letters without 
a secretary and cannot send out many newsletters without the postal frank. The 
legislator with professional staff members can deal more effectively with constituency 
service request, especially if he can afford to locate staff members in the district 
office.557 
 
In support of this view, Parker observes that, the reason the amount of time legislators spend 
in their district over the years increased was because of the travel allotment given to them.558 
In other words, the availability of resources make legislators more professional and 
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professionalism has been found to result in a higher level of congruence between constituents’ 
opinion and legislators’ behaviour.559 This may be because with the resources of professional 
staff and funds available to them they are able to engage more with constituents as more 
contacts were reported from the legislators to their constituents.560 Since legislators can identify 
themselves as professional legislators, they are more likely to identify with constituents and be 
sensitive to them. They do more case work and focus more on providing services to their 
constituents. This is an indication that, the resources available to them, places them in a better 
position to be independent of the executive and other external bodies that may influence their 
decisions and work for constituents’ interests.561 Their staff size has been hypothesised to 
impact positively on their service activities because as a result of this, greater attention can be 
paid to constituents.562 It has, however, been shown that legislators can also decrease their 
personal efforts as a result of this very fact. This might be because they may feel that, their 
staff, if large enough, can handle the service request on their behalf, thereby relinquishing their 
duty to constituents.563 This goes to show that more resources offer legislators more power to 
do their job. Larger salaries also motivates them and allows the position to be taken as a career. 
The overall effect of this is that, representation is enhanced as legislators are now provided the 
means with which they can dedicate themselves to representing their constituents better.564 
 
Research has found that, prior to the professionalism of the legislature, a lot of legislators tend 
to retire voluntarily because of the low pay.565 However, with this new reform, legislators with 
full time incomes can work full time at being legislators and not look for any other job. They 
depend on their legislative position as a means of livelihood and this consequently tends to 
increase their re-election concerns and their desire to work for constituents in order to be 
returned into office.566 Certainly, it is reasonable to suppose that the availability of resources 
will also affect the kind of people that would be attracted to become legislators. People who 
see themselves as professional politicians are likely to be attracted.  
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As professionals with greater capacity and resources available to them, they may feel qualified 
to hold a trustee orientation.567 They are also likely to have unique political ambition that may 
be static or progressive. Maestas is of the view that those resources that lead to internal career 
opportunities can make the legislators have a static ambition while those that expose them to 
the public might lead to a progressive ambition.568 However, in order to keep their careers, they 
may need to focus on district’s interests and are not likely to have discrete ambition. 
Professionalization can be an incentive to represent the interests of constituents and it can also 
increase electoral security. By increasing legislator’s interests in re-election and providing 
them with resources that can be used to increase their capacities, their vulnerability is 
reduced.569 It would seem that, this security would weaken their sensitivity towards 
constituents, on the other hand it can be seen as the effect of being responsive. They become 
less vulnerable because they are responsive as such less fearful of losing a re-election because 
they tend to have the confidence of their constituents. They have this confidence because they 
are in contact with constituents and tend to know to some extent their standing with them. The 
fact that they enjoy this insulation from defeat can be attributed to how they have been able to 
engage in their job as legislators.  
 
Some may argue that legislators do not differ in their ability to represent merely because they 
have more resources available to them. However, the fact that having more resources makes 
them more professional cannot be denied. As Jewell puts it, the extent of professionalism is 
critical to the opportunity and resources that the representatives have to perform their task.570 
The opportunities they have to use different channels in making decisions on behalf of their 
constituents is what will enable them to represent those interests well.  
 
Although, the availability of resources is crucial to the success of the representative, one cannot 
help but state that, the emphasis on resources may also make the representatives to lose their 
focus. This is because, to exist and present themselves to voters, politicians need funds and 
when these funds come from special interest, they are usually in exchange for favours.571 These 
exchanges of political contributions tend to have effect on the activities of the representative 
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and create a situation where politicians deviate from their promises to voters and end up serving 
their personal interests or the interests of their benefactors. However, with effective structures 
in place this can be checked and legislators who have discrete ambition can be checked out of 
the system.    
 
From the above analysis, it is clear that the Jeffersonian argument that civic duty should be an 
incentive that predominates over material rewards may not resonate with many legislators 
today especially with the Nigerian Legislators. Politics in Nigeria is generally seen as a means 
to an end and a great majority of the legislators seek legislative positions as a result of the huge 
financial benefit that comes with being a legislator. Generally, in Nigeria, legislators are well 
paid. They have their own offices and are provided with personal secretaries and salaries for 
other political aides to assist them in carrying out their function. Provision is also made for 
them to have constituency offices. Conversely, some of them chose not to have constituency 
offices and carry out their business in odd places, such as their homes. One would expect that 
the amount of resources available to them would make a difference in the way they represent 
as it is obvious that, the resources at their disposal would assist them critically and impact on 
issues like constituency communication and overall representation of community interest.  
 
In addition to the resources made available to them, experience and familiarity with the 
legislative acts may be crucial for the effectiveness of legislators. The implication of how well 
they are able to translate preferences into actions that would be responsive to constituents’ 
interests can also be determined by the procedure they follow in making decisions on behalf of 
constituents and their success at the job. If one looks critically at how decisions are made by 
the Nigerian legislators one might be tempted to come to the conclusion that they are not 
professional because, in the course of their activities, especially those outside the assembly, 
they do not follow an institutionalised predictable pattern. Most of their decisions are made by 
their own initiative of what they perceive is good for their constituents as there are no guidelines 
that influence these decisions. They exercise their powers especially in the allocation of 
resources in their various constituencies in the implementation of the CDF policy 
independently rather that follow laid down procedures and expectations. Most of the legislators 
have never been involved with such issues and are completely inexperienced in taking 
constituency cues in the allocation of projects in their constituencies. In such situations, 
legislators may very likely be motivated by self-interest and the unfettered pursuit of individual 
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goals may result in outcomes which are obviously inferior to other attainable possibilities.572 
Despite the resources that may be available to them, all these issues have implications on how 
they are able to function effectively and represent constituents’ interests. Nonetheless, as they 
derive a strong sense of personal satisfaction from holding their offices they may attend to 
constituency issues just because they want to be re-elected.  
 
6.5  Strength of Leadership 
 
The manner in which the leadership in a legislative assembly is shaped by the institution also 
has its effects on representation. This is because it is central to the legislative process. Alan 
Rosenthal describes the legislative leadership as the fulcrum on which much of the legislative 
work hinges.573 Strong leadership is associated with strong and effective legislature, while 
weak leadership is likely to create a weak legislative institution.574 However, it can also be 
argued that, the same strong leadership can be a central impetus for the lack of responsiveness 
to constituents on the part of the legislators as against the legislature as a body. According to 
Herrick, good strong legislative leadership can no doubt yield a more efficient law-making 
process, but this would ultimately give the legislators less time to engage in their non-law-
making responsibilities.575 There is no doubt that in such a situation, the process of consensus 
building may be more efficient. Also, the deliberative and law-making processes may be 
vibrant. However, this might affect their other roles, like their individual responsibility to their 
constituents.   
 
Consequently, it can be said that, though this institutional feature may not affect the shared 
experiences of the legislators, it might not give them a leeway to identify with specific issues 
affecting their particular constituency and focus on it. For instance, the norms and rules in 
legislative chambers with strong committee may affect member’s ability to work on a particular 
set of issues that may be of serious concern to their constituency. Based on this reasoning, a 
more flexible leadership might be more likely to give the legislators the opportunity to further 
the particular interests of those they have particular responsibility to represent. 
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With regards to their orientation, legislators may have different orientation, perhaps that which 
is more constituency focused, but this may change depending on their experiences in the house 
and the legislative design of seniority and leadership under which they find themselves. Such 
unique orientation may have to be downplayed in order to accommodate the general mood of 
the legislature. Therefore, in advocating for more district focus representative leadership, 
flexible leadership and committee systems with less stringent rules is what will give the 
legislators the incentive to be more responsive to constituents’ interests. This would allow them 
more time to focus on different types of activities and undertake responsibilities that would 
benefit their constituents. It may be argued that this trend of decentralization might affect the 
effectiveness of the leadership in terms of control and management of the house as it would 
make them weaker in their relations with the executive. The emphasis here is not to reduce 
their position of influence and their relevance in the political system with the overall balance 
of power. Rather, what is advocated is for the leadership to be such that it would not alter the 
incentive structure, so that members might be able to work for and represent the interests of 
their constituents. 
 
The apparent mixed effect of the strength of leadership is that it has also been found that 
legislators in states with strong leadership appear to be more secure and this should decrease 
responsiveness.576 For the most part, leaders in legislative assemblies in carrying out their 
responsibilities in the institutional management tend to place high proprieties in ensuring the 
security of their members. They get involved in campaign activities of their members and they 
remain influential in ensuring that there is high turnover in terms of the members that return 
after every election. Under such leadership members may seem secure, but the extent to which 
such leadership may insulate a member that constituents want removed is highly improbable.     
 
The leadership in the political parties is another aspect that needs to be considered. The political 
parties are meant to provide leadership and direction for their members. The performance of 
their members who hold political positions, to a very large extent depends on the internal and 
external structures that have been put in place to ensure that their policies are implemented. 
Unlike the legislative leadership that may be a bit flexible, the party leadership has to be strong 
for their policies to be effectively implemented. Ironically, it has been argued that, when parties 
become weaker, legislators tend to turn to the constituency for support.577 This state of 
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disintegration can foster a sense of constituency among the members.  In the United States, for 
example, it has been argued that the re-election imperative is what drives the legislators away 
from policy making to focus on seeking institutional powers towards case work.578 In such 
situations, the focus tends to be on the member’s constituency. This can be true for less 
competitive electoral systems where the Member of Parliament may seem to be the only 
connection between the people and the unresponsive bureaucracy.  
 
The party system in Nigeria can be best described as weak. It is characterised mainly by 
instability, fragmentation and a lack of clear ideology.579 The impact of this weakness in 
relation to the activities of legislators can be seen in terms of a lack of guidance in the way 
members decide to implement the policies and objectives of the party. Without proper 
guidance, there is no way the policies of the party can be implemented effectively. This can 
only be made possible where a strong party is in existence. The party as a democratic institution 
has a responsibility to ensure that personal interest does not override the collective good. So, 
while legislators deal with their respective constituencies, there is need for them to take 
decisions following and abiding by those party objectives which ultimately would be to the 
interests of the people. Although some of these institutional features have real effect on the 
way the representatives represent, they tend not to be consistent. There is no doubt that 
leadership influence, both of personalities and the party, can either limit and exacerbate 
legislator’s activities. The institutional qualities and differences play a role in determining the 
effectiveness of representation.   
  
6.6   Rules Governing Election 
 
As observed by Giovanni Sartori, electoral systems are the most specific manipulative 
instruments in any political system.580 The point of electoral laws is that, it would be the creator 
and the regulation of the means of translating the popular choice of the people into a 
representative government. This conception of electoral law has as its underpinning, an 
aspiration that it serves to legitimise the exercise of state powers. Therefore, the detailed 
mechanism of its regulation is what will determine the success or failure of any system of 
representation that is built upon it. There are several aspects of the electoral system that would 
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not be discussed here though they have consequences and important implications for 
representation. This research will rather focus on certain rules that govern the election itself 
and its implication on the representative process. The general principles that govern the 
relationship between the representatives and their constituents should be contained in these 
rules. In considering the rules governing elections, the focus would be on whether such rules 
place emphasis on the rights of the citizens and the responsibility of the representatives towards 
their constituents? Does it ensure the accountability of the representatives? How far does it go 
to ensure that representatives stay within the confines of what is stipulated? 
 
In response to these questions, several recent reforms are seen designed into electoral systems 
that are thought to increase the vulnerability of the incumbent in some jurisdictions. It is argued 
that this vulnerability can enhance representation by increasing the responsiveness of the 
representatives to their constituents.581 Since a key function of election is to ensure that 
legislators are responsive to those who elected them, it is assumed that legislators who are 
vulnerable will work to improve their relationship with their constituents in order to be returned 
to office. Such legislators would be particularly concerned about keeping their jobs and they 
are likely to be more responsive to constituents.  
 
Generally, laws that affect the ease with which candidates can run for office have been shown 
to have mixed effects on legislators’ incentive. Such laws make it difficult for new candidates 
by increasing incumbent security, decrease progressive ambition as well as increase district 
related orientation. It may also decrease the legislator’s capacity to represent because 
candidates will be more focused on campaign activities rather than representation activities.582 
Nonetheless, it needs to be stated that if laws which ought to regulate the performance of 
legislators in office allow them to get away with shabby representation, then such laws are not 
for the benefit of society. Laws which give very little opportunity to voters to remove and 
replace those who fail to work in their interests, does not benefit constituents. For example, the 
rule of recalling a representative under the Nigerian electoral system is almost impossible to 
enforce. Section 116 of the Electoral Act 2010 provides for a petition to be signed by half of 
the persons registered to vote in that member’s constituency alleging loss of confidence in the 
member. Also, their signatures must be verified by the Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) before it can be approved in a referendum by a simple majority of those 
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registered to vote in that constituency. Such impractical laws leave the people powerless with 
no choice but to wait for the term of such a representative to end. Thus, it is seen that the 
institutional design not only make it impossible for constituents to sanction erring 
representatives, the courts as well most times reject suits from citizens against the government 
for their lack of performance.  
 
Laws that govern election finance may have either a positive or negative effect on how the 
legislator when elected represents constituents. While spending limits may tend to enhance 
accountability, legislators who have no limit in the amount of contribution they receive during 
election tend to spend their time recouping or paying back contributors to the campaign and in 
the process lose focus on the majority of the constituents who may not have contributed 
financially to their elections. This invariably decreases the incentive to represent. Some states 
for this reason, have gone ahead to regulate not only how much can be contributed but also 
who may contribute to an election campaign and this includes individuals, parties political 
action committees, corporations and unions.  
 
Although, the effect of spending limits on presumed incentive would suggest greater 
accountability, it might likely have the negative effect of making the election more difficult 
and result in less activity on behalf of constituents. Considering that modern democracies see 
elections as the means through which citizens express their preferences,583 such rules that give 
the citizens the capacity to sanction representatives that deviate from their electoral promises 
or more generally from the preferences of the citizens is what will create in the representatives 
the need to be more responsive. This has to do with the extent of citizens’ control or lack of it 
over the representatives and their actions in a political system. It implies the capacity to reward 
or punish and not only the capacity to listen.584 
 
Since political representation is evaluated in terms of its capacity to aggregate interests and 
efficiency in producing binding decisions that affect citizens’ lives, the consensus view is that, 
institutional rules should enhance participation and enlarge the number of people that take part 
in decision making in matters that concern them. This determines where the power 
concentration lies. The claim connecting the rules of election and representation is that the 
representatives are actually elected so they can represent the peoples interests but if the people 
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are not able to elect those that they want to represent them and participation is not widespread 
then the representatives may not be able to act in the interest of constituents. In essence, the 
type of representation is what is relevant here. This is because politicians have goals, interests 
and values of their own. Once elected, they may decide to pursue their private goals or some 
other objective that may differ from those of their constituents. Where such motivations are 
present, they tend to do things that do not really represent the interest of their constituents.  In 
order for this not to happen, there is need for the rules that govern election to be open and 
transparent and for the citizens to have sufficient information to be able to evaluate their 
representatives.  
 
However, situations may arise where the representatives may deviate from the preference of 
their constituents because they believe they are acting in their best interest.585 This also impacts 
on constituents’ belief as they feel that such representatives act below their expectation. 
However, if such decisions make them to be sufficiently better off, there may be no reason for 
the constituents to complain. This impunity however comes with its own reputational 
considerations as adhering to promises is actually an investment in credibility, a virtue that 
most politicians tend to be struggling with in the world today. These reputational mechanism 
goes a long way to encourage representatives to be more responsive and adhere to the interests 
of constituents as the institutional design in most democratic systems as observed by Manin do 
not compel politicians to abide by their promises.586  
 
The view taken here does not support the narrow view of the accountability theorists who see 
accountability as the mere responsiveness to the preferences of the represented and attention to 
their wishes without allowing the idea of representation to serve as a guide or standard for their 
action. In such situations, their conduct is irrelevant to representation.587 Such narrow view in 
the opinion of Pitkin, does not tell us whether a representative has represented well or not. 
What is upheld here is how accountability is shaped in a crucial way by the institutional design. 
Therefore, the extent to which the electoral rules make it possible for the citizens to hold the 
representatives accountable determines how they are able to represent their preferred interest 
Thus, it becomes clear that political representation has the challenging responsibility to uphold 
the highest standards of ethics, transparency, accountability, efficiency and essentially 
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leadership by example which should serve as a spring board for a corrupt free and democratic 
society.588 Consistently, evidence is found that indicates that legislators fail to meet up to this 
responsibility. This is due to the persistent flaws in the overall institutional arrangement. These 
inefficiencies are sometimes based on concepts and instruments that are rooted in normative 
assumptions that frequently are not consistent with the general design of the country’s 
constitution. A typical example of this is corruption. This has been a major challenge for the 
legislature as the representative of the people in Nigeria.589 Federal and state Assembly 
members in Nigeria, have not been free from allegations of corruption in their activities and 
the legislative process as a whole.590 As an institution which is supposed to foster accountability 
through scrutiny and administration, they have failed and are rather perpetuators of inordinate 
and corrupt practices.  
 
This raises the question, why there are no institutional mechanisms capable of enforcing these 
representational ideals? In answering this question one can see that historically democratic 
systems hardly contains mechanism that ensure that the choices of citizens would be 
respected.591 The reason advanced has always been that, citizens may be ignorant of policy 
issues and therefore they need to give the government some latitude to govern. Presumably, 
they are to use the period of election to evaluate government actions and either return them to 
office or punish erring ones.  
 
Since democratic societies do not habitually bind representatives to adhere to their promises or 
even the preferences of those they represent, what needs to be in place is that, the institutional 
design must allow for changes in the circumstances so that there can be some guidance on how 
representative activities are carried out. Representatives may still be induced to represent if 
they have the awareness that they have to account to the citizens. This accountability 
representation occurs in two situations. Firstly, voters retain the incumbent only when the 
incumbent acts in their interests and secondly, when the incumbent chooses policies or in taking 
decisions act in a manner that is necessary to get re-elected.592 Also, there is need for the 
institutional design to make it possible that constituents get the needed information to enable 
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them to hold their representatives accountable. This includes empowering the opposition who 
would serve as agents and help in giving this information to the citizens. They are agents 
because they want to be in government. For this to happen, they need that retrospective 
judgement against the incumbent during elections. This serves as an incentive for them to 
monitor and inform the constituents on the performance of the government. Here information 
plays a major role as constituents are able to know and reflect on the actions of their 
representatives in various issue areas.  
 
There is no doubt that these enabling features can enhance the system of representation in any 
given society. However, all democracies are not the same, some systems foster representation 
more than others. While we might have some knowledge about how some of the inherent 
designs in the institution might affect representative behaviour, there is little knowledge about 
how these features might make the constituents to have a bit of control so that they can point 
out responsibility where there has been lack of representation and hold such representatives to 
account. This is the real problem in Nigeria, as the choice of deciding who becomes a 
representative is not left to the voters alone to decide. They are bound to choose from 
candidates put before them. This situation does not work in favour of the voters. If they can 
credibly employ their votes to sanction the incumbent, this might induce representatives to act 
well in the future.593 
 
6.7   How Institutional Design Can Preserve Citizen’s Interests 
 
The discussion in the preceding section has shown the ways in which various features affect 
the legislator’s incentive to represent. These effects are mainly due to their vulnerability, 
ambition and role orientation. Emphasis has been on those that tend to increase incentive by 
providing arrangements that would enable the wishes of citizens to be considered. This is 
because the interest of citizens is what should be of priority in any democratic system. 
Consequently, in analysing the connection between what citizens want and what the 
representatives do, it is important to assess the success of the institutional design in achieving 
the inclusiveness of citizens and the extent to which they are able to contribute and have a say 
in matters that affect them. Theorists have argued that unless modes of engagement are 
carefully designed, there is a real danger that citizens especially the marginalised people will 
be neglected. Young argues that a mechanism for the effective recognition and representation 
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of the diverse voices and perspectives of those constituent group should be put in place.594 
Features that brings about closer relationship between the representatives and the constituents 
would be better at including citizens preferences, while those that create more gap between 
them is less likely to create a congruence between what the citizens want and what the 
representatives do. Also, when the institutional design upholds policies that are opposed to 
citizen’s preferences, it does not help representation but the extent to which it makes the 
representatives to be committed to their constituencies is what would enhance their 
responsiveness to them.  
 
Thus, institutional design that creates incentives for those involved to show behaviours that are 
consistent with meeting the expectation of the people is what is needed. The dynamics through 
which citizens develop relatively stable expectations also need to be emphasized and this is 
mainly through information that they receive. Miller suggests that three conditions affect 
accessibility of information and these are frequency, salience and familiarity.595 This means 
the frequency of the legislators contact with the sub constituents, the importance of the sub 
constituency and the familiarity with them increases the likelihood that the legislator would 
think about constituents when making decisions. In the absence of this, it is difficult to come 
up with an evaluation of representational congruence. The quality of representation would 
arguably deteriorate and this may affect the entire political system.  
 
The ideal of effective representation where citizens’ preferences are considered can only be 
realised when the institutional design enables citizens to make their contributions on decisions 
that are made and implemented on their behalf. Goodin qualifies this by stating that democratic 
institution ought to embed the ‘all affected’ principle.596 This is what will bring about 
institutional efficiency. To get constituents contributions, legislators do not have to passively 
wait for constituents to come to them, rather they are to use the advantage of the proximity that 
the small size constituency offers to reach out to constituents, educating them about their 
activities and getting their inputs about how they want to be represented. Without this 
communication, the legislator has no way of knowing constituency needs and preferences 
which will invariably lead to misrepresentation.  
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Most of these suggestions might seem theoretical because in actual practice, they are rarely 
realised. Many institutional features are designed to encourage representation where 
accountability is devalued. This is best exemplified in systems where the representatives are 
thought to know it all and must be allowed to take decisions without citizen’s input. Apart from 
this fact, other social and economic problems entangled with the institutional design tend to 
reinforce lack of representation. This is the situation in Nigeria, where the political divisions 
coincide with economic and social ones and the citizens are highly segregated into 
interpersonal networks. In such a situation, the difficulty of the representatives in getting the 
preferences of the citizen can be appreciated. The possibility of separatism that exist among 
the people may not also allow the representatives to identify the preference of the people.  The 
next section looks at how institutional features would affect time spent on constituency work. 
Those features that would make legislators spend more time on their constituency are adjudged 
to be those that would preserve citizens’ interest and make them represent better. 
 
6.8  Explaining Variations of Institutional Effect on Time Spent on Substantive 
Representation  
 
So far, the measure of representation has been based on how it acts in the interests of those 
represented. An appropriate indicator of legislator’s commitment to act on citizens behalf can 
be determined by how much time they spend on engaging in such activity. Since time is a 
limited resource, the extent to which the institutional design allows them to engage in 
constituency activity is important, hence the need to look at each feature to predict its effect. 
 
Firstly, the size of the district has been shown to have effect on the time spent on constituency 
activity. On one hand principles that help create districts with shared commitments such as the 
single member districts (SMD) found in Nigeria should make it easier for legislators to know 
their district and want to engage more with them. This form of districting principles has been 
found to increase their district orientation.  However, it is also argued that since this district is 
easier to know, it may decrease the need legislators have to stay in contact and as such feel less 
need to work at spending more time on constituency activities. This could be associated with 
the fact that such districting principles make them less vulnerable. Although, such legislators 
may also have surprisingly progressive ambition, it is expected that this feature should increase 




It has been shown that longer terms in office are expected to increase legislator’s incentive and 
thus make them spend more time working for their district. This is due to their re-election 
concerns to ensure they are returned to office.  A distinction must however be made between 
the kind of activities they are engage in during the time spent with constituents. Those contacts 
which is for representational purpose rather than election purpose is what determines the 
success in substantive representation. This form of contact is what can achieve policy goals.   
 
Also, the idea that legislators with resources spend more time engaging in constituency activity 
has been advanced. Parker in his research finds that the reason the amount of time legislators 
spent in their district increased over the years was because of congressional travel allotment.597 
Maestas is also of the view that professionalised legislators have spent more time monitoring 
constituents’ opinion because they have resources to do so. 598 Resources such as staff, office 
budget and being full time legislators can be seen to enable them to spend more time with 
constituents and to represent them better. Other features such as strength of leadership and 
electoral rules seem to have mixed effect on representation as a whole. However, rules that 
make re-election difficult have been found to increase time spent on constituency issues. Time 
spent with constituents makes representatives more visible to constituents and thus enable them 
get their votes.  
 
Based on the above, I expect the following features to increase the time legislators spend on 
constituency activities: small district size, no term limits and availability of resources. The 
effect of strength of leadership and rules governing elections are more ambiguous. In 
examining these effects, the respondents described in Chapter 4 were asked how these features 
affected the time legislators spent engaging in constituency activities. When answering these 
questions, the respondents were given an option of 1-5, 5 indicating more time and 1 indicating 
less time. The same options were given to both the legislators and the constituents to indicate 
how much time they think these features allowed for constituency activity. Their mean 
responses were taken on the 5-point scale and table 6.1 reports the finding.  
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Q In your opinion, how does the following features affect the time legislators spend on 
constituency activity? 
 
Table 6.1   How Constitutional Design affect Time Spent on Constituency Activities 
 
 
Variable features  
Time spent on 
constituency activity 
(Legislators opinion) 
Time spent on 
constituency activity 
(Constituents opinion) 
Small district size 4.4 4.7 
Unlimited term in 
office 
4.3 4.5 
Resource availability 4.5 2.1 
Strong leadership 3.2 3.0 




The finding shows that both parties agree to the fact that small district size and unlimited term 
serve as an incentive for legislators to spend more time engaging in constituency work. In line 
with the earlier literature, this could be due to dyadic relationship that is found in such districts. 
Resources have been argued to have the greatest effect on substantive representation but here 
the results seem to show that there is a significant disagreement with the views of both parties. 
The 1.2 gap between both views may not necessarily be due to the importance of this particular 
feature, but it is mainly due to the lack of accountability for the use of these resources when 
placed at the disposal of the representatives. Constituents may not necessarily disagree with 
the effect of this feature in creating an incentive for constituency activity because resources on 
its own may suffice to encourage representatives spending time on constituency work, but they 
may feel that the lack of accountability makes the representatives behave otherwise.  
 
Consistent with the idea that strong leadership has a negative impact on time spent engaging in 
constituency work, both views indicate that this particular feature would not serve as an 
incentive. Strong leadership may make them stay in chambers more affecting their focus on 
constituency work. Tough rules on election seem to create the most discrepancy in the views 
of both parties. While legislators did not like tough rules on elections, constituents thought 
though rules might make them spend more time on constituency work. Most constituents 
indicated 4 on the 5-point scale with the mean of 4.6 compared to the legislators’ 2.5. Using 
the same body of literature cited earlier, it would make sense to assume that this discrepancy 
suggests a preference for institutional reforms that would hold legislators more accountable. 
This shows a sign of dissatisfaction in the existing structure and that citizens are beginning to 
221 
 
act in ways that indicate they want changes in the institution so that it could put representatives 
under greater scrutiny and control.  Overall it is seen that institutional features determine how 
substantive representation can be achieved. Engaging in substantive representation which is 
the constituency aspect of the legislator’s work is an established culture of any representative 
system. However, its success depends increasingly on those features in the institutional design 
that may enhance it.  
 
6.9 Conclusion  
 
This chapter tried to examine how the different variations in “institutional design” from which 
the legislators act serves as an incentive or a hindrance for them to represent constituents. It is 
expected that by affecting legislators’ ability and incentive to engage in certain actions the 
institution is likely to affect their representational style. The aim is to show that the political 
institutions in which the representatives operate are important political phenomena in 
determining how they represent. It assumes that institutions influence the actions of the 
legislators and although other social factors might affect the legislative behaviour, the argument 
here is that the institution matters and it allows for these other forces that may come into play 
in legislative behaviour.  
 
Five main features were singled out in this analysis; (i) the size of the constituency (ii) term 
limits (iii) resource availability (iv) strength of leadership and (v) election rules. Whereas some 
features particularly those related to professionalism and those that provide resources that 
enable legislators to engage more with constituents were shown to create an incentive to 
represent, others, particularly the electoral features were shown to have conflicting effects on 
their responsiveness and ability to represent. A summary of how each of these features affects 
representation is presented below. 
 
The features that were thought to affect dyadic relationship which is the one on one relationship 
between the representative and constituents were analysed. The size of the district or its 
magnitude was expected to affect the closeness of this relationship. Small district is expected 
to build tighter relationship between the representative and their constituents.599 The Single 
Member District (SMD) design is expected to enhance this closeness. Constituents are expected 
to feel more connected with their representatives as they are more likely to know each other on 
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a personal basis as a result of the small size. On the other hand, in the Multi Member Districts 
(MMD), constituents may not feel that same connection as there may be more than one 
representative and a larger group of people to represent. Since there are more constituents to 
be reached and more areas to cover, they were not as visible as members from the small 
districts.   
 
Members in small size constituencies were shown to be more secure due to their relationship 
with constituents and they tend to guide this relationship and this serves as an incentive for 
them to represent those constituents. According to Jewel, the single member districts make the 
legislator to be more directly responsible to the constituents.600 This fact may make the 
representatives to be more sensitive to the demands of constituents. Also, due to this closeness 
they are shown to have a static ambition but never a discrete ambition. On the whole it was 
shown that, the form of districting clearly affects the focus of representation. Dyadic 
relationship is the critical link in a representative democracy and it is bound to increase the 
odds that representatives serve the interests of constituents.  
 
The length of term in office was also shown to affect legislative representation. The main 
argument was that, this feature would allow more people to serve in the legislature and it would 
enhance accountability. The representatives would face constituents more frequently giving 
them the chance to reward or punish legislators according to how they have served them. 
However, it was shown that, this feature has its implication on how the representative 
represents. Term limited legislators were shown to engage in deliberative style and better at 
legislative decisions than with activities relating to their constituents. They are likely to be 
trustees and pay more attention to broader interests than those of their constituents. This feature 
makes legislators less sensitive to constituents and their preferences as re-election is not their 
focus. Legislators with no term limits were shown to have more time to develop the expertise 
and knowledge of their constituents to be able to serve them better. Since term limits tends to 
weaken the links between the representatives and their constituents it is seen to diminish their 
ability to represent. 
 
The third feature that affects representation is the availability of resources. These are deliberate 
reforms that are meant to increase the capacity of the legislator by making them more 
professional in their job. This includes giving legislators full time salaries in order to make 
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them full time politicians, giving them offices and staff in order to enhance their work and meet 
their obligation to constituents. Resource availability was shown to have a positive effect on 
representational activities. Full time salaries made them focus on their jobs at representing 
constituents and not look for other jobs while the staff enabled them to connect more and keep 
in touch with their constituents. Although, these effects were sometimes mixed and weak, 
especially in the case of Nigeria. On the whole, providing legislators with greater resources 
seems to increase their activities on behalf of constituents. It was shown that, professional 
reform changes legislator’s relationship with constituents, having the resources to represent is 
important as it increases their commitments to constituents and the level of their representation.  
 
The strength of leadership of the legislative assembly was also shown to have an effect on 
representation. While strong leadership is said to give the legislators less time to engage with 
their constituents as a result of the focus on law making and deliberative aspects of the job, 
weaker and more flexible leadership might give them more opportunity to further particular 
interests of constituents as they may have more time to do this. Although this feature was found 
to have some inconsistent results, in the sense that it did not affect factors that were thought to 
affect legislator’s incentives to engage in representative activities, it was shown that it does 
affect their vulnerability. It was argued that weakness in the leadership, especially party 
leadership, tends to foster a sense of constituency among the representatives even though this 
is mainly for electoral gains.   
 
Finally, the rules governing elections were analysed and found to be the most manipulative 
instrument in legislator’s behaviour. The extent to which those rules enhance accountability 
and make the incumbent vulnerable determines the extent to which they can be responsive and 
able to represent. Also, important is how these laws regulate the ease with which they run for 
office. These laws can either impact negatively or positively in the focus of the representative. 
While spending limits increase accountability, contribution limits would decrease the incentive 
for the legislators to be sensitive to constituents. A key aspect that is thought to enhance 
representation are those rules that enhance citizen participation in decision making. Rules that 
uphold standards of ethics, transparency, accountability and efficiency are seen as what would 
ensure the interests of constituents is considered.   
 
In conclusion, the ways in which the different design characteristics in the institution affects 
how the representatives are responsive and represent the interest of their constituents has been 
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considered. Each of these designs have their strengths and weaknesses in the manner in which 
they influence the representatives to be responsive to constituents. By recognising their 
influences, it is possible to reinforce those that strengthen representation and diminish those 
that do not. As Seward rightly puts it, in considering the possibilities of democracy, attention 
should be paid to those devices that singly or collectively enact and define democratic 
principles in ways which offer a richer evocation of those principles.601 
 
Peters notes that the problem with institutionalism is the ‘paradox of constraint’ that affects it. 
Since it is created by individuals, there is a difficulty in realising whether the institutions affect 
the individual’s behaviour or whether it is the individuals that affect the institutions.602 In 
considering this, one has to be objective in realising that the different ways that we arrange our 
political affairs have different implications for the realisation of representation. This is why the 
institutional theory is important. It articulates the feasible constraints that are inherent in any 
democratic system rather than looking at such principles in the abstract. If attention is given to 
the institutional expression of these principles then it can be of help in guiding political 
judgements and actions. Shapiro argues that speculation about what ought to be is likely to be 
more useful when informed by relevant knowledge of what is feasible.603 
 
While recognising the importance of the broader institutional architecture that can be inherent 
in a federal system like what obtains in Nigeria, the approach here is less ambitious as it only 
considers the effects of these five combinations. Consequently, some important aspects of the 
federal system fall out of the scope of this discussion and they may also have important 
consequences for representation in Nigeria. Thus, in considering the barriers to representation 
in Nigeria, it is worth noting that the structural and institutional design though endogenous may 
not account for all or even most of the problem of lack of representation.  
 
Although, the perspective here is that legislators have to try to work on behalf of their 
constituents, this process of representation must be created and re-created through a political 
process of dynamic activity604 and be structured by the institutions in any given society. The 
efficacy of representation is largely dependent on the ethical and cultural factors that are 
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inherent in the institutional design that structure the process of representation, with the 
expectation that it will generally guide the activities within its system. Therefore, before 
legislators can claim that they represent constituents, it is important that they have in place the 








FINAL CONCLUSIONS  
7.1    Introduction  
Puzzled by the nature of representation in Nigeria, this thesis has demonstrated that the 
approach whereby legislators act without considering the interests of constituents results in 
lack of effective representation. Exploring the activities of the legislators, the thesis has 
analysed some of the problems with representation and assessed the extent to which good 
representation can be achieved. The aim has been to increase our understanding of what it 
means for legislators to represent constituents and to identify ways of reducing or perhaps 
overcoming the barriers of poor representation in the Nigerian political system. In doing this, 
the research briefly sketches a brief outline of some of the problem plaguing representation and 
why legislators are unable to achieve this ideal. The reasons for this failure is addressed 
thematically in each of the chapters. This chapter makes an overview of the whole thesis and 
analyses the collective findings that proves the hypothesis. The concluding discussion as well 
as an assessment of how future research can be built on these findings is also discussed here. 
The thesis contributes empirically and theoretically to our understanding of how 
representatives represent their constituencies in Nigeria.  
 
7.2     Outline of Research 
 
In Chapter one, having analysed the concept of representation both historically and in the 
Nigerian context, the thesis went on to evaluate models of representation. Three models of 
representation were analysed (delegate model, trustee model and the responsible party model). 
Unlike the delegate view where representatives act on the instructions of their constituents, the 
trustee view sees representatives as relying on their own initiative. The responsible party model 
on the other hand posits that representatives in acting for constituents will always pursue the 
programmes of the party under whose banner they were elected. The delegate theory seems to 
align itself more to the argument of this research as representatives are thought to act in 
accordance with the wishes of their constituents thereby taking their interests into 
consideration. This model led to the theorising of representation in this thesis in line with the 
view of Pitkin which sums up representation as “acting in the interests of the represented in a 
manner responsive to them”.605 Thus a framework of interest articulation and responsiveness 
is adopted and used as a theme throughout the thesis.  
                                                          




Through the analysis it surfaced that the type of representation that legislators offered to 
citizens is partly a function of their perception of their own role orientation. Most legislators 
tend to think they are representing citizens just by the mere fact that they have been elected 
into positions. This formal authorization 606 as advocated by Hobbes might be the start of the 
representative relationship, but it certainly does not show that the legislator is acting in the 
interest of constituents. This view only tells us a part of the story because formal authority 
alone cannot be coextensive with representation. In the analysis, other definitions were given 
of what it means to represent. These were the symbolic, descriptive and substantive views of 
representation. However, it was shown that among these definitions, what seems to capture the 
very act of representing is the substantive acts of the representatives. The representative must 
be able to act because action is required for them to represent the interests of their constituents. 
This suggests that, action of the legislators is an important point through which their 
representative capability can be assessed.  
 
Thus, a deeper understanding of the concept is had when there is a link between the formal 
authorisation, the symbolism aspects, the descriptive meaning and the substantive acts of the 
representative. In this way, the concept is redefined as an activity which is performed properly 
when it is able to articulate the interests of constituents and be responsive to their preferences. 
The substantive acts of representatives become a practical way in which representation can be 
measured because their deliberate acts are involved. This was made clear in the analysis. The 
argument is that, political conception of representation requires representatives who derive 
their legitimacy of being in office from the people through elections, to advance the policy 
preferences of their constituents (provided, that policy preference is lawful).607 Therefore, good 
representation is that which reflects the presence of the sovereign citizens in the form of not 
just their political actions on Election Day, but their judgement that transcends the actual 
manifestation of their electoral will. This is what allows us to recognise the energetic function 
of representation and enables citizens to hold their representatives accountable.   
 
Nevertheless, in the evaluation of representation in Nigeria, it was shown that, the approach 
taken by legislators where citizens are uninformed about matters that concern their welfare in 
                                                          
606 Hannah Pitkin, ‘Hobbes, Concept of Representation II’, American Political Science Association, (1964) 914 
www.jstor.org accessed 17th August 2015. 
607 Dovi, The Good Representative (n 3) p. 1. 
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the constituency and decisions are taken without due consultation with them to get their 
preferences cannot be in their overall interest. Such representation that is not in the interest of 
citizens cannot be effective representation. The requirement for effective representation is for 
representatives to have some kind of relationship with their constituents where there can be 
continuous interaction and communication between both parties. Representation is thus seen 
as not just a single enterprise, but as having many unique actions and collaborations between 
representatives and constituents. It could involve working on policies, being visible or working 
on an individual’s problem. Legislators may vary in the degree to which they may be active in 
each of these forms of representation. One thing that is certain however is that, they are not put 
in office for themselves. They are there to act on behalf of the people and represent their 
interests. They can only be said to represent if this function is carried out effectively.   
 
The thesis went further to analysed ways that representatives can be made to be more effective 
in representing. The rule of law, ethics and responsibility was brought to play as what can guide 
representatives to effective representation. The extent to which they are able to abide by those 
man-made rules and higher rules coupled with the positive cues that they get from the society 
will determine how well they are able to represent their constituents. Incidentally, what is 
considered as representation in Nigeria seems to be rooted in a deep misconception of what the 
representative role should be. In the prevailing representative system, legislators do not seem 
to act in the interests of the people or the nation. Rather, it is a system for the pursuit of the few 
interests of the elites in the society. This conclusion is reached after examining the actions and 
how decisions are made on behalf of constituents. An evaluation of key legislative action and 
decision making in the implementation of the CDF reveals that they were tainted with political 
patronage and self-service. The CDF which is a government initiative which ordinarily should 
serve as an incentive for legislators to represent their constituency interests by acting on their 
behalf in particular constituency development projects was found to be flawed. Evidence in 
Chapter 4 shows that the implementation of this policy has been without constituents making 
their input or taking part in any form of decision making. Constituents are not informed about 
what projects to be allocated in their constituency district or how these projects are being 
implemented. This has hugely led to the failure of this initiative to meet its policy goals which 
is to meet the development gap in the rural constituencies in Nigeria. This ultimately results in 
a lack of representation of constituents’ interests.  
The inability to articulate the interests of constituents on the part of the representative coupled 
with the inability of the constituents to hold the representatives accountable is seen mainly to 
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be the main cause of the lack of effective representation in Nigeria. This brings us to one of the 
major barriers of representation which was identified as lack of participation. Participation is a 
process through which people influence and share control over development initiatives, 
decisions and resources which affect them. The argument for citizen participation often rests 
on the belief that where citizens are engaged, formulated policies might be more realistically 
grounded in citizens preferences.608 This is not reflected in democratic representation in 
Nigeria. Political representation in Nigeria is rather closed. The people are only told what the 
politicians think they should hear. There is no transparency about policies and citizens lack the 
information that would empower them to hold representatives accountable. For effective 
representation to be achieved, people need to understand the value of their participation and 
shoulder the responsibility of holding government officials to account. This can only be done 
when they are provided with information and education and allowed to participate fully in 
decisions that affect them. Failure to do this means, they will continue to be short-changed and 
any representation following would not be in their interest.  
 
Although the empirical research made it clear that there was dissatisfaction from the citizens, 
on the existing form of representation, constituents seemed to be indifferent. This is due to the 
lack of information and understanding on their part. They do not know what to expect from 
their representatives and this tends to make them powerless and unable to hold them to account. 
It was also shown that though some kind of contact may be found between the legislators and 
the constituents, there was no information given to the constituents as to the use of the CDF 
policy initiative to provide development in their constituency. The legislators believe that as 
elected officers, their actions must be accepted by the constituents and in this perception, they 
fail to meet constituency needs. This can be seen in the lack of concurrence between legislative 
actions and constituency needs in the constituency districts. People’s choices are not reflected 
in the development policies and the result is that development projects provided under the CDF 
are not far reaching and mostly they are of no use to the constituents. This is not in the interest 
of constituents and a legislator that provides such a project fails to represent their constituency 
in that regard.   
 
Furthermore, in determining why representatives fail to represent, one key factor is the 
institutional design under which the representation might be taking place. Having in mind that 
                                                          
608 Renee A Irvin, John Stansbury, Citizen Participation in Decision Making: Is it Worth the Effort, Public Administration 
Review Jan/Feb 2004, 61,1; ABI/INFORM, Global p. 55. 
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representation can only be properly theorised and evaluated when the opportunities and 
constraints of the legislators are taken into consideration. Certain institutional features were 
discussed that could enhance or serve as hindrance to effective representation. They features 
are the size of constituency, term limits, availability of resources, strength of leadership and 
electoral rules. Since the primary justification for a democratic political system is to provide 
arrangements that would enable the interests of citizens to prevail, institutional design that 
upholds the interests of citizens is apparently seen as not a luxury but a necessity to complete 
a transition to a consolidated democracy.609 
 
In line with the above, the literature makes it clear that the size of constituency district and the 
resources available to the legislator play the most positive role in making the representative 
excel in their work.610  However, in evaluating the extent to which these factors enable 
legislators to represent effectively in Nigeria, it was found that, although the legislators 
operated from single member constituencies which were reasonably small and should 
ordinarily serve as a basis for them to have closer contact with their constituents, there was still 
a remarkable distance in the relationship between the representatives and the constituents. 
Legislators were not relating with constituents the way they should. In fact, some constituents 
from the interview stated that, they do not see their representatives until it is time for election 
when they come to rally for their votes. This raises the question as to how a representative can 
represent a constituency he or she does not see. The answer to this is not farfetched, 
representation in Nigeria is not for the interest of the represented, but for the few political class 
and their interests. 
 
Analysing the effect of the availability of resources, legislators in Nigeria were also shown to 
be empowered financially. From the case study, we see that allocations are given to every 
member for use in their constituency. Availability of resources has been shown to have an 
important positive incentive to motivate legislators to represent better.611 However, the 
normative lessons learnt from this thesis is that, if there are weaknesses in the system in 
monitoring the activities of legislators, this incentive can have an adverse effect. This is 
apparent in the discussion on accountability.  
                                                          
609 Hellman Joel S. 1998 “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Post-Communist Transition” World Politics 
50, 203- 234 at 210. 
610 Malcolm E. Jewell, Representation in State Legislators (n 195); Rebekah L. Herrick, Representation and Institutional 
Design, Lexington Books (2011).  




7.3    Findings in Relation to Hypothesis 
 
This section analyses further the findings of this research and critically proves the hypothesis 
stated in the introduction that: for representation to be effective, legislators must act in a manner 
responsive to the preferred interests of constituents. The first aspect in proving this hypothesis 
is that, it brings to the fore representation as an activity which the representatives must do on 
behalf of their constituents. In analysing this activity, the question that is raised is whether the 
approach taken by legislators in Nigeria while acting on behalf of constituents provides 
evidence that their interests is being taken into consideration.  
 
In answer to the above question, perceptions of legislators and constituents were analysed and 
a comparison of both views as revealed in Chapter 4 was that the type of representation 
provided was not grounded in citizens interests. Political writers have attested to the fact that 
the practice of being a representative and the act of representation is not a straightforward 
matter.612 This may be the case in the Nigerian political system because on a casual look, it 
may seem as if representation is taking place. This could also be because after the military 
dispensation and the reinstating of democracy in the country in 1999, there has been successive 
election every four years both at the national and state level to choose candidates who will 
represent their people. Unfortunately, on a closer look, both theoretically and practically what 
is seen in the jurisdiction is far from representation of the interests of the people. The perception 
of the different stakeholders reveals that, the legislators mostly do what they want without 
consulting with their constituents. They mainly believe that they are elected to take decisions 
on behalf of the people and as a result of this, the constituents’ preferences are not reflected. 
This conception of representation strongly reaffirms the notion of lack of representation.  
 
The social culture that builds the attitude of the representatives and the constituents alike and 
the lack of knowledge of what it means to represent works against the establishment of good 
representation in the country.  The perception of representatives has been shown to affect their 
behaviours and this mainly affects their attitude to representation of constituents. Most 
representatives tend to have developed a patron type relationship with their constituents and 
they do not believe in the participation of the people. They do not relate with the people except 
                                                          
612 Scott Brenton, Representative Roles and Responsibilities, Parliament of Australia (2015) p.1  www.aph.gov.au.  
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during elections when they come to canvass for their votes. They tend to see the constituents 
as people whose judgements they cannot trust, and they sometimes see them as rivals of their 
own progress. On the part of the constituents, it was also seen that there is that distrust of the 
representatives. However, what seems frustrating is the attitude and culture of accepting 
everything the representatives do without question. This goes to show that the people are not 
aware of their rights.  
 
It was also found that the peoples’ choices are not reflected in the development programmes 
because of the distance between elected leaders and the mass of the people and decisions made 
are often marred with corrupt practices. This happens to be the case when there is no 
accountability in representation. This research has indicated that people need to be involved in 
the full circle of decision making that affects them and be fully empowered before development 
initiatives like the CDF can be used as an effective tool to represent their interests. This implies 
that people should be involved in the selecting, planning and monitoring of these projects and 
this is how a model of democratic representation which takes the interests of the people into 
consideration can be achieved. 
 
This form of participation seems to be absent in Nigeria. The closest that can be seen of 
people’s participation is a one-off Town Hall meeting in rare instances and this is only among 
a few political loyalties. This goes to show that the representatives are not clear about 
continuous people participation. They tend to think that participation should be confined to a 
specific stage. Even the few that attend the town hall meetings were seen not to be informed 
about the activities of the legislators. Where constituents are not consulted, legislators have no 
way of knowing what their preferences would be and as such they may not be able to act in 
their interests. This was evident in the CDF projects that were allocated in communities. It was 
found that the constituents had no idea of the programme and legislators did what they thought 
would serve the needs of the people without consulting with them. The result was that some of 
these projects were not tackling the pressing needs of the people that they want government to 
address. With continuous participation representative would be more informed of constituency 
needs and avoid the allocation of scarce resources on irrelevant projects that do not meet 
constituency needs. Representatives would also inform constituents about their activities and 
this would not only help in bridging the gaps but also but also make them more responsive to 
constituents’ interests. Blom defines representation as an accountable aggregation of 
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interests.613 This means that, the role of the legislators is not just confined to what they do in 
Parliament, their roles and responsibilities which are done outside the parliament play 
important part in determining how well they represent. Therefore, their activities on behalf of 
constituents is a focus through which their representative capacities can be recognised. It is this 
activity or conception of representation that can serve as a measure of the individual legislator’s 
capabilities and not what they do in conjunction with others while in Parliament.  
 
Another key finding in this research is that institutional features that were ordinarily supposed 
to help representatives in their jobs in other jurisdictions seem to have adverse effect in Nigeria. 
Although there is scarcity of research in this area, from the few available literatures, it was 
made clear that variations in institutional design can affect many aspects of how legislators 
represent their constituents. Legislators with staff and those that have other resources tend to 
engage more with constituents.614 These legislators tend to have greater capacity and due to 
their professionalism, they have more incentive to represent well.  A critical look at the 
Nigerian system reveals that, even though the legislators are empowered with resources as is 
the case with the CDF, due to the lack of checks and accountability, the legislators fail to use 
this policy for the proper representation of constituents’ interests. Like other jurisdictions, 
findings also indicate that shorter term limits weaken relationships between legislators and 
constituents. However, electoral laws, and district size have limited effects. 
 
Overall, the contention here is that the very nature of representation in Nigeria tells us that the 
interests of the constituents are not taken into consideration. The prevailing system of 
representation in any jurisdiction is shaped by its advocates who are themselves formed by the 
political contexts and priorities. The Nigerian political system has a long way to go in eliciting 
the right behaviours from representatives in the discharge of their duties. Effective citizen 
representation can be achieved when representatives are seen to act, and in that activity, get 
citizens involved, allowing them to have a say in what affects them. It is only when this is in 
place that it can be said that they are responsive to the interests of citizens or their interest is 
considered.      
 
 
                                                          
613 H R Blom, ‘Ethos and Interests, Argument for a Representational Differentiation in a Changing Society, in H W Blom, 
WP Blockmans and H de Schepper (ed) (1992) p. 149. 
614  Henrick, (n 518).   
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7.4    Implications  
 
The finding in this research has important implications for the nature of politics in Nigeria. 
Political representation testifies to the fact that although democracy can be explained in terms 
of rules of the game, safeguarding constituents’ interest is not a neutral part of those rules. It 
completes the process by promoting the views and identifying with the represented. While this 
view might seem to defy certain cognitive theoretical approaches to democratic principles, it 
cannot be denied that democratic representation is much more than simple electoral procedures. 
It requires representatives having a proper understanding that the success of their positions 
relies on their connection with citizens to get their views and be informed of their interests so 
that they can represent them better. It also demands an ethical culture of citizenship that enables 
both the representatives and the represented to see their political relationships as not 
antagonistic and the advocacy not as an unconditional promotion of sectarian interest against 
the welfare of the whole. Thus political in the context of representation entails a complex 
process of unifying and connecting citizens by projecting them as stakeholders. It is also primed 
to keep representatives in a perpetual motion where they continue to act on citizens’ behalf, 
but this action is not without accountability.   
 
This view of political representation however seems to be problematic in the Nigerian political 
system. This is because it can hardly be rendered in terms of the representatives actually 
knowing what constituents want or actually doing what is in the interest of constituents. The 
result of this is that people’s expectations and their representatives actions never tend to 
correspond. It is a common thing to see that political actors evade their responsibility to their 
constituents. This is due to the lack of accountability and monitoring in the system to ensure 
that political actors are responsible for their actions or inactions. A system that does not imbibe 
this accountability regime to limit some of the corrupt practices of politicians can only serve 
as an instrument of oppression to the people. If mechanisms are not in place to ensure that 
representatives actually represent the interests of those who elected them, it would result in the 
alienation and exclusion of constituents. The effect of this would be the development of 
cynicism and apathy amongst members of the public or at the very worst the breakdown of the 
political system. This damage can have a long-lasting consequence on the people.  
 
Given the evidence that we have found in this research of the damaging effect of failure to hold 
representative accountable, the CDF policy can be said not to be meeting the purpose for which 
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it was established. But the imperfections and doubts in the process may be corrected if serious 
attention is given to the activities of legislators by condemning and punishing those who 
circumvent the system for their own personal gains. The value of this would be that they would 
become conscious of their activities and that they are being watched and this would account 




In line with this research the following recommendations are made:  
 That Whistle-Blower Protection Bill be passed by Parliament that would enable citizen 
report incidences of corruption that they see in their constituency districts. It would also 
go a long way to check the activities of those who should represent the interests of the 
people.   
 That the Constituency Development Fund Bill be passed into Law with provisions to 
punish implementers who go contrary to its provisions.  
 That a system of monitoring and evaluation be put in place for each project 
implemented to ensure they are completed.  
 That an impact assessment of the projects already sited be done in order to ensure they 
are in line with and meeting the needs of the constituency district where they are sited.    
  
7.6 Future Research  
 
This analysis has made a modest contribution to our understanding of how representatives 
represent constituents in Nigeria. What needs to be explored is how the lack of representation 
by the individual legislator affects the legitimacy of the Parliament as a whole and how the 
activity of legislators affects how the parliament is perceived vis-a-vis other arms of 
government.  Secondly, a function of acting as development agents has gradually become a 
part of parliamentary function. This has great potential, but as shown in this research, it may 
be corruptly used to the advantage of a few at the expense of the constituents.  There is need to 
evaluate the role of legislators in the implementation of projects and social development 
initiative in Africa. A comparative study of their operation in various African countries that 
implement the CDF would give a necessary insight into how they can be positioned as 
instruments to bring about lasting development in the continent, rather than a means of futher 
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plunging their citizens into poverty and widening the gap in the society through the distribution 
scarce resources in the hands of a few political elites.   
 
Furthermore, research into the effective interaction between representatives and interest groups 
is needed. What is seen in some jurisdictions is that parliamentary lobbying by interest groups 
has become a pronounced feature in the political landscape.  This is because these groups have 
the collective capacity to lobby representatives and to bring benefit to members which 
individual constituents may not be able to do. They are influential in interest formation and act 
as useful filters to the different information of the people. As the population continues to grow 
it becomes too large for the representatives to deal with individual constituents, so encouraging 
the creation and institutionalisation of such groups should be seen as a way forward in 
articulating the interests of the people. Given that the activities of these groups are so minimal 
in Nigeria, there is need to encourage their existence as they help in providing a full 
understanding of the working of a political system.  
      
7.7    Conclusion  
 
In this thesis, representation has been portrayed in a more nuanced way than is assumed by 
legislators in Nigeria with a very important aspect having to do with their activities on behalf 
of constituents. The lack of effective representation suggests that legislators need more 
knowledge to equip them in the performance of this important function. Constituents 
necessarily need to scale up their expectations of their representatives and be ready to hold 
them accountable for their actions. This is necessary to enhance democracy in Nigeria and 
would be beneficial to the political system as a whole.   
 
Generally, representatives and constituents have been shown to have limited understanding of 
what it actually means to represent in the political sense and this could be attributed to the fact 
that not much attention has been given to representation as an activity. The review of scholarly 
work confirms that representation as an activity has never received any serious consideration. 
This is not because its importance is not acknowledged, but it may partly be due to the fact that 
it borders on individual behaviour which may present its complexities on examination. 
However, in determining the reason for their being in office, the sole purpose is to represent 
the interests of constituents and to act on their behalf.  As such it is necessary that their actions 
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be continuously held up to scrutiny to ensure that they uphold and preserve the standards of 
democracy.   
 
Mechanisms which encourage legislators to see their time in office as a period of service to the 
constituents and not a time to enrich themselves are advocated to be put in place. In line with 
this, the normative values of accountability and responsibility were established in this thesis. 
This means that the representative must always have reason for what they do and such reasons 
must be guided by citizens’ preferences. They must be willing to give account to their 
constituents for their actions and inform them of decisions they make on their behalf. This 
brings to the fore the fundamental elements of citizen participation that would enable actions 
and decisions of representatives to be grounded in citizens preferences. Liberal democratic 
theory advocates that representatives are meant to reflect the political values of their citizens 
and their popular preferences should control the direction of their actions and policies.615 These 
are elements that should always be attributed to any representative action, so it has the effects 
of keeping a check on legislator’s activities.  
 
Where these are not enforced in a system, then morally preferable ways in which 
representatives can achieve their goals of a particular case of representation is what is 
advocated. To do this, norms are introduced into representative activities and societal values 
come to play a role in the way representatives represent. This is done in a bid to differentiate 
between proper representations of citizens interests from representation that just has to do with 
the mere fact that a person has won the elections and occupying the office of a representative. 
Representation therefore does not just happen because a person is in office, underlining this 
concept is the fact that legislators have an obligation to act for constituents and be accountable 
to them. This is a direct way to measure how well they represent constituents’ interests.   
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